Asia Pacific Multilateral
Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation:
Exploring the Possibilities
 

Edited by
Ralph A. Cossa
 

A Report from the International Working Group on
Confidence and Security Building Measures
organized by the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

Honolulu, Hawaii
December 1996

Chapter 1 || Top

Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Survey of Proposals

Brad Roberts and Zachary Davis

In its inaugural report in autumn 1994, the task force on confidence and security building measures of the U.S. member committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) identified a broad agenda of actions that states within the region might take in their effort to build a regional security community. Among its 17 specific proposals were a number related to nuclear issues, including broadening existing cooperation on nuclear safety, strengthening systems of national export controls on militarily-sensitive items and expanding international cooperation in this area, working toward full implementation of existing global arms control treaties, among them the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and constructing a regional organization to oversee the nuclear fuel cycle.

The task force elaborated such a broad agenda of nuclear-related steps for a number of reasons. In our assessment, regional nuclear developments could be highly corrosive in the long term to the stability that today prevails in much of the region. But the concerns are not just long term: suspicions within the region about the ultimate purpose of nuclear energy programs in a number of countries--principally but not exclusively Japan--already make decisionmakers wary.

The task force’s proposals were aimed at using the foundation of existing regional cooperation to build stronger, more transparent institutions for the future and more common perceptions of shared long-term interests. In calling for enhanced regional cooperation on nuclear energy, the task force is not also seeking an enhanced role for nuclear power generation in the region; indeed, it is concerned with the risks of weapons proliferation that nuclear energy entails.

In its second report of spring 1995, the task force sought to shift the trans-Pacific nuclear debate from its focus on the NPT review and extension conference of April-May to the longer term regional effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as biological and chemical ones, into the region. This report identified the ways in which the improved implementation of global measures combined with complementary regional measures could contribute to regional security. It emphasized particularly the importance of building confidence at a time when the materials, technology, and expertise necessary to build weapons of mass destruction are being rapidly diffused through a globalizing economy.

This second report noted particularly the regional confidence and security benefits that could be generated through greater cooperation on nuclear energy. The relevant trends are quite stark: today, five countries within the region operate approximately 70 nuclear reactors; over the next 10-15 years the number of countries and reactors may well double. The task force report thus called specifically for creation of an ASIATOM. It noted:

In 1995 and 1996 interest in regional nuclear cooperation has intensified considerably. Many institutions have joined the debate including, among others, the Advisory Committee for Energy (which reports to Japan’s MITI), the Asia Society, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California, the Japan National Committee on Pacific Economic Cooperation, Pugwash, the RAND Corporation, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, and the U.S. Department of Energy. More than a dozen proposals have emerged, as varied as their titles: in addition to ASIATOM, there is now PACATOM, PACIFICATOM, APOPUNE (Asia-Pacific Organization for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy) and EARC (East Asian Regional Compact). In April 1996 CSCAP's international working group on CSBMs again visited the subject (with two papers on the subject, as discussed below). The prospect of establishing an organization for nuclear cooperation has attracted growing interest, some support, as well as some pointed criticism.

Purpose

The purpose of this discussion paper is to survey the range of options for improved regional nuclear cooperation in order to facilitate analysis and debate within the region. Current proposals will be described within this larger taxonomy. Neither USCSCAP nor its CSBM task force at this time offer a recommendation as to the particular measure best suited to current and future needs. We note, however, that a number of alternatives seem to have significant drawbacks, while some others seem to offer little promise in building confidence and security in the region.

Possible Scope of Cooperative Activities

Deciding which activities best remain the purview of national governments or corporations and which might usefully be assigned to a common organization is the crux of beginning to decide what type of organization is needed. This section of the paper identifies the range of activities germane to nuclear energy and possible types of cooperation.

Safety Cooperation. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant a decade ago vividly demonstrated that major nuclear accidents unfold across national boundaries and create significant international public health problems while generating substantial political friction. As nuclear power has begun to play a more prominent role in energy production in Asia, national safety programs have been created and some bilateral cooperation is in evidence. But improved international cooperation for safety could offer many benefits.

There are two possible areas of cooperation. One is crisis prevention, where efforts might focus on improved reactor and facility designs and on standardizing operating procedures. The second is emergency responses, where efforts might focus on common training programs, improved sharing of information in time of crisis, and perhaps even regional response teams.

Some such cooperation occurs under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but supplemental forms of cooperation take place in Europe under the aegis of EURATOM and elsewhere on an ad hoc basis.

Energy Cooperation. Regional cooperation on a wide range of energy issues might be conducted under the auspices of a regional energy authority. One possibility would be to establish an energy distribution grid for member states that could supply, utilize, and distribute energy throughout the region. Access to such a regional energy network might ease the apparent desire of some governments to achieve costly energy self reliance. Another possibility would be to conduct joint research and development work on nuclear and/or non-nuclear energy sources, whether coal, oil, natural gas, or renewable resources, as well as energy conservation and environmental protection. Such cooperation could help states in the region to build up diverse energy resources to meet long-term needs.

This form of cooperation is well advanced in North America and Europe and is found sporadically elsewhere in the world. Within Northeast Asia, similar cooperation couuld stem from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation (KEDO), which is building two power reactors in the DPRK to replace Pyongyang’s existing nuclear facilities and helping it to meet interim energy needs.

Research Cooperation. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy remains a top priority of many countries within the region, and not just for electricity generation. A regional fund might be created aimed at providing technical aid for joint research on such uses as medical, agricultural, and scientific applications of nuclear technologies--as well as energy uses. Such cooperation could augment existing technical assistance offered by the IAEA.

Regional Safeguards. Greater transparency in civilian nuclear activities has emerged as a concern and priority in each region where nuclear power has developed. Under the IAEA, visits and inspections are carried out at nuclear facilities that states have declared as part of a so-called safeguards system (such transparency is an obligation of all non-weapon states under the NPT). But in both Europe and Latin America, supplemental safeguards activities have been put in place to meet particular political and security requirements. In each case, the regional approach encompasses the IAEA and its inspections process as an integral partner, though each has done so differently.

As one participant in the Latin American process has observed, "regional inspection arrangements could have the following benefits for other regions: (1) They could be more politically acceptable to the region in question than IAEA safeguards alone...; (2) they could build confidence between participating nations; and (3) regional rivalry could be reduced as states learn more about each other." Reducing the burden on the IAEA so that it can focus on existing problems of compliance could be an added dividend of such regional measures.

Within Southeast Asia, the foundation for such cooperation exists in the recently created Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, which commits states in the region to cooperatively safeguard their nonnuclear commitments by fully implementing IAEA practices and norms and as supported by additional regional control measures, such as fact-finding missions.

Managing the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The nuclear fuel cycle is a topic wrapped in technical esoterica and high politics. The back end of the cycle refers to the nuclear fuels and waste by-products that are removed from nuclear reactors once they have been used. Their safe and secure disposition is a major political, environmental, and security concern within nuclear states, among their neighbors, and for the international community more generally. The ongoing accumulation of spent fuels and radioactive waste is a major reason that the ultimate role of nuclear energy remains in doubt. To date, no politically acceptable long-term solutions have been found and even interim solutions are much debated. The absence of such solutions is a major reason that nuclear energy has fallen into disfavor in the United States. It may have similar repercussions within those Asia-Pacific countries now accumulating such wastes (especially those that project large future nuclear power generation programs) and their neighbors.

Cooperation on the back end of the fuel cycle might take a number of forms. At a minimum, resources and research programs aimed at both short-term and long-term solutions might be pooled and more productively coordinated. Cooperation on temporary and in situ storage, vitrification, transportation, and environmental protection could support this effort. Creation of a regional repository for spent fuel would be more ambitious and perhaps contentious, but could have a major positive impact in alleviating concerns over the safety and security of these materials.

Discussion of the back end of the fuel cycle also invokes questions about the disposition of plutonium, a fissile byproduct of uranium-based nuclear fuels that is recyclable as an energy source. Plutonium poses problems at both the back and front ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, and thus is treated in the following section.

Managing the Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The front end of the cycle refers to the provision and preparation of nuclear fuels. Throughout Asia, such fuels are generally acquired and prepared by commercial industries operating on the international market. This is true elsewhere in the world but is by no means universal. In Europe, EURATOM coordinates fuel purchases with national purchasing entities but it actually owns the fissile materials and is responsible for accounting for their location and disposition at all times.

A fundamental issue relates to the use of plutonium as a fuel. As noted above, plutonium can be recycled as reactor fuel. Indeed, recycling plutonium in this way could conceivably produce more fuel than is consumed, by burning it in special reactors, called breeder reactors. This has led some to hope that nuclear fuel might be permanently renewable and thus the ultimate source of energy independence. This hope has led some countries, including particularly Japan, to make large investments in order to build a future plutonium-based economy. But breeder technology has so far proven unreliable and extremely costly, leading most states originally interested in breeders to abandon their efforts. Today, most countries with nuclear power industries, including the United States, do not engage in plutonium reprocessing for nuclear power. An alternative technical approach, that blends plutonium into uranium fuels (called mixed-oxide or MOX fuels) for burning in commercial reactors, has been explored. But it too has experienced cost and technical difficulties and in any case would produce residual quantities of plutonium and not eliminate them altogether.

Concern about the plutonium economy can also be traced to the fact that plutonium can be recycled not just for energy purposes but also for weapons purposes. As more countries acquire larger quantitites of excess plutonium, fears mount that new nuclear weapon states may emerge and that fissile materials may be stolen by non-state actors and used for terrorist purposes. Moreover, the supply of plutonium is increasing at a relatively rapid rate today, as the nuclear arsenals of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States are being partially dismantled. The possibility that such spent fuel and excess weapons plutonium might be diverted to weapons purposes at some later time explains the widespread opposition to any step that would expand the international plutonium economy--or even sustain it.

Alternative forms of cooperation on the front end of the cycle are thus conceivable. An Asian cooperative program might focus just on the acquisition of uranium and on the monitoring and disposal of spent fuels under high safety and environmental standards. It might also encompass means to use available plutonium for commercial energy purposes. One such approach would embrace the long-term plutonium economy, by creating common recycling facilities and enabling the accumulation, use, and reuse of plutonium stockpiles--whether nationally or by an international organization. Such an approach would have significant implications for security perceptions within and beyond the region. An alternative approach would seek to work away from a plutonium economy, by burning and eliminating excess plutonium stocks by the MOX-option noted above (though, as noted above, this would not eliminate all plutonium; nor does it alleviate the problem of long-term waste disposal).

A detailed summary of possible nuclear fuel cycle issues, a comparative assessment of experience in various regions, and a compilation of relevant documents has been provided by Ed Fei of the U.S. Department of Energy.

A Survey of Current Proposals

The flurry of specific proposals generated over the last couple of years approach this set of tasks and concerns in different ways. As their titles suggest, many of these proposals look to the European experience as a framework for future Asian institutions and procedures. EURATOM provides a useful analogy, but its genesis is tied to a particular historical epoch (post-war reconstruction and integration) and its current fuel cycle rights and responsibilities have been elaborately negotiated with the United States. A detailed comparative analysis of the conditions that gave rise to EURATOM and those that prevail in Asia today has been provided by Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki (Chapter 2), who concludes that "Significant differences between Europe in the 1950s and Asia in the 1990s exist. However, similarities and growing needs justify an ASIATOM scheme based on the EURATOM model." In fact, there are other useful analogies, such as ABACC (the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) and KEDO, as well as the so far negative experience of South Asia in building a cooperative monitoring regime.

Few of the proposals select out solely the least ambitious types of cooperation noted above. Most of the proposals include cooperation on safety, distribution, and research as lesser-included aspects of some larger endeavor. If such endeavors prove too ambitious at this time in the Asia-Pacific, it is important to consider whether separate measures aimed at such cooperation could contribute to regional interests. It seems likely that they would contribute to shared interests in safety and development, although their contribution to the effort to build up a security community over the next decade or two would likely be nil.

One or two of the proposals emphasize the value of international cooperation in promoting public acceptance of nuclear power generation. This is not an interest that is universally shared by Asia-Pacific nations. The United States is hardly alone in the region in emphasizing diversified sources to meet the region's long-term energy needs.

Most of the proposals also identify increased transparency that could be achieved with a regional safeguards system as a valuable adjunct to existing IAEA mechanisms. Such safeguards are described as necessary "to promote the bright side of nuclear power generation while keeping its shadow side under control based on the recognition of nuclear power for peaceful use as an 'international public asset'."

When it comes to the nuclear fuel cycle, the proposals begin to differ substantially, and the debate about them becomes more intense. Different notions about whether or not to incorporate fuel cycle activities into a regional cooperative approach, and if so at what end of the fuel cycle and with what role for plutonium, have produced quite different ideas about the nature of the organization that might be created, its membership, and the future role of the Asian nuclear sector in the global context.

A cooperative regional approach to the back end of the fuel cycle has been proposed by Professor Atsuyuki Suzuki of the University of Tokyo, in which he details two new mechanisms of collaboration. One would focus on the construction and operation of an international facility for immediate storage of spent fuel produced within the region, named the East Asian Collaboration for Intermediate Storage (EACIS). The other would focus on constructing and operating an international facility for research on geological disposal, named the East Asian Collaboration for Underground Research (EACUR). The former would be made available for the intermediate storage of civil-used spent fuel and would not be available for the permanent or final storage of fuels or for military-used fuel. The latter would be devoted to the research and development of technologies related to geological disposal.

A cooperative regional approach to the front end of the fuel cycle has been proposed by Ambassador Ryukichi Imai. He recommends the construction of joint facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium use as well as agreements on quality control and safety.

Proposals that integrate a full spectrum of fuel cycle measures with other safety and safeguards steps have been offered by a number of analysts. USCSCAP member Robert Manning proposed in spring 1996 creation of a PACATOM organization that would facilitate cooperation on safety, safeguards, security, and spent fuel management, but whose primary focus would be a joint U.S.-Japanese anti-plutonium initiative (Chapter 3). He called for Japan to dedicate a MOX-burning reactor to PACATOM, to reduce existing stocks of excess plutonium.

A separate PACATOM concept has also been proposed by William Dircks, head of the non-proliferation office of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He emphasizes safety and nonproliferation as the twin functions of an Asian regional nuclear organization. He notes the utility of different fuel cycle arrangements for different subregions, given the different role currently played by nuclear energy in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and among the Pacific island states. Dircks proposes a gradual build-up of functions.

Subregional variants on the fuel cycle also feature in the proposal by Professor Kumao Kaneko. He notes that in Northeast Asia nuclear developments have reached the point where problems at the back end of the fuel cycle loom large, whereas in Southeast Asia the challenges relate to building the basic infrastructure. With regard to reprocessing, he notes the likely reluctance of the United States to consent to reprocessing in Korea. He proposes creation of an Asia-Pacific Organization for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (APOPUNE), organized along regional centers. He also envisions an evolutionary process.

An East Asian Regional Compact (EARC) has been proposed by Jor-Shan Choi of Stanford University and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. EARC would have as its objectives: economic cooperation, proliferation resistance, radioactive waste disposal, and nuclear safety. It envisions a mix of safeguards and fuel cycle services tailored to the needs of the subregions.

The Path Ahead

These various proposals, and others that might conceivably follow, entail quite different notions of scope, membership, and timing. The choices confronting Asia-Pacific nations seeking stronger nuclear cooperation are numerous. From the point of view of these two authors, the following points stand out as particularly salient in making those choices.

First, a step-by-step approach makes more sense than bold new stroke at this time. Setting too ambitious a goal could result in failure, thus setting back the effort to build a regional security community.

Second, doing nothing makes little sense as well. There are common and near term problems that require solutions--especially problems of safety standardization and interim storage of radioactive materials. Concerns about inadequate transparency in existing weapons programs already reinforces anxieties about the long-term evolution of relations among major and minor powers within the region. Existing patterns of cooperation within the region are not sufficient to meet these demands.

Third, new forms of regional cooperation should engage only in activities consistent with the NPT and the statute of the IAEA. Activities not safeguarded by the NPT and IAEA should not be undertaken by a regional organization. A regional approach should be viewed not as an alternative to the global mechanism but as a complement to it, just as in Latin America and Europe. Both KEDO and SEANWFZ have these purposes in mind.

Fourth, different approaches within the two major subregions seem to make sense. Within Southeast Asia, where nuclear energy remains a planning issue, there is an opportunity to set in place practices, procedures, and institutions aimed at safe, transparent, and proliferation-resistant nuclear industries. Within Northeast Asia, early priority should be given to spent fuel management. A cooperative approach to both short- and long-term challenges related to the disposition of radioactive fuels and other waste materials could pay large political and security dividends for Northeast Asia. This is a problem faced by nuclear energy producers as well as their non-nuclear neighbors in the region. It is also a problem where the United States has real equities--both something to give and something to gain. It should be noted, however, that agreement on the desirability of regional reprocessing of plutonium, even the MOX-based approach, would likely be difficult to achieve. There is a widespread belief that the diffusion of plutonium extraction capabilities would have serious negative implications for nuclear nonproliferation.

Endnotes

Chapter 2  || Top

Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (ASIATOM)

by Tatsujiro Suzuki

Background and Objective

The prospect for rapid increase in energy demand in the Asia-Pacific region has driven many countries to develop nuclear power. Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea )and Taiwan have already had significant nuclear power programs, followed by China and possibly by Indonesia and Thailand. Meanwhile, primarily triggered by the suspected secret nuclear weapons program in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), there is an increasing concern over possible nuclear proliferation in the region. Similar conditions existed in Europe during the 1950s when the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was created. Therefore, there has been an increasing discussion about a "EURATOM-type" regional cooperation scheme in the Asia-Pacific region (so-called, "ASIATOM"). However, specific contents and framework of such a regional scheme are not yet clearly defined. What aspects of EURATOM can or cannot be applied to the possible Asian scheme? Are there any needs/benefits or costs of creating a regional scheme like EURATOM in the region? This paper attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the history of EURATOM and current conditions in the Asia-Pacific region.

Original Goals and Achievements of EURATOM

History: Origin of EURATOM. In order to understand the original motivations of EURATOM, we have to look at political and economic conditions surrounding Europe in the 1950s. There were increasing tensions between the U.S. alliance in Western Europe and the Soviet Union. It was the beginning of the Cold-War era. The Soviet Union already tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, and the U.S. had started the "Marshall Plan" to redevelop Western European economies. The political as well as economic integration of Western Europe was one of the priorities for the U.S. alliance to cope with the potential threat from the East.

In 1950, the first significant multinational community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was established. The ECSC was a "turning point" in terms of community building in Western Europe, since it created a "High Authority" whose decision was binding over each nation’s policy. It was believed to be the first supranational organization that has a strong political authority over the member countries. Between 1951-54, Western Europe tried to create a "European Defense Community (EDC)", under which a joint European Army was envisioned. However, this did not succeed mainly because the European Army under the supranational organization was still too sensitive to deal with at that time.

Meanwhile, in 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower made a famous "Atoms for Peace" speech at the U.N., leading to the new era of peaceful use of nuclear power. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed U.S. industry to develop nuclear power technologies for peaceful use and to expand its activities overseas. At the same time, there were concerns over future availability of oil which led to many nations seeking peaceful nuclear power technologies as well as nuclear fuel, i.e. uranium that was also considered a scarce resource. Those concerns led to the development of a regional organization specializing in nuclear power. The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) concept was developed along with the concept of the European Economic Community (EEC) between 1955 and 57. Both the EURATOM and EEC Treaties were signed in 1957, and EURATOM came into force on January 1, 1958. The original members of the EURATOM were Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

Motives and Goals behind EURATOM

There are different motives and goals among participating members. Key countries to be noted here are France, Germany, the U.S., and the U.K. However, in summary there were two major goals, nuclear non-proliferation and the establishment of a civilian nuclear industry in Europe. In addition, it is important to point out that the efforts to establish EURATOM helped to improve confidence building in the region, after the failure of EDC.

Non-proliferation in Western Europe. The U.S.efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons started immediately after the end of World War II. The initial proposals made in 1946, such as the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report" and the "Baruch plan", aimed at creating an international organ which had strong authority over nuclear activities and materials. Rejected by the Soviet Union, the U.S. took a unilateral approach by passing the MacMahon Act (1946), i.e. in principle denying nuclear technology transfer to other countries. This denial policy upset allies like the U.K., France, and Canada. Despite this "denial" policy, the proliferation of nuclear weapons occurred as the Soviet Union (1949) and the UK (1952) developed their own nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the difficulties of containing nuclear technologies, the U.S. shifted its non-proliferation policy from "denial" to "control through peaceful use of nuclear technologies." The "Atoms for Peace" proposal was based on the idea that by supplying U.S.technologies and materials the U.S. can control other countries’ nuclear programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established for both promoting peaceful use of the atom and "safeguarding" technologies.

In Western Europe, the countries of concern were France and Germany. A significant nuclear weapon program was already underway in France. France and Germany were worried about each other, and the smaller nations in the region were also concerned about those two nations. The primary non-proliferation objective of EURATOM was contain these two countries in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was uneasy about EURATOM since it could strengthen nuclear capability in Western Europe. This East-West rivalry as well as concern within Western Europe were the important political background to facilitate the establishment of EURATOM. These were the primary reasons for the U.S. to give early support to EURATOM.

Development of civilian nuclear industry in Europe. The "Atoms for Peace" policy announced in 1953 was a turning point for the U.S. and the rest of the world in terms of development of civilian nuclear industry for energy production purposes. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act allowed U.S. nuclear suppliers to be engaged in nuclear technology transfer to other countries. More importantly, the Act allowed the release of nuclear material (uranium) as nuclear fuel which was considered scarce at that time.

Triggered by the Suez crisis in November 1956, Western European nations faced an "energy crisis" due to concern over supply security of conventional fuels (mostly oil and coal). The foreign ministers of EURATOM countries appointed a three-man commission to study the role of nuclear power in meeting increasing energy demand. The commission’s report, known as the "Three Wise Men Report," concluded that there were urgent needs for new energy sources and recommended that the Community undertake in cooperation with the U.S. to establish a sizable nuclear reactor development.

At that time, it was considered essential for European nations to get access to U.S. nuclear materials and nuclear technologies. In addition, among European nations, it was considered important to jointly develop their nuclear power industry as a part of economic integration of Europe. It was also beneficial for U.S. vendors to get access to the growing European market. Therefore, EURATOM was mutually beneficial for European nations and the U.S.

EURATOM as a Catalyst to Improve Confidence Building. The third, but not the least objective of establishing EURATOM was to improve confidence building within the region. It was important to point out that the failure to establish EDC set the stage to establish EURATOM. During the EDC debate, it was the French rejection that led to the collapse of the proposal. The EDC raised questions about the national identity in France, but more importantly, also raised the question of West Germany’s post war rearmament. European nation were concerned about potential conflicts between old rivalries, Germany and France. The proponents of EDC were eager to come back to create another European organization in order to dissipate such regional concern. A few months after the defeat of EDC, fresh efforts were underway to "inject new life into the European movement."

Thus, the efforts to establish EURATOM had a more ambitious, long-reaching goal to create a truly integrated European organization. The regional dialogue and efforts to establish the EURATOM and the EEC were important to improve confidence within the region, in particular after the defeat of the EDC concept. In 1957, both the EEC and EURATOM Treaties were signed and as of January 1, 1958, the EURATOM Treaty came into force. The first signatory countries were, France, FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

Regional Safeguards Systems

Early History. Those original goals and motivations led to the creation of a unique concept of regional safeguards. The original concepts of safeguards, such as material accounting and inspection, were developed by the U.S., and was introduced through bilateral agreement between the U.S. and individual recipient countries like Japan. It was an essential condition of technology and material transfer to non-nuclear weapon states to assure they would be used only for peaceful uses. But the IAEA safeguards system was not fully developed yet at that time. When the U.S. and EURATOM started the negotiation of safeguards, it was EURATOM that proposed its own regional safeguards system.

Why did EURATOM nations want to establish a regional safeguards system, instead of U.S. inspection or under-developing IAEA safeguards system? The main motivation was commercial, i.e., they thought that the U.S. inspection rights could be too intrusive, and they wanted to avoid far-reaching access to their own nuclear facilities by inspection officials from the U.S.(or from nations outside Europe in the case of IAEA). The U.S. and the IAEA were originally concerned whether independent regional safeguards system could be trustworthy.

In order to get U.S.confidence, EURATOM regional safeguards, mostly modeled on U.S.bilateral safeguards requirements, had somewhat stronger rules than the IAEA safeguards currently employed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One of the most important aspects of EURATOM safeguards was strong authority given to the EURATOM Agency, modeled from ECSC. There were several important Articles to define the uniqueness of EURATOM safeguards.

Article 81 specifies that EURATOM inspectors "shall at all times have access to all places and data and to all persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal with materials and equipment or installations." Article 81 was based on U.S.bilateral safeguards concept, and is applied to all member countries, even to Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) such as France and the UK. Under the NPT/IAEA safeguards, NWS have no obligation to accept safeguards (voluntary submission). This "universality" nature is one unique aspect of EURATOM safeguards.

On the other hand, Article 84 contains a so-called "defense clause" which excludes materials intended for military use from the safeguards. Article 84 says that "the safeguards may not extend to materials intended to meet defense requirements." This clause was inserted primarily because of French debate before joining EURATOM. France did not want to close the option to use nuclear materials for defense purposes, which they finally exercised in 1960. While the NPT/IAEA safeguards do not allow non-NWS to be engaged in any military activities, EURATOM safeguards do not prohibit the military use of nuclear materials.

Finally, Article 86 specifies the legal ownership of special fissile materials, i.e. plutonium-239, uranium-235 and uranium-233. Article 86 says; "Special fissile material(SFM) shall be the property of the Community. The Community’s right of ownership shall extend to all special fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member State." This provision is also similar to the one originally included in the U.S.legislation, and was similar to the original U.S.proposals such as the Baruch plan. It is important to note here that EURATOM safeguards distinguish SFM from ores and source materials. EURATOM has exclusive ownership to those SFM, but has only the right of option to other nuclear materials. Article 80 also says that the Commission may require that any excess special fissile materials recovered or obtained as by-products and not actually being used or ready for use shall be deposited with the Agency or in other stores which are or can be supervised by the Commission.

In essence, EURATOM made its regional safeguards system as close as to the original U.S.proposals which envisioned strong international authority over nuclear materials and activities. In return, the regional safeguards system provide a useful mechanism for Europe in

order to limit U.S.intrusions into Europe’s nuclear affairs. U.S.rights of intervention ended at the Community’s external frontier, so long as the security commitments were honored.

EURATOM and IAEA/NPT Safeguards. When the NPT came into force in 1970, the IAEA and EURATOM negotiated to reach the safeguards document (INFCIRC/193) which is designed specifically to accommodate the respective safeguards demands of both the IAEA and EURATOM. The key features are detailed below.

First of all, both organizations are responsible for collating safeguards information in the EURATOM, i.e. routine inspection is done by both EURATOM and the IAEA (Article 72). In practice, however, IAEA inspectors participate in about 50% of all EURATOM inspections. Second, the inspection would take place under the concept of the principle of "observation", i.e. the EURATOM reports nuclear material movements and inventories to the IAEA under the Verification Agreements between the IAEA, the Community, and the member states. For special inspection, there is no limitation for the IAEA.

For sensitive facilities that involve large quantities of fissile materials, such as reprocessing, enrichment and plutonium fuel fabrication plants, the IAEA and EURATOM agreed that the "principle of observation" would not apply. The two organizations would form joint teams (with a slightly larger EURATOM team) to inspect such facilities.

Although this "joint team" arrangement has worked well so far, the "principles of observation" often creates both duplication and conflicts since there are gray zones of overlapping responsibilities. In order to achieve more effective safeguards arrangements, the IAEA and EURATOM agreed in 1992 to implement a New Partnership Approach (NPA). The new features include the following:

• improving cooperation during the planning of and carrying out of inspections;

• pooling resources, to the extent possible, for inspectors training, procurement of materials, shared analysis, development of instruments, etc.;

• once implemented, the IAEA will reduce its inspection effort in the non-NWS of EURATOM countries by more than 50% (compared with 1990) and this reduction will be more than at places where a regional safeguards system does not exist.

As a result of these new approaches, the burden of IAEA is expected to be reduced significantly. This regional safeguards concept was also applied to Japan. Japan demanded a similar safeguards arrangement as a condition to ratify the NPT. The agreement signed in 1973 was very similar to the EURATOM agreement, with the important exception that Japan will only be granted when Japan set up and maintains a national safeguarding system (that is as effective and "functionally independent" as that of EURATOM.) Japan established a "Nuclear Material Control Center" to satisfy this condition.

US Acceptance (Concession) of EURATOM Regional Safeguards. It was crucial for EURATOM to be successful to get early acceptance from the U.S. It is important to understand why the U.S. accepted the EURATOM concept, in particular the regional safeguards system.

Security concerns about the Soviet Union, NATO integration, and containing France/Germany were major political motivations for the U.S.

In addition, the U.S. commercial interest was an also important factor. By reaching the agreement with EURATOM, the U.S. was able to secure the majority of the Western European market for both reactors as well as enrichment services through which the U.S. can exercise political control over recipient countries.

It is interesting to note that at that time the U.S. was much less concerned about reprocessing and plutonium use than enrichment technologies. The U.S. refused to provide enrichment technologies, but did not restrict reprocessing of spent fuels. On the contrary, at that time, plutonium recycling was encouraged by the U.S. to save the scarce uranium resource. And plutonium from civilian spent fuels (reactor-grade plutonium) was thought to be not useful for manufacturing a nuclear bomb. Therefore, the U.S. did not impose "case-by-case" approval right for reprocessing within the EURATOM region, unlike other bilateral agreements such as the one with Japan. This exclusion of U.S.approval right of reprocessing became the major obstacle in renewing the US-EURATOM agreement negotiations in 1994-95.

So, at the end, the U.S. made some concession to get the EURATOM scheme going for both security and commercial interests. It is important to remember those U.S.interests and motivations in early days of EURATOM.

Given the recent difficulties experienced between EURATOM and U.S.during the negotiation of the US-EURATOM agreement, it may be unlikely for the U.S.to accept any similar regional scheme to reduce U.S.influence over sensitive activities.

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

Conflicts in Reactor Development. Regarding the civilian nuclear side, EURATOM countries did succeed in getting access to U.S.technology and materials, while limiting U.S.influence within the region. However, commercial conflicts among member countries, in particular Germany, France and the U.S., prevented the successful integration of technological development in Europe.

First, France refused to provide its gas-graphite reactor (GCR) technologies to other European nations. The US-EURATOM agreement, signed in 1958, provided the other member nations with U.S.light water reactor (LWR) technologies as well as cheap enriched uranium fuel. In the early 1960s, construction of LWRs by Italian, German, and Belgian-French manufactures began. By the early 1970s, France also adopted U.S.LWR technology, giving up its indigenous

GCR technology. It became clear by then that the LWR would be the dominant reactor type in Europe (and the rest of the world).

Then the oil crisis came in 1973. In 1974, the U.S.Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) changed its enrichment contract policies which led to European plans to develop their own enrichment capacity within Europe. Primarily because of the competition between France and Germany, two enrichment enterprises were established instead of a single European enrichment enterprise. URENCO was based on German technologies and EURODIF was created led by France. As the LWR market was growing rapidly, French, German, and U.S.LWR vendors started to compete with each other outside the European market. Both the German vendor (KWU) and the French vendor (FRAMATOME) terminated their license contracts with the U.S.vendor (Westinghouse:WH) to compete independently in the world market. Both vendors won contracts in various parts of the world, such as in Brazil, Argentine, Pakistan, S. Korea, and even in China.

In the end, each country developed its own nuclear industry and competed with each other using similar technologies transferred from the U.S. Commercial integration of nuclear industry originally envisioned under EURATOM was never achieved. In fact, it can be concluded that EURATOM was not justifiable if it was only for technological and economical reasons:

"Looking at the hard economic and technical facts, one actually finds very little justification whatsoever for the existence of EURATOM."

Some Notable Success. However, multinational collaboration did lead to some successful international ventures such as URENCO and EURODIF, both of which are successful enrichment corporations. International cooperation in fast breeder reactor development was considered success until mid-1980s when several countries decided to withdraw. Their collaboration still exists as a form of "European Fast Reactor (EFR)" project, which is currently led by French effort. There is also a German-French collaboration on European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR), although this is a commercial venture between two companies (Framatome and Siemens) rather than the European efforts. Research laboratories and institutes established by the Treaty in various countries so far did not play major roles in developing advanced nuclear technologies. Still, they may provide useful examples of "shared and coordinated R&D programs" under the regional treaty. Currently, the joint R&D programs on actinide recycling and transmutation are good examples of such programs funded by the Community.

And, more importantly, large reprocessing facilities in the UK and France have become a de-facto regional fuel cycle center in Europe. Since the cancellation of the Wackersdorf reprocessing project in Germany, they are the only commercial size reprocessing facilities in the region. Although both proliferation and environmental concern still remain, existence of both facilities could become beneficial if they can provide regional long term spent fuel storage as well as possible plutonium storage capacity. This would eliminate future expansion of reprocessing capacity as well as Pu stockpile in other countries in the region.

Lessons from EURATOM

Based on the above analysis, it is important to summarize the overall benefits and costs of EURATOM as lessons for a future regional scheme like ASIATOM or PACATOM.

First, the primary motivation and its justification of EURATOM was political, although commercial interests did play important roles in formulating EURATOM, as noted by Nau:

"EURATOM’s origins and evolution would be eminently political, i.e. affected more by relational or contextual considerations than economic and technical factors." Security interests against the East bloc and the motivation toward political integration of Europe were the primary driving forces to establish EURATOM (and the EEC). A regional safeguards system was useful then for both Europe and for the US, as the IAEA safeguards were still underdeveloped. The efforts to establish the EURATOM in 1950s helped to enhance confidence building in the region.

Second, EURATOM as a means to develop civilian nuclear industry in the region did not succeed well. However, regional scheme provided some benefits to both European and U.S.nuclear industry. In particular, the EURATOM limited U.S.intrusion into European territory which could be viewed as "failure" by the U.S. Some multinational collaboration also led to successful international ventures within Europe.

Third, potential sources of conflict remain in the field of civilian reprocessing and plutonium policies. Originally, the U.S.put lower priority on controlling reprocessing, but this subject has become the one of the most sensitive issues between EURATOM and the U.S.government.

Asia-Pacific Similarities and Differences

There are important similarities and significant differences between the current Asia-Pacific region and EURATOM during the 1950s. Some can be considered favorable, but some of them are considered not favorable for establishing a regional scheme.

Political Background and Security Interests. First, the political background in the Asia-Pacific region now is quite different from that in Europe in the 1950s. The end of the Cold War has reduced East-West tensions which were the primary motivations behind EURATOM. On the other hand, there is an increasing momentum within the Asia-Pacific region toward economic and political integration such as the establishment of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization. Although APEC is a much looser regional framework than the EC, the general trend in the region is favorable for establishing a regional scheme.

Second, there are differences and similarities in security relationships among the countries in the Asia-Pacific region now and those in Europe in the 1950s. The Cold War is over and the U.S.is no longer concerned about the Russian threat. There may be less incentives for political integration within the region against external threats. However, there are similar conditions. There are concerns about possible regional conflicts such as the ones between China and Taiwan, and the one on the Korean Peninsula. During the 1950s, similar concerns did exist between West and East Germany, as well as France and Germany. The relationships between Japan and the victims of Japan’s military aggression during World War II have not completely healed. Neighboring countries are still concerned about Japan’s growing military capability. Chinese increasing military presence also is a major concern among nations in Asia. In Europe in the 1950s, similar concern existed toward Germany by neighboring countries. In a sense, there is a clear and increasing need for confidence building in the region, which itself can justify the efforts to establish a regional scheme as was the case for the EURATOM.

Nuclear Proliferation. The indefinite extension of NPT, along with the NWS’ commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cutoff Convention, made the big difference in the nuclear proliferation picture between now and the 1950s. The global non-proliferation regime is now much more mature and solid, and most countries(except China, India, and Pakistan) in the region accept full scope safeguards under the NPT regime. However, there are new and significant proliferation issues emerging in the region. Most notable is the revelation of a suspected secret nuclear program in North Korea. Recent establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) under the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, can be a good model for future regional cooperation in containing proliferation.

Other concerns come from expected expansion of civilian nuclear power programs that could bring potential nuclear weapon capability in the region. For example, Japan’s plutonium programs have raised significant concerns within the region. Despite Japan’s efforts to increase the transparency of the program and its "no plutonium surplus" policy, its potential weapon capability is becoming a target of concern among the neighboring countries. More importantly, it is suggested that other nations in the region might follow Japan’s plutonium programs. For example, China recently announced that it would build 50 tons/y reprocessing plant by 2000, and 400-800 tons/y plant by 2010 or so. Japan, in addition to the existing Tokai (90 tons/y) reprocessing plant, is planning to complete its first commercial size (800 ton/y) plant in Rokkasho around 2003 or so. South Korea and China are also expressing interest in development of breeder reactors.

With regard to safeguards, the revelation of secret nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea has increased the concern about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. Additional burdens are likely to come from expanding civilian plutonium programs, as well as safeguarding the excess fissile materials resulting from nuclear disarmaments by the superpowers. Given zero-growth budget constraints, the IAEA safeguards system needs help to improve its effectiveness.

Civilian Nuclear Power Development. Unlike the 1950s, the global nuclear market is now well established and access to both technologies and nuclear materials are no longer the issue. More importantly, the U.S. is no longer the dominant supplier of nuclear technologies, materials, and enrichment services.

However, there are several important factors that could justify regional cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear power in the region. In fact, East Asia is the only region in the world where steady expansion of nuclear power is expected. As of 1995, the total global nuclear capacity is 344 GWe, out of which only 16% (57 GWe) is in Asia (including South Asia). By 2010, this share is expected to increase to almost 30%. 80% of the growth during that period (70 GWe out of 93 GW) is expected to happen in Asia (See Table-1).

This expected high demand for nuclear power primarily comes from increased energy demand in the region and concern over future adequate supply of fossil fuels as well as environmental concern resulting from increased consumption of fossil fuels. This itself may justify regional cooperation on energy and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. This situation resembles the energy situation in Europe in the 1950s. Please note here that most of the growth of nuclear capacity is expected to happen in Japan, China, and South Korea.

Expansion of nuclear power in Asian countries increases the potential needs for regional cooperation. In particular, safety, waste (spent fuel) management, and advanced technologies are the major common issues that all nuclear nations are facing. Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry(MITI)’s Advisory Council published a report in 1995 whose primary conclusions are; [1] increased dialogue on nuclear safety, operation and spent fuel/waste management, [2] tighter controls consistent with international regulation, and [3] "one-set supply on safety"- both hardware and software need to be transferred. In a recent 7th International Conference for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia, sponsored by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, 9 countries agreed to add "safety culture" as a new agenda for the next conference.

Possible Adaptation of the EURATOM concept

Recently, there have been various proposals made by Japanese as well as other experts for a regional cooperation scheme in peaceful use of nuclear power in the region, many of which referring to EURATOM as a possible model and Japan as a possible leader to take such initiatives.

Let’s examine two broad goals of regional schemes which EURATOM originally pursued, i.e. nuclear non-proliferation and civilian nuclear power development, in order to assess potential applicability to the Asia-Pacific region.

Nuclear non-proliferation. The primary non-proliferation goal of EURATOM was to contain proliferation within the region. This was important for both members of EURATOM and countries outside (especially for the U.S.). Similar interests exist for the current Asia-Pacific region. More importantly, the needs to improve confidence building in the region are evident.

In order to enhance regional confidence, EURATOM safeguards can be modified and adjusted to the Asia-Pacific regional scheme. Some of the features worth considering are:

All of the above features can bring considerable benefits over the existing NPT/IAEA safeguards regime. In addition, a regional safeguards system can be built on experiences at Japan’s Nuclear Material Control Center. Current discussion on an "International Plutonium Management" scheme can also incorporate regional safeguards, including the materials from military programs if necessary. In addition, Japan’s voluntary non-proliferation policy, such as increased transparency, can be a good model for all countries to adopt in the region. Cooperation with existing regional safeguards regime such as EURATOM is also advisable.

On the other hand, there is a potential concern about credibility of regional safeguards. The U.S.may not accept the regional scheme easily, if it would reduce or weaken its influence over the activities in the region, or if the regional scheme is designed to allow expanded reprocessing and plutonium programs without U.S.control. However, the U.S.may support such a regime if there are significant non-proliferation benefits such as described above. It is important to assess whether potential benefits are large enough for the U.S. to accept the regional scheme.

Other concerns would be the membership of the regime. Taiwan may not be able to join if China joins. Whether non-NPT countries such as India and Pakistan should join is another important issue. Dealing with North Korea could be also sensitive, although the KEDO framework could be a good base for the possible ASIATOM regime.

Potential for civilian nuclear cooperation. The experiences of EURATOM suggest that regional integration of nuclear industry may be too ambitious, and there is no such need here. Access to uranium is also not an important issue. It is important to note that technical and economic reasons only may not be good enough to justify a regional scheme (as EURATOM lessons suggest).

Meanwhile, there are common issues that all countries with nuclear power programs are facing, i.e., radioactive waste (spent fuel) management, nuclear safety, and advanced nuclear R&D. For example, a new cooperative scheme to solve the radioactive waste issue can be an interesting goal. One specific short term goal is to develop a regional spent fuel storage facility. This would also help to reduce pressure on utilities and reduce unnecessary reprocessing. In the longer term, a possible regional fuel cycle center can be envisioned if such needs arise in the future.

Establishing a common nuclear safety culture is another important goal. One accident in any country in the region could seriously affect all nuclear programs in the region (or beyond). Japan can certainly play an important role in expanding "safety culture" in the region. Safety culture can include the precision needed to have effective physical protection, material accounting and environmental monitoring which is also useful for non-proliferation purposes. There are various international laws and conventions regarding nuclear safety, safeguards, liability, and waste (Table -2). It would be useful for all member nations in the region have to consistent standards, regulations, and agreements in meeting those international regulations.

Coordinated efforts on advanced nuclear R&D can be another potential area, although EURATOM experiences suggest this would be very difficult if commercial interest and national prestige are involved. However, it is worthwhile to consider joint R&D programs to develop the next generation of advanced reactors including breeders. This would help standardize the future reactor market in the region, and would increase the transparency of research programs in member countries.

Concern for future energy security and environment protection can be addressed not only by nuclear power but by other means. In fact, both the APEC meeting and the World Energy Conferences recently held in Japan addressed much broader issues than nuclear power. Such regional cooperation would help satisfy both energy security and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

Conclusions

There are significant differences between EURATOM in the 1950s and the Asia-Pacific region now. However, there are some similarities and growing new needs that could justify a regional scheme like ASIATOM.

In particular, the ASIATOM concept could bring substantial benefits in enhancing confidence building within the region and improving safeguards. For example, the universal nature of EURATOM safeguards can be attractive in improving safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States. The concept of "legal ownership of fissile materials" could be useful for management of surplus materials. A regional safeguards system complementing IAEA safeguards could also reduce the burden on the IAEA.

There are also potential benefits in coordinated efforts to solve common issues for civilian nuclear power development in the region. For example, sharing "safety culture" and coordinated efforts to solve spent fuel management issues could be beneficial. Coordinated R&D efforts to solve emerging energy and environmental issues could be another potential area of interest. However, it is important to note that economic and technical needs only may not be good enough to justify a regional scheme, as the EURATOM lessons suggest.

In sum, the efforts to establish some kind of regional scheme are worth pursuing. In order to establish such a scheme, though, acceptance by the U.S. is essential. Early dialogue and coordinated efforts among interested parties are desirable. In particular, Japan, along with the U.S., can play a leading role in helping expand a "safety culture" as well as a "non-proliferation culture" in the region.

Table 1: Nuclear Power Programs in the Asia-Pacific Region
(Gwe)
 

	1995	2000	2005	2010
Japan	39.7	42.9	54.0	66.5
S. Korea	8.2	13.7	18.7	22.1
Taiwan	4.9	5.1	7.7	7.7
China	2.1	2.7	5.3	25.0
India	1.7	3.3	3.8	3.8
Other	0.1	0.1	1.4	1.4
Asia Total	56.7 ( 16.5%)	67.8 (18.3%)	90.9 (22.5%)	126.5 (28.9%)

N. America	115.9	115.9	116.6	107.6
W. Europe	123.5	129.3	128.5	129.1
E. Europe	43.7	52.2	62.1	66.2
Others	4.6	4.6	6.7	7.7
World Total	344.4 (100%)	369.8 (100%)	404.8 (100%)	437.1 (100%)

Source: Based on data from OECD/NEA, Nuclear News, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum.

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Table 2: Status of International Treaties in the Region

	NPT	IAEA Safeguards (FSSG)	Nuclear Safety Convention		Nuclear Liability	Nuclear Emergency Convention		London Convention (Waste)
			Sign	Ratify	Law	Notify	Assist
Japan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
China	Yes	No (voluntary)	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taiwan	No	Yes (IAEA/US)	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
S. Korea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. Korea	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Indonesia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Source: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, "Genshiryoku Sangyo Shimbun (Nuclear Industry News)", June 15, 1995

Endnotes

1.  The Economic Commission of Europe (ECE) was established in 1947, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established as a result of the Marshall Plan in 1948, and the Council of Europe was established in 1949.

2.  Howlett, Darryl A., EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards, St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1990, p. 17.

3.  Howlett, D.A., op. cit., p. 17. Even today, joint European Army is still too sensitive

4.  Germany would have liked to start a cooperative military program with France (and Italy).  France, which liked the idea originally, dropped from the program under the President De Gaulle in the early 1960s. (personal communication with Dr. Annette Schaper, April 1996).

5.  Louis Armand, Franz Etzel, and Francesco Giordani, "A Target for Euratom," A report prepared at the request of the government of Belgium, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, May 1957, quoted in Henry Nau, National Politics and International Technology : Nuclear Reactor Development in Western Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1974, p.104.

6.  E. Fursden, The European Defense Community: A History, Machmillan, 1980, quoted in Howlett, op. cit.

7.  L. Sheinmann, "EURATOM: Nuclear Integration in Europe," International Conciliation, May 1967, no. 563, p. 7, quoted in Howlett, op. cit. p. 18.

 8.  D. Howlett, 1990, op. cit. p. 68.

 9.  The EURATOM Treaty, Article 81.

10 .  The EURATOM Treaty, Article 84.

11 .  The Article 77 says the purpose of the EURATOM safeguards is to assure that the nuclear materials "are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users."  (emphasis added)   But the Article 77 was vague whether military facilities are excluded from the safeguards.

12 .  The EURATOM Treaty, Article 86.

13 .  EURATOM even has the right to replace staff at utilities by own personnel if it is not satisfied by materials accountancy.  This once happened at a German nuclear reactor. (Personal communication with A. Schaper, April 1996).

14.  In practice, however, those provisions are not as strong as the theory suggests (ex. utility has a de-facto ownership of the material, military materials are excluded from safeguards).  Recently, EURATOM wanted to set an example of its power: it denied its signature for a deal between a Germany utility and a supplier of Russian origin fuel and ordered it to take some French fuel instead.  The German case is still pending at the European Court, but it seems likely that the utility will lose the case. (Personal communication with A. Schaper, April 1996.)

15.  W. Walker, "The US-EURATOM Disagreement," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Discussion Paper #55, 1995, p.4.

16 .  Howlett said that the document was based on the intense negotiations between the IAEA and the EURATOM, and the relationship between the two organizations Òhad suffered recurrent strains.Ó D. Howlett, op. cit., p. 214. In addition, INFCIRC/193 applies only to non-nuclear weapon states and separate agreements had to be negotiated between NWS (France and UK) and the IAEA.  The separate agreements were based on INFCIRC/193 but significantly modified to account for the right of NWS to withdraw items from safeguards.

17 .  Commission of the European Communities, "Report on the Operation of Euratom Safeguards: 1991-1992," July, 1994.

18 .  D. Fischer and P. Szasz, edited by J. Goldblat, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, Taylor and Francis, London and Philadelphia, 1985, p.73.

19 .  K. Knorr, "EURATOM and American Policy. A Conference Report," Princeton University, 1956, quoted in D. Howlett, "Regional Nuclear Co-operation and Non-proliferation Arrangements: Models from other Regions," paper for the Twelfth PPNN Core Group Meeting, "East Asia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation," Shizuoka, Japan, 28-29 November, 1992. p.64.

20 .  D. Dillon testimony, "Proposed Euratom Agreements Hearings before the JCAE," Congress of the United States, 85th Congress, second session on the proposed Euratom agreements and legislation to carry out the proposed cooperative agreement, Part 1, p.84, 1958, quoted in D. Howlett, 1992, ibid., p.64.

21 .  See the detailed discussion in W. Walker, "The US-Euratom Disagreement," op. cit., 1995.  Under the new Agreement, which has been signed by both parties, 30-year programmatic approval of reprocessing and plutonium use is given to the EURATOM, which is a similar condition given to the Japanese plutonium program.

22 .  The original intention was to have an integrated reactor development programs in EURATOM.  However, several countries (France, Germany and UK) had already national reactor programs before the EURATOM. See the detailed discussion in H. Nau, National Politics and International Technology: Nuclear Reactor Development in Western Europe, The Johns Hopkins University press, Baltimore and London, 1974.

23 .  A. Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy, 1963, quoted in H. Nau, op. cit. 1974, p.96.

24.  H. Nau, op. cit. 1974, p.96.  Nau also argues that U.S.along with the UK who later joined the EURATOM but not to participate at the beginning, were in favor of certain types of integration which would serve their larger political interests but promote to limit other types of integration which might threaten Anglo-American monopoly of nuclear weapons policy.

25.  Regarding Japan’s plutonium programs and their proliferation implication, please see E.B. Skolnikoff, T. Suzuki, and K. Oye, International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., September 1995.

26.  IAEA has been restructuring its safeguards system and came up with the new concept, "93+2", last year to improve cost-effectiveness and detection capability of clandestine programs.

27.  See, for example, Kent Calder, "Asia’s Empty Tank," Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, No. 2, 1996. pp. 55-69.

28.  The concern over oil supply in the 1950s, however, was only shortlived. Oil supply problem did not materialize until the oil crises in the 1970s when again expectation of nuclear power was heightened.

29.  MITI’s Advisory Council on Energy, Sub-Committee on Nuclear Power, Report on International Cooperation in Asia, June 1995. (in Japanese)

30.  Denki Shimbun, March 6, 1996. 9 participant countries are: Australia, China, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

31.  R. Imai, "A Call for Regional Cooperation in Nuclear Energy," Japan Review of International Affairs, Summer 1995, pp. 266-271.  T. Kano, "Economic Development of Asia and International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy: A Proposal for PACIFCATOM)," paper presented at the Symposium Commemorating the 7th APEC Ministerial Meeting, PECC/PBEC Joint Symposium, Osaka, November 18, 1995.  A. Suzuki, "Reducing Proliferation Risks--Expanding and Internationalization of Verification and Control Regime: IAEA and Others; Managing Proliferation Risks from Civilian and Weapon-grade Plutonium and Enriched Uranium," Presented at the 45th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, "Towards A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," Hiroshima, Japan, July 23-29, 1995.   E.T. Fei, "Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Issues in East Asia," presented at the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue IV, Beijing, January 1996.  R. Manning, "PACATOM: A Nuclear Cooperation Regime as Asian CSBM," prepared for Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures, Washington DC, April 22-23, 1996.

32.  It is reported that 7 countries participating in the discussion of "International Plutonium Management Scheme", (Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.) agreed in December 1994 that they would publish on a yearly basis the data on the size, composition, and location of their stocks of commercial plutonium.  see A. Suzuki, op. cit., 1995.

33.  Manning suggested a Japan-US plutonium initiative in which Japan would cancel or defer its commercial plutonium programs.  See Manning, op. cit., 1996.

34.  Kaneko suggested the initial membership as follows; Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, S. Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, the U.S., and Vietnam.  He suggested that India, Pakistan and N. Korea can join if they accept the non-proliferation conditions specified by the PACIFICATOM. See Kaneko, op. cit.   Kano and Imai suggested Russia, France and UK as other possible members.

35.  It is important to point out that France was not a member of NPT until very recently while being the original member of EURATOM.

36.  Kaneko stresses the importance of "back-end" of fuel cycle issues and international management of radioactive waste is also suggested by Kano, citing the proposal by the Republic of Marshall Islands whose national assembly voted unanimously in a special resolution to invite an international repository of high level radioactive waste. Fei also suggested that Siberia, Gobi in China, and parts of Australia as possible candidates for possible site for international spent fuel (or waste) storage. See Kaneko, Kano and Fei cited above.

37.  Imai suggested that joint international management of fuel cycle facilities (enrichment and reprocessing) would be better in the Asian region. See Imai, op. cit., 1995.

38.  Imai suggested that Japan can open its national facilities for research and training to people from Asian nations, as the U.S. did during the initial phase of nuclear power development. See Imai, op. cit., 1995.

39.  A. Suzuki suggested that by developing civilian plutonium technologies Japan can contribute significantly to improve safeguards-related technologies. see A. Suzuki, op. cit., 1995.

Chapter 3  || Top

PACATOM: A Nuclear Cooperation Regime as Asian CSBM

By Robert A. Manning

Introduction

In the protracted debate over how to shape a post-Cold War Asia-Pacific security architecture, there are frequent references to many of the web of Western institutions and to rich East-West arms control experiences. These range from calls for an Asian-version of OSCE to ideas for more transparency, from Defense White Papers to pre-notification of military exercises. Thus far, the debate has resulted in one nascent experiment in forging new regional security cooperation mechanisms, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a security dialogue still largely a process in search of a purpose. Now the time may be ripe for a targeted effort at problem-oriented institution-building on an issue of common concern: a new regime of nuclear cooperation beginning in Northeast Asia, where nuclear power in the region is concentrated, and where turbulence is on the rise.

Despite myriad proposals, from governments and non-governmental organizations, no forum focused on political or security issues has yet emerged to mediate or build multilateral cooperation among the four major powers (U.S., Russia, China, Japan) and two Koreas in Northeast Asia. The U.S. forward-deployed military presence and network of bilateral alliances remains the core of the East Asian security system. The ARF and other nascent dialogues seek to add supplemental layers of assurance. Yet the sub-region is the locus of new tensions. Both Korean-Japanese, and Sino-Japanese relations reveal territorial disputes such as the Tokdo/Takeshima island controversy in the case of Korea-Japan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu flap complicating already difficult Sino-Japanese relations, offer manifestations of assertive nationalisms beginning to bump up against each other.

Arguably the most urgent security issue facing the region is the future of the Korean Peninsula, a flashpoint where the interests of all four major powers intersect. The North Korean nuclear crisis, and the two light water reactors which Pyongyang is to receive as a result of the October 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea, illuminated the link between civil nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. The informal pattern of cooperation with North Korea, subtly institutionalized in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation (KEDO) should be viewed as a security and confidence building measure, not merely a corporate entity created to build two light water reactors. This is true regardless of the ultimate fate of the agreement, which ultimately may not be realized for reasons beyond its scope -- Pyongyang's recalcitrance on broader security issues and the absence of a comprehensive North Korea strategy on the part of the U.S. and South Korea.

Japan and the Nuclear Problem

There is a wide spectrum of options for regional nuclear cooperation ranging from modest, discreet initiatives on nuclear safety to sweeping ideas for joint management of spent fuel and plutonium in a broad, collectively administered regional institution. Such an institutional breakthrough could significantly enhance regional security, as well as facilitating the safe use of nuclear energy in East Asia.

At the heart of the security dimension of a nuclear cooperation regime is Japan's ambitious plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactor plans. These goals are viewed in Japan almost exclusively as a matter of domestic energy requirements. Japan relies heavily on nuclear power to meet its energy needs as an alternative to imported energy sources. It is important to make a sharp distinction between civil nuclear power, in a once-through fuel cycle, and the closed fuel cycle, where spent fuel is reprocessed and fissile material produced. The development of reprocessing facilities and commercial breeder reactors adds a measure of proliferation concern, even though Japan is fully transparent. Japanese, however, tend to view their efforts to create a full fuel cycle solely as realization of an understandable dream of energy independence. Yet plans laid a quarter century ago have been overtaken by reality and no longer have any economic rationale.

This is grist for worst-case conclusions among some states in the region, particularly China and both Koreas. These Northeast Asian neighbors focus on Tokyo's capabilities, real and projected. Both Beijing and Seoul view Japan's plans to stockpile plutonium against the background of a bitter history and continued suspicion and distrust as evidenced in the controversies surrounding the 50th anniversary of World War II in 1995 underscoring Japan's inhibitions to confront its past. In that context, Japan's fuel cycle may appear rather different, given the capability of Japan, with the third largest defense budget in the world, H-2 rockets, reconnaissance capability, world class high technology and large quantities of plutonium

Japan's plutonium policies figure largely in the worst-case nightmare scenarios for Asia: a nuclear arms race between Japan and China -- and quite possibly with a reunified Korea. This is not meant to imply that Japan has any such intentions or that such an arms race is unfolding or even is imminent. Rather, the point is that there is a connection between Japan's fuel cycle activity and regional security perceptions -- and perhaps behavior of certain actors. In any case, Japan's nuclear agenda is mixed with the bitter historical legacy from its colonial behavior in the 1920s and 1930s in the political psychology of East Asia. This forms the inescapable political/strategic backdrop against which the spectrum of possible areas of nuclear cooperation occurs. The possibilities (discussed below) range from modest collaboration to enhance nuclear safety to more ambitious collective management of the back end of the fuel cycle (spent fuel storage and plutonium banks). In varying degrees, all the possibilities hold some promise of contributing to regional security.

Nuclear Power and Plutonium

One of the principal security issues of the post-Cold War era is the disposition of plutonium. Japan's inability to account for 154 pounds of plutonium (enough to manufacture about 10 bombs) at its Tokai-Mura reprocessing plant in 1995, plutonium stuck in the reprocessing machinery, highlighted the perils of plutonium. The margin of error in monitoring such plutonium alone could amount to fissile material for two nuclear bombs. Indeed, many nuclear technical experts say that it is extremely difficult to adequately safeguard reprocessing facilities in a manner that can provide timely warning of a diversion, the test of any safeguards regime.

Decisions taken by Japan over the next decade -- whether or not to implement long-planned, but long delayed reprocessing and commercial breeder reactor programs rather than postponing final decisions -- could be an important factor shaping security dynamics and nuclear policies in Northeast Asia as well as the global non-proliferation regime. Japan has a rare opportunity to recast its regional as well as global role. Indeed, by simply making a decision now that would likely result by default in the early 21st century in any case, Tokyo could demonstrate regional leadership on an issue on which it has a special moral authority, as well as lay the basis for a historic U.S.-Japan initiative at the global level.

A nuclear cooperation regime, adapting elements of the European Community's long experience in EURATOM to Asian circumstances, would mark a creative step in regional institution-building, moving from vague dialogues to multilateralism with clear, if circumscribed, purpose. The mutual benefits of a cooperative mechanism addressing a host of pertinent issues regarding nuclear energy may offer new opportunities for a problem-solving approach to shaping a regional or sub-regional political framework able to ameliorate distrust, provide a modicum of reassurance, and perhaps catalyze cooperative endeavors in other areas.

It is a win-win proposition, reflecting common needs and addressing common problems. The projected growth of nuclear energy (and fuel cycle activity) in the region, and significant changes in Japan's plans, suggest that now is the moment to initiate a nuclear cooperation regime in the Pacific, beginning in Northeast Asia. In Japan, nuclear power already provides some 30% of total power generation, and a similar proportion of Taiwan's power. South Korea depends on nuclear energy for 40% of its requirements. China, a growing oil importer, currently depends on nuclear power for less than 2% of its energy needs, but has plans to expand its use of nuclear power substantially by 2020. Elsewhere in the region, Indonesia and Thailand currently plan to begin utilizing nuclear power by 2010. Any nuclear regime should be inclusive in nature open to NPT member states in the Pacific.

As countries of the Asia-Pacific develop nuclear energy, they will increasingly be concerned about a host of nuclear related issues. These range from safety, monitoring radiation, and fuel sources to the most prominent and vexing problem of managing spent fuel -- particularly its storage -- to accidents a la Chernobyl, and recycling systems. There are already signals that a post-unification Korea is likely to pursue the acquisition of reprocessing capabilities. China now plans to begin civil reprocessing in 2010, has made known its interests in reprocessing spent fuel and using MOX fuel in light water reactors, as well as its interest in exporting nuclear facilities and fuel cycle services. Russia also has ambitious plans to not only keep operating its reprocessing facilities but to develop new generations of breeder reactors.

This is the case despite the fact that there is a large global surplus of uranium, increased by fissile material from dismantled U.S. and Russian warheads, and no economic rationale for recycling plutonium, by some estimates, for the next 75-100 years. Under the START I and START II (if it is ratified by Russia) treaties, for example, Russia is dismantling more than 2000 weapons a year resulting in 10-15 tons of plutonium and 45 tons of enriched uranium annually until 2003. Clearly, the world is awash with plutonium and enriched uranium.

Life After Monju

Against this backdrop, the December 1995 accident at the Monju experimental reactor, a large leak of sodium coolant appears to mark a turning point for Japan's troubled fuel cycle program. Beyond the event itself, the political impact of a cover-up and scandal (in which the official in charge of investigating the accident committed suicide), may, in the view of some well-placed official sources, mark the death knell of Monju. Moreover, the Monju affair may be a harbinger of the beginning of the end of Japan's understandable dream of reprocessing. After less than six months in operation (at less than full capacity) Monju is shut down, officially for at least three years, and the larger planned commercial reprocessing and breeder reactors, such as the Rokkasho-Mura breeder reactor, have been further postponed into the next century (2003 for Rokkasho). Further postponements are quite likely, as Japan is reassessing its entire nuclear fuel cycle program. The success last August of the first referendum ever held in Japan, where anti-nuclear activists opposed a planned new nuclear reactor, appears another sign of the times.

The likelihood, however, is that Japan will deal with this situation in a typically Japanese manner: avoid making a decision to abandon the whole program, but rather defer it by a string of postponements which accrete over time into de facto cancellation. There is tremendous bureaucratic inertia, concentrated in the Science and Technology Agency (STA) and the nuclear establishment which has sunk some $6 billion in Monju, upwards of $16 billion on Rokkasho-Mura, and still more into the Fugen Advanced Thermal Reactor. These sunk costs and the bureaucratic inertia of the breeder program comprise a powerful force for continuing the program, whether it makes sense or not. The breeder program appears the largest in a growing list of failed industrial policies (e.g. Fifth Generation computer, HDTV). Regardless, it is now a question of throwing good money after bad.

The bottom line is that there is little economic rationale for commercial breeder reactors now and for the foreseeable future. The Mox fuel Japan is now buying is 3-6 times more expensive than conventional reactor fuel. There will likely be a glut of uranium for at least another 50-75 years, which could ensure a steady supply of fuel for Japan’s power reactors. Moreover, it is quite possible that breakthroughs in fusion could alter the future of nuclear power or that other viable alternative energy sources will emerge. The commercialization, for example, of electric automobiles alone, now just on the horizon, would dramatically alter energy demand projections. And on top of that, the problems at Monju (the French have had similar technical problems) reflect technical difficulties in making this complex technology work. Based on current plans, Japan, which already has taken back 11 metric tonnes of plutonium, would be saddled with still more if Monju is shut down for three years. Some estimates project that Japan's plutonium surplus would grow by over 1.5 Mt over the course of a three-year Monju shut-down.

There are at least two basic options for Japan, with a continuum of menu items within them. One would merely scale back the scope of its fuel cycle program and stretch out its realization. A more dramatic option is to turn the lemon into lemonade, and following Germany's lead, defer the program for at least 50 years except for continued research and development. If Japan pursues the former option, there would still be several possibilities for regional nuclear cooperation regimes along the lines of Europe’s EURATOM agency, as Tokyo's Atomic Energy Commission has begun to explore.

Some in Japan, however, are attracted to the EURATOM model as a means of regionalizing closed fuel cycle activities, thus legitimizing reprocessing and a plutonium economy. It is with the goal of legitimizing its reprocessing plans in mind that such a model of an ASIATOM or PACATOM organization has been suggested by some in the Japanese nuclear establishment and its supporters. Indeed, officials of Japan's Power Reactor & Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) apparently have quietly begun preliminary discussions with Russian and Chinese officials aimed at developing cooperative fuel cycle programs, though no formal talks have taken place.

If such efforts are aimed at developing fuel cycle activities under the control of each individual country, this course is filled with potential dangers. Given regional security concerns discussed above, the question of whether commercial reprocessing should be encouraged leaps out as an issue to be carefully considered. Such a course of action could lead to a "virtual" nuclear arms race, where a reunified Korea decides to revisit the question of reprocessing which Seoul foreswore in a 1992 accord in order to get Pyongyang to shut down its reprocessing facility.

In Europe, regional nuclear energy issues are managed by the European Atomic Energy Community - EURATOM. Like Northeast Asia, Europe has a history of conflict and one that features both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. EURATOM, created in 1957, was the European Community’s effort to regionalize the management of civil nuclear power. But it emerged as part of the larger effort to create a European Economic Community. Its mandate includes a common market to insure free movement of nuclear commerce, nuclear safety standards, safeguards (beyond those of the International Atomic Energy Agency), ownership of fissile materials, nonproliferation policy, research, and negotiations with other countries on the import and export of nuclear materials.

How might the experience of EURATOM benefit either the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or regional security in East Asia? One potentially useful example of how such a nuclear regime can serve as a confidence building measure is EURATOM’s system of safeguards and inspections. Beyond IAEA inspections, each member country of EURATOM assigns inspectors to the EURATOM safeguards agency. EURATOM can dispatch inspectors on an anytime, anywhere basis to member states facilities, both non-weapon and nuclear weapon states non-weapon facilities. Applied to Asia, Chinese or Korean inspectors -- detailed to PACATOM -- might inspect Japanese facilities and vice versa under PACATOM auspices. North and South Korean inspectors could also inspect each other’s nuclear facilities. Such developments would be useful reassurance measures.

Institutionally, there are several possible manners in which PACATOM could unfold. Japan could propose the creation of PACATOM, a nuclear cooperation regime, beginning with the four major powers and the two Koreas. A formula should be worked out with China (modeled on the APEC or Asian Development Bank nomenclature for Taipei) for bringing Taiwan in at some point, as it relies substantially on nuclear power. A central fact of life is that no such organization makes any sense unless China is a member and active participant. Beijing is already concerned about the growing amounts of spent fuel from Taiwan's civilian reactors. And as PACATOM would be largely a technical agency rather than a political or overtly security-oriented one, it would be more palatable to Beijing. But initially, Beijing would be unlikely to participate if Taiwan were also included unless a major improvement in cross-strait relations occurred.

PACATOM would be adhesive, open to other Pacific Basin states, as relevant (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand, the Philipenes, and Vietnam actually begin civil nuclear power programs). One important distinction between EURATOM and PACATOM is that in this case, the U.S. would be a member state. Tactically, it could be established in modular form, with the various components of it (e.g, nuclear safety cooperation or regional safeguards regime) proceeding at their own pace based on a larger conception of what the full regime would entail. Alternatively, particular components could be put forward as discrete elements of regional cooperation in an independent fashion.

Already Japan has embarked on a modest initiative, holding a conference in November 1996 on Nuclear Safety in Asia attended by most officials of nine Asian states with G-7 countries as observers. While the meeting was exploratory in nature, it appears to be a first, incremental step toward cooperative efforts at managing the peaceful use of nuclear power.

In addition to the illustrative example of a regional safeguards regime discussed above, other component elements of PACATOM might include:

• Assisting all parties in meeting the requirements of the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, and the recently adopted Convention on Nuclear Safety and Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. This could also include standardizing systems for accounting for nuclear material.
• Human resource cooperation in monitoring radiation levels and other technical exchanges and training to enhance nuclear safety. This would include safety awareness, a regional alarm and mutual support system in case of accidents, and a mechanism for compensation to other countries for damage by a nuclear event. It would also include transferring technology which improves reactor safety.
• Improving safeguards standards and practices, as discussed above. This must not be viewed as a substitute for IAEA and NPT full scope safeguards. Rather, it must be viewed as adding an additional layer of safeguards and the confidence-building aspect provided by mutual inspections by East Asian inspectors which over time might supersede IAEA inspectors as EURATOM appears to be in the process of doing.
• Cooperation in Research and Development. Establish a PACATOM program for research and development to improve nuclear safety, develop a data base on incidents at power reactors, and research into peaceful uses of nuclear energy in medicine and other areas.
• Cooperation on the storage/management of spent fuel. Storage of spent fuel is a key problem for nations relying on nuclear power, and thus a powerful mutual interest. This could evolve into an area of major regional and global non-proliferation significance. It could include regional waste sites, for example, burying spent fuel or vitrified waste on a disputed unpopulated island (e.g. Tokdo/Takeshima), in Siberia, or in the Gobi desert, with PACATOM or the country producing the waste paying a fee to the host country. It could entail Japan dedicating a MOX-burning reactor to PACATOM to serve as a regional, IAEA or PACATOM-controlled facility to burn excess plutonium. It also could involve Japan either building a dedicated MOX-burning reactor in Siberia or moving the canceled German MOX plant, and through putting plutonium from dismantled Russian warheads, with the power produced providing energy to the Russian Far East;
• Establish a regional plutonium bank, where any member could deposit plutonium to be placed under the legal control of PACATOM, thus curbing suspicion of closet nuclear weapons programs;

The component elements outlined here have economic, energy, and security dimensions.

Taken together, they would amount to qualitative new patterns of cooperation in East Asia . There are some North-South or aid aspects, and there are other aspects which foster a sense of community by underscoring common interests and obligations and generating new habits of cooperation.

A Northeast Asian Framework

One possible non-nuclear outcome that could be facilitated by such an enterprise is a new impetus, by demonstration, of a pattern of consultation and cooperation in Northeast Asia that could serve as the beginning of a six-party political framework -- perhaps as a subgroup of the ARF -- which might address other relevant issues, such as external aspects of managing the process of Korean reunification (e.g. guaranteeing a nuclear-free Peninsula, guaranteeing a peace treaty, etc.) Such a Northeast Asia political framework could be a useful addition to the regional security nexus. Certainly

the dearth of East Asian regional institutions contrasts sharply with the burgeoning signs of potential turmoil.

The regional security environment in Northeast Asia offers Japan as compelling a rationale for rethinking its plutonium policies as do the economics of the fuel cycle. Viewed from Tokyo, Northeast Asia is highly volatile. Against a background of a century of animosity, Japan faces a Russia likely to evolve in a nationalist direction even as it consolidates democracy and privatizes its economy.

There is still uncertainty about post-Deng directions for China. In any case, China is rapidly modernizing its military, leapfrogging a generation in missile and nuclear technology with technology acquisition and scientific help from Russia and others. And China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal. A lack of transparency leaves some doubt about the precise numbers, but the consensus view of U.S. analysts is that the Chinese triad (long-range and medium range missiles, bombers, and sea-based delivery systems) totals about 400 weapons (including fission weapons with yields of 20-40 kilotons and thermonuclear weapons with 1-5 megaton yields). China has several dozen ICBM's and roughly 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Two Chinese nuclear tests in the past year indicate that Beijing is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, perhaps MIRVing it in the process. And amidst all this, Sino-Japanese relations are more tumultuous than at any time since normalization in 1972. The recent heated dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is a manifestation of this new turbulence, of buoyant nationalisms beginning to clash.

Even if Korea is reunified peacefully, so long as Japan is stockpiling plutonium, a reunified Korea is likely to contemplate reprocessing. Discussions with prominent actors in Seoul's scientific and defense establishments suggest that despite the December 1991 denuclearization accord, the issue of the back end of the fuel cycle could well be revisited post-reunification. It should be recalled South Korea embarked on a drive to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Its status as a middle power surrounded by major , mostly nuclear powers has not changed. Seoul is pursuing a range of technical research programs including free electron lasers, high-speed centrifuges, high-energy capacitors, and technologies relating to advanced metalworking and high-voltage electrical circuits which, taken together, could be construed as leading towards virtual nuclear capability. Seoul has also explored technologies for plutonium recycling.

A 1995 study done by two researchers at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), a Defense Ministry-run think-tank suggested South Korea pursue a "two-tier" policy developing autonomous nuclear technologies as Japan has done, implying Korea should also consider attaining opaque capabilities. This is not to suggest any ROK government policies or intent in this regard, but merely to highlight thinking in the Korean scientific and defense establishments.

A dramatic shift in Japan's plutonium policy could have a substantial impact on regional security dynamics. If Japan were to surrender fissile material to IAEA or PACATOM control, fears of a nuclear Japan would have no conceivable basis. It would diminish Sino-Japanese strategic competition and complicate the Chinese rationale for its nuclear modernization. Any Korean enthusiasm for reprocessing would also lose its momentum and much of its rationale.

Moreover, such a Japanese move could provide new impetus for a six-party political framework for Northeast Asia, as Seoul has proposed on several occasions, most recently, at the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok in July 1994. Though Northeast Asian states participate in this dialogue, there is yet no effort to create a forum particular to the sub-region whose security concerns are largely distinct from those of Southeast Asia. The large (20 countries) and unwieldy character and fuzzy agenda do not recommend the ASEAN security dialogue as a likely mechanism to manage Northeast Asian concerns. Moreover, unlike Southeast Asia, which faces no immediate threat to stability, Northeast Asia is the locus of the most likely flashpoint in the Pacific -- the heavily-armed standoff on the Korean Peninsula, particularly in light of economic strife in North Korea and potential "hard landing" scenarios for reunification.

A political framework for Northeast Asia has been proposed over the past five years by Russia, and previously by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III, and repeatedly by South Korea. Given the intersection of the four major powers (U.S., Japan, China, Russia) interests on the Korean Peninsula and the real time issue of the North Korean nuclear program, there would appear a logic and potential for the question of Korea to serve as a catalyst for new patterns of subregional political/security cooperation between the two Koreas and the four major powers. There is a potentially rich agenda -- from managing the impact of Korean reunification (e.g. guaranteeing a peace treaty and/or a denuclearized Peninsula) to military transparency measures, and even to Northeast Asian environmental issues such as acid rain.

As part of either a parallel or building block approach to the global initiative discussed above, a Northeast Asia forum could explore a ban on highly enriched uranium and plutonium production. Such an initiative could be part of a sub-regional approach to nuclear cooperation. If it is deemed that reprocessing or enrichment services are necessary, they could be done on a Northeast Asia basis, perhaps under IAEA or PACATOM auspices. This issue could be part of a sub-regional energy development agenda. At the same time, PACATOM would be structured in an inclusive, adhesive fashion, open to other Asia-Pacific nations.

Regional and Global Synergy: PACATOM and Beyond

A firm Japanese decision to either defer for 50 years, or cancel outright, its breeder development program as another unsuccessful industrial policy experiment, could open up possibilities for Japanese leadership on bold global proliferation initiatives quite apart from regional possibilities. Taking a leadership role in non-proliferation by rethinking its plutonium policies would certainly be a confidence-building measure in the region as well as bolstering Japan's case for a UN Security Council seat. Japan's nuclear program could be the vehicle for showing that it is serious about non-proliferation, for demonstrating global leadership in ways welcomed by its neighbors, as well as assuaging doubts about its intentions. A two-dimensional U.S.-Japan initiative based on a Japanese decision to defer for a 50-75 year period or to forego future fuel cycle activity beyond research and development could have a major global and regional impact. It could also help reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan security alliance with a post-Cold War definition of partnership.

A PACATOM initiative might also serve as a catalyst or building block for a larger global non-proliferation measure, perhaps as a joint U.S.-Japan initiative. The U.S. does no civilian reprocessing, and does not encourage the civil use of plutonium. But the Clinton Administration has hewed to traditional policy of maintaining its commitments in regard to the use of plutonium in West European and Japanese civil nuclear power programs (both use U.S.-supplied fuel and thus require U.S. permission for reprocessing it.) Understandable administration reluctance to press U.S. allies on civil reprocessing is based in part on the legacy of the Carter Administration’s campaign against plutonium in the 1970s, in part on the reality of multi-billion dollar sunk costs by Europeans, and the force of bureaucratic inertia. The British, for example, have invested some $3 billion (5000 jobs at stake) at its just completed THORP plant.

While a solution able to fully recoup costs is unlikely, use of these facilities for storage and enriching uranium could offer alternative uses if reprocessing was halted, and remaining losses could be absorbed by both sides. Apart from compelling financial arguments, there is a political case to be made to the Europeans and Japanese for not reprocessing. (In Japan's case, there is also a regional security dimension discussed below.) If proliferation is in reality a high-priority security issue, then given the enormous costs being borne by the U.S. to get rid of the baggage from the Cold War, the goal of moving away from the use of plutonium and establishing international management of the substance should be viewed as a form of burden-sharing.

There is now a window of opportunity to launch a U.S.-Japan plutonium initiative. There is heightened concern over plutonium at a moment when the post-Cold War international system is being shaped. If Japan canceled or renegotiated its contracts with the French firm, COGEMA, and British Nuclear Fuels in a coordinated effort with the U.S., it would cause both Britain and France to re-evaluate their respective reprocessing plans. Coordinated with a Japanese nuclear policy shift, the Clinton administration could then approach Moscow with a call to reciprocally place all or some portion of plutonium from dismantled weapons in what would be the beginning of a global stockpile of plutonium under IAEA control. The goal would be to end global production, transport, and use of plutonium. In what could become a trilateral venture, some plutonium could be converted into MOX fuel and used in a dedicated power reactor, perhaps in Siberia, which would both dispose of plutonium and provide electricity. At the same time, Japan could limit itself to also burning MOX fuel with the same goal -- getting rid of surplus plutonium. Some of Japan's surplus could be burned as MOX fuel while some might be vitrified.

Such an initiative could facilitate U.S.-Russian negotiations to accelerate their timetables for a production cutoff to no later than 1997, declare inventories of their respective stockpiles, negotiate reciprocal monitoring of warhead dismantling, and to place initially, 50% of plutonium from dismantled US and Russian warheads under IAEA control, and all under IAEA inspection. Under its statute, the IAEA, has the authority to take custody of excess, safeguarded fissile material.

This U.S. and Russian precedent could be the foundation of a non-discriminatory multilateral convention prohibiting the production of all fissile material. A willingness by the U.S. and Russia to yield surpluses from dismantled warheads to IAEA inspection and control would deprive threshold states of the argument that the regime is discriminatory. The other declared nuclear weapon states are believed to have sufficient stockpiles for planned modernization. India and Israel are believed to possess about 300 Kg each. Pakistan has indicated a willingness to freeze its nuclear efforts, and there are indications that Israel and perhaps India may be willing to cease fissile material production.

There are a host of technical details such as what will be safeguarded and what form storage should take. Disassembling a warhead yields plutonium "pits" from the weapon core. These can be tagged, sealed, and stored for the short term. U.S. warheads are stored in heavily-guarded "igloos" at the Pantex facility in Texas, which can dismantle about 2000 warheads a year. Russia has a similar dismantling capability, but lacks adequate storage facility, a problem which U.S. aid is designed to ameliorate. There is continued scientific debate over what to do with surplus plutonium both in the intermediate term and for ultimate disposal. The combination of using it as MOX fuel and, based on factors of cost and security risks, vitrifying the rest in glass for ultimate disposal may be a useful way to approach the problem..

Under the best of circumstances, achieving an international regime to control plutonium would be a difficult and protracted process involving several stages. Achieving IAEA custodianship of excess stockpiles could be built from the bottom-up on a regional basis, as well as the top down with the military cutoff as the first phase. Storage would be regionally-based, with Britain, France, Russia, the U.S. and Japan likely sites. Defining both what is "excess" and a criteria for releasing plutonium to nations for R&D purposes would be a difficult challenge. As nuclear specialist George Perkovich has suggested, one important positive incentive for adherence to a plutonium regime would be a globalization of the problem of ultimate disposal of plutonium, for which no nation has yet designed a fully satisfactory answer.

Conclusion

It is useful to recall that the origins of EURATOM were inseparable from then-fledgling efforts in the 1950s to create a European community. Similarly, the PACATOM idea may be viewed as part of a larger process of forging regional institutions and a still elusive sense of community in the Asia-Pacific. In the near term, however, it is unlikely that any grandiose designs will unfold. One reason is a collective lack of vision about the direction of the post-Cold War order. Another obstacle is a kind of intellectual disconnect between Asia specialists and nuclear specialists who rarely see the intersection of the two disciplines. This essay has sought to offer a road map to the future, albeit one with a host of possible detours. One virtue of the numerous proposals which have begun to surface for nuclear cooperation in the Pacific is that they shift the debate from vague notions of multilateral dialogue to more focused possibilities which are built on addressing concrete issues. Another virtue is that they offer Japan a unique occasion to demonstrate a sense of stewardship both regionally and globally in an area where it has a special claim based on its history as well as technological accomplishments.

Japan also has an important opportunity to dispel doubts about its intentions, exert leadership, and bolster both regional security and global non-proliferation. If it fails to seize this opportunity, the result will quite likely be similar to Japan's actions during the 1990 Gulf War: Japan will make the right decision in the wrong way and get little credit for it. In any case, what decisions Japan makes will set the parameters of the possible for the notional PACATOM. But even the minimalist options would be a significant step forward.

Chapter 4  || Top

Possible International Cooperation for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in the Asia-Pacific Region

by Hiroyuki Kuroda

Energy demand in the Asia-Pacific is expected to increase greatly in the near future due to increased population and economic growth. That demand will boost the construction of nuclear power plants, which give us large amounts of electricity. Nuclear energy is said to be the most advantageous in terms of economic feasibility and environmental protection. On the other hand, there are a lot of problems to be cleared up before we use nuclear energy, such as nuclear safety and non-proliferation. This paper points out what kind of cooperation we could achieve in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific.

Current Situation

There are two reasons to increase construction of nuclear power plants in the Asia-Pacific. One is the drastic increase of energy demand due to rapid economic growth. The Advisory Committee of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) notes that primary energy demand in 2002 will be twice as much as that in 1992. It also says that electricity demand could be 3.8 times as large as that in 1992.

Another reason is that nuclear energy has a great advantage in environmental protection. Thermal power stations installed with facilities for desulphurization and denitrogenization cause air pollution and acid rain in the area. The use of fossil fuels also emits more CO2, the so called "greenhouse gas." This raises serious concern about global warming. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, is said to emit none of the gases mentioned above. This could encourage developing countries struggling with environmental problems to build nuclear power plants.

In this situation, nuclear energy development is being promoted in the Asia-Pacific as below. (Table 1) In China, more than 10 plants would be built by the year 2000. China is also willing to develop a reprocessing plant and would run a commercial one by 2010.

South Korea released details on its future nuclear program last year. It said that 18 nuclear plants would be operated by 2010. India has 10 nuclear plants right now. Recently Russia and India have agreed to build two more plants, in addition to the four plants currently under construction.

Pakistan is now constructing a nuclear plant with Chinese cooperation, while Indonesia will announce whether or not it will build a nuclear plant by 1997. Detailed nuclear development plans are being considered in Thailand and Vietnam.

Current International Cooperation

The World Association of Nuclear Operators(WANO) shows us an example of how current international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear power development is promoted. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, many people including nuclear experts expressed their serious concerns about the safety of nuclear power plants in East European countries. This triggered the movement to establish a borderless nuclear information exchange network in the world. Lord Marshall (President of the Central Electricity Generating Board in the United Kingdom at that time) proposed to set up WANO in 1987. After his proposal, a preliminary meeting was held in Paris with many nuclear experts from all over the world. It made three major principles to establish WANO:

- WANO should be a private, non-governmental organization of nuclear operators.

- The major function of WANO would be to facilitate the exchange of nuclear operating information and experience among nuclear operators.

- A Coordinating Center would be established in London, while regional centers could be also located in Paris, Moscow, Atlanta, and Tokyo.

WANO was officially established on May, 1989 and works as an international organization. Since it is a British legal entity, WANO is run as a company based on Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. The General Meeting refers to the shareholders' meeting in the companies and consists of Ordinary Members. Ordinary Member means a representative per country or area with a voting right in general meeting. In Japan, for instance, Japanese Nuclear Operators -- which consist of 10 electric power companies and a research institute -- constitute a single Ordinary Member. The utilities and a research institute mentioned above are called Joint Members. As of April 1, 1996, WANO is composed of 35 Ordinary Members with 138 nuclear operators.

In the Asia, a Tokyo Center makes plans and organizes its activities. There are 16 members from 6 economies (China, India, Japan, Korea, Pakistan and Chinese Taipei). (Figure 1) The major activity of WANO is to exchange nuclear operation information through a world-wide computer network.(Figure 2) Other activities are as follows:

- Implementing exchange visits of nuclear power plants,

- Conducting workshops or seminars,

- Ranking nuclear plants by Performance Indicators.

There are two advantages to this organization. First, since WANO is a non-governmental organization, all operating nuclear power plants in the Asia-Pacific region have joined WANO activities -- both China and Chinese Taipei participate. Even the nuclear power plants in India and Pakistan, countries which did not ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are also members of WANO. Second, transparency of nuclear power operation is secured by peer pressure. By exchanging accident information, visiting the plant sites and ranking the plants by performance indicators, we could easily understand what is going on at each plant. On the other hand, international cooperation is limited to nuclear power operation in WANO; it does not include front end or back end activities.

A Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation

Last November, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) co-hosted a symposium commemorating the Seventh APEC Ministerial Meeting in Osaka. In the symposium, Mr. Tokio Kanoh, Managing

Director, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) proposed international cooperation in nuclear power called "PACIFICATOM".

Mr. Kanoh said, "If a nuclear accident happens, the effect of it could extend beyond national borders. If there is a country suspected of secretly developing nuclear power, it could be a big threat not only in the region but also in the world." Therefore, he proposed to establish an international cooperative scheme called PACIFICATOM (provisionally named) for nuclear cooperation. He said, "It should be designed to promote the bright side of nuclear energy, controlling its shadow side, based on the recognition that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is an international public asset."

To set up a PACIFICATOM, Mr. Kanoh showed us three key words: Widen, Deepen, and Open. "Widen" means that PACIFICATOM could be multilateral and broader cooperative organization. He said that "cooperation should be extended to other economies outside the Asia-Pacific which handle nuclear business such as exploration, processing of uranium, and international disposal of radioactive waste materials." In the meanwhile, "PACIFICATOM should not be rigidly organized like the United Nations but more loose with its membership based on countries or areas like APEC and PECC." Such cooperation, he pointed out, should be done in five areas in a comprehensive and integrated scheme:

- Export of equipment (hardware)

- Technical cooperation (software)

- Operation and maintenance (OM)

- Finance

- Management

"Deepen" means that cooperation should be broadly extended to front end and back end: enrichment, conversion, processing to spent fuel, reprocessing, and radioactive waste disposal. As for nuclear safety, he said that international cooperation could move a step further from information exchange and peer reviews to setting guidelines for safety standards. In addition, Kanoh emphasized that maximum attention should be paid to nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring transparency, and security of nuclear energy.

"Open" represents Open Regionalism; PACIFICATOM should open its door not only to Asian countries but also to anyone in the Pacific region which is concerned deeply with nuclear power. To let the organization work effectively, PACIFICATOM should include the U.S., which is the world leader of nuclear power generation; Canada, which has abundant uranium resources and its own original nuclear power technology; and Australia, which also has a lot of natural resources. Furthermore, closer ties could be also maintained with other international organizations, such as IAEA, OECD/NEA, The Uranium Institute, and WANO.

Mr. Kanoh concluded by, saying that PACIFICATOM could start with a nuclear experts’ meeting to make sure an international cooperation is feasible. He also added that we should promote the meeting, building up a consensus steadily.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would offer the following suggestions to promote international nuclear cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

Establish a Comprehensive International Scheme for Nuclear Cooperation. First, as many nuclear experts have already mentioned, a comprehensive international scheme for nuclear cooperation in the Asia-Pacific should be established to strengthen the non-proliferation system in the long term. The scheme should be a non-governmental, track-II organization like CSCAP. It could result in encouraging Chinese Taipei, which runs a lot of nuclear power plants, and countries such as India and Pakistan which do not ratify the NPT to join the scheme. More nuclear-related international organization and community should be involved in the scheme.

The scheme, for example, could establish rigid safeguard standards or set up inspection teams to visit the nuclear facilities of its members. It also could improve "Safety Culture", which is closely related with non-proliferation, offering training programs to nuclear operators in the region and transferring safety-related nuclear technologies. In addition, this scheme should try to introduce safer, non-proliferation-oriented nuclear technology to economies, reforming the regional energy market.

Set Up Regular Meetings with Nuclear Energy Experts. Second, to establish an effective regional scheme, track II organizations like CSCAP could set up regular meetings with nuclear energy experts in the short term. After the Cold War ended, more attention has been paid to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the world. It might be time to review current nuclear cooperation efforts. To make any future organization work more efficiently and support non-proliferation efforts, the cooperation of national security experts and nuclear experts would be definitely important. Continuous talks between them also could result in effective cooperation, such as on how a legal system to secure non-proliferation should be made or how technical research to reduce the amount of spent fuels should be promoted. Such reviews would reinforce the non-proliferation scheme further and enhance a "Non-Proliferation Culture" among nuclear experts. These kinds of meetings might be a realistic first step for international nuclear cooperation.

Organize an International Forum for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Development. Third, CSCAP should organize an international forum for the peaceful use of nuclear energy to promote dialog in the Asia-Pacific. To respond to many concerns from others, for example, Japan released a "No-Surplus Plutonium Program" which balances the demand and supply of plutonium. Japan’s neighbors however, still feel uneasy about the Japanese nuclear program. Although this uneasiness might not stem only from its nuclear program, closer communication should be promoted to persuade others how transparent Japanese program is. The forum would give more opportunity to bridge such gaps and improve public confidence and mutual understanding in the region.

Recently, many energy experts pointed out that a third energy crisis could happen in near future, due to the drastic increase of energy demand in the Asia-Pacific. To prevent the crisis, each economy should make balanced energy policy to ensure the stable supply. Nuclear energy, which might not be first option to meet energy demand, is one of the most important energy resources for "Energy Security" in economies.

Consensus for peaceful use of nuclear energy is built when the economies which use nuclear energy realize their responsibilities and show us their nuclear programs clearly. The success of creating this environment largely depends on how closely non-governmental organization like CSCAP can communicate and cooperate with people in the nuclear community who actually make efforts in fulfilling the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This communication could help identify how we could reduce weapon-grade plutonium stockpiled in military facilities. Furthermore, international cooperation could help convince nuclear power users that greater transparency in such nuclear programs enhances to their national security and prospects for sustainable economic growth.

It might be a time for Japan, given its excellent performance in nuclear power operation and its international commitment to non-proliferation to play a leading role in establishing a regional cooperative scheme. Such an initiative would definitely gain international support for the Japanese nuclear program and could pave the way for further nuclear development and consensus building in the Asia-Pacific.

References

Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, The Current Situation of Nuclear Development - 1995 Annual Report.

Tokyo Center, World Association of Nuclear Operators, Outline of WANO, 1996, Tokyo, Japan.

Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, Toward Securing Safety of Nuclear Power (Tokyo ERC Shuppan,1995).

Ministry of International Trade and Industry. New Era for Asian Cooperation (Tokyo Tsushosangyo Chosakai, 1996).

KANOH,Tokio. Economic Development of Asia and International Cooperation in Nuclear Power-Proposal for PACIFICATOM-, November 18,1995, Japan.

CALDER, E.Kent. "Pacific Defense Arms, Energy, and America’s Future in Asia," Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1996.

SUZUKI, Tatsujiro."Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region(ASIATOM)," paper for the meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific, Washington, D.C., April 1996.

Civil Use of Plutonium: A U.S. Position Paper

John A. Dooley
Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs
U.S. Department of State

As presented to the 2nd PNC International Forum on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,
November 18, 1996, Tokyo, Japan

As countries with advanced civil nuclear programs move ahead with their plans to recycle plutonium as fuel in existing power reactors, there is an evident need to give assurance to the world community that the use of plutonium on a routine commercial basis will only be carried out under appropriate conditions and controls. There is general agreement that plutonium, because it can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive components without transmutation or further enrichment, is a particularly sensitive material and requires special precautions for handling and use. Given the central role that non-proliferation plays in maintaining and promoting global security, and the fact that plutonium by its nature raises unique proliferation concerns, the need for special precautions is obvious.

The United States has adopted a policy toward reprocessing and civil plutonium use that has several dimensions. The first point to be made with respect to our policy is that the United States does not encourage reprocessing. Indeed, we actively discourage reprocessing in regions of proliferation concern. Moreover, the United States does not itself reprocess, either for civilian or military purposes. We believe that the continued production of separated plutonium is not justified on either economic or national security grounds. We believe further that the continued accumulation of plutonium in excess of foreseeable needs gives rise to serious proliferation and security risks. U.S. officials have made these points many times in recent years. This position is well known, though no doubt it is not universally shared.

The United States also recognizes, of course, that other nations have a sovereign right to make their own energy choices. Where these choices differ from ours, we believe it is important that we nevertheless remain engaged with each other in the interest of maintaining a strong global non-proliferation regime. A number of our close friends and allies, in Japan and Western Europe, have decided that for themselves the use of plutonium for civil power generation is economically viable and an essential means of achieving energy security. They have large, well established, and technologically sophisticated programs for civil reprocessing and plutonium use. They have also made comprehensive non-proliferation commitments, and they have scrupulously adhered to those commitments.

In the case of these friends and allies, the United States is determined to remain a reliable partner in the civil nuclear field. As a concrete manifestation of our determination to maintain our commitments, we have entered into agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Japan and with the European Atomic Energy Community that among other things give advance, long-term U.S. approval for the reprocessing and retransfers for reprocessing of U.S.-supplied reactor fuel, and for subsequent activities involving the use of the recovered plutonium. These advance, long-term consent arrangements allow our major cooperating partners to plan and conduct their advanced civil nuclear programs on a predictable and reliable basis.

The U.S.-Japan Agreement has been in force for nearly a decade. I believe that both parties regard the manner of its implementation over this period as highly satisfactory. There has been one shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan pursuant to the Agreement, and no doubt more will follow. Just recently, on August 20 of this year, the United States and Japan took action under the Agreement to add five mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom to the list of facilities where activities relating to the Agreement’s advance, long-term consent arrangements may take place. The new U.S.- EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation entered into force on April 12 of this year, and contains similar advanced approval features.

In short, therefore, reprocessing and civil plutonium use in Japan and EURATOM are a reality, and the United States, despite its differing views on the wisdom of these activities, does not seek to impede them. It is also a reality, however, that these activities have encountered outright hostility in some quarters, particularly among certain activist groups, and a substantial amount of skepticism and unease among the public at large. Over the long run it seems doubtful whether commercial reprocessing and plutonium use can succeed without some measure of public support and acceptance. A key question, therefore, for those engaged in these activities, is how such support and acceptance can be secured.

One important way, clearly, is by increasing transparency, by making available to publics and parliaments in a timely and accurate manner the factual information that is necessary to alleviate their concerns.

Representatives of a number of countries have been meeting periodically in Vienna to conduct discussions on an International Plutonium Management Regime. The countries participating are Belgium, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This group is in the late stages of drafting a set of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium.

One important feature of the proposed Guidelines would be a set of specific recommendations aimed precisely at increasing public understanding of the management of plutonium in the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle -- in other words, at increasing transparency. Under consideration are recommendations that would have each adherent to the Guidelines publish occasional brief statements explaining its national strategy for nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle and, against that background, its general plans for managing national holdings of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities, including plutonium transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities. Each adherent would also publish an annual statement of its holdings for peaceful purposes of plutonium in various forms, including an estimate of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel.

The United States is very much in favor of increased transparency regarding holdings of plutonium in the civil nuclear sector and will strongly support inclusion of the principles just described in any final text of the proposed Guidelines. We agree with our counterparts in other

governments that increased transparency is an important step in the right direction. But it is not, in our view, the only step that needs to be taken,

The fact is that there is at this moment too large a supply of recovered plutonium available worldwide in comparison with even the most optimistic expectations for near-term use. The existence of stockpiles of excess civil plutonium will continue to pose a serious proliferation risk until concrete steps are taken to bring supply and demand into balance. Left unaddressed, the situation will only become worse to the extend that plutonium recovered from dismantled weapons may begin to compete for the limited space in civilian power reactors. There is simply too much plutonium out there. The anti-nuclear activists know this, and they are intend on making sure that our legislatures and, increasingly, our general publics know it.

The United States does not dispute that decisions on the means for dealing with the problem of excess plutonium are sovereign decisions. But we do believe that they are decisions that must be faced up to in a serious manner, and sooner rather than later, if a global increase in the risk of proliferation is to be avoided. For our own part, we strongly believe that the accumulation of stockpiles of plutonium should be eliminated wherever possible. In keeping with this belief, we will continue to emphasize to our cooperating partners the importance of avoiding surpluses of plutonium. We will also continue with our own activities, already well under way, to reduce our stockpile of plutonium excess to defense needs and to examine the options for the long-term disposition of this plutonium. The U.S. Department of Energy has been preparing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on the latter subject, and specific decisions are expected in the near future. In the U.S. view, the prospects for the continued success of our common efforts to ensure a world free from the consequences of proliferation will very much depend on efforts to deal with excess fissile materials such as plutonium.

Appendix B  || Top

About the Authors

Ralph A. Cossa is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS and co-chair of the CSCAP International Working Group on CSBMs.

Zachary Davis is a policy analyst at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Hiroyuki Kuroda is Deputy Executive Director of the Japan National Committee for the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (JANCPEC).

Robert A. Manning, a State Department advisor for Asian policy from 1989-93, is a Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute.

Brad Roberts is a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, and co-chair of the CSBM Task Force of USCSCAP.

Tatsujiro Suzuki is a research fellow at the Socio-economic Research Center, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry in Tokyo and a former fellow at the Center for International Studies, MIT.