Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. founded in 1975, the thrust of the Forum's work is to help develop cooperative policies in the Asia-Pacific region through debate and analyses undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging issues in political, security, economic/business, and oceans policy issues. It collaborates with a network of more than 30 research institutes around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating its projects' findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and publics throughout the region

An international Board of Governors guides the Pacific Forum's work; it is chaired by Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Forum is funded by grants from foundations, corporations, individuals, and governments, the latter providing a small percentage of the forum's $1.2 million annual budget. The forum's studies are objective and nonpartisan and it does not engage in classified or proprietary work.

PACATOM: Building Confidence and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency
 

Prepared by Ralph A. Cossa
 
A Report from the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures

organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
 
 
Honolulu, Hawaii

October 1998

Acknowledgment

The Pacific Forum CSIS is grateful to the following organizations and foundations for their generous support of this project.

The Asia Foundation

The Cooperative Monitoring Center

The Ford Foundation

The U.S. Department of Energy

The United States Institute of Peace

The W. Alton Jones Foundation
 
The views expressed and conclusions reached, both in the main text and in the appendices, are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pacific Forum, the sponsors, other working group participants, or their parent countries or organizations.

PACATOM: Building Confidence and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency
Table of Contents
	Page
Executive Summary	v
Overview	1
Background	2
CSCAP
CSBM International Working Group
General Observations About CSBMs	3
General Observations About Nuclear Energy	4
Energy Demand
Use of Nuclear Energy
Environmental Considerations
Reprocessing Option
Impact of Asian Financial Crisis
PACATOM Goals and Objectives	6
Nuclear Energy-Related Concerns	7
Multifaceted Concerns
A Laymen’s Guide
Categories of Concern
PACATOM: A Work in Progress	11
Possible Scope of PACATOM Cooperative Activities	12
Safety Cooperation
Energy Cooperation
Research Cooperation
Regional Safeguards/Transparency
Managing the Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Managing the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Reviewing the Arguments	13
Alternative Approaches	14
Status Quo Plus
Creating a PACATOM Institution Now
Pro-Active Confidence Building Measures
Identifying the Core Issues	15
Safety
Back End Concerns
Interim Transparency/Confidence Building Measures	16
Specific Projects	17
Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Handbook
Generic Monitoring Project
Other Transparency Measures
Future Efforts	18
Appendices:
A. Summary of the May 1998 Working Group Meeting
B. Summary of the October 1997 Working Group Meeting
C. Summary of the May 1997 Working Group Meeting
D. Statement on Nuclear Fuel and Energy Issues by Senator Domenici
E. Combating the Civilian Use of Weapons-usable Plutonium, by Ed Fei
F. Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization Proposal
G. A Proposal for Regional Storage of Spend Fuel, by Atsuyuki Suzuki
H. Asian Regional Stability and Nuclear Fuel Cycles, by Ed Fei
I. Asia Pacific Regional Nuclear Framework: Requirements and Effects

PACATOM: Building Confidence and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency

Executive Summary

The prospects of a rapid increase in energy demand in the Asia-Pacific region, combined with the perceived need for energy security or self-sufficiency, have driven many countries to develop or at least contemplate the future use of nuclear energy. This real and projected increased peaceful use of nuclear energy brings with it rising safety and non-proliferation concerns. In order to address these concerns, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)--a non-governmental organization linking together research institutes and security specialists from throughout the region--is conducting an investigation as to the feasibility of developing multilateral approaches toward ensuring the peaceful, safe use of nuclear energy. The purpose of this examination, conducted by CSCAP's international Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), is to evaluate ways to increase nuclear safety and transparency and promote greater understanding and confidence among Asia-Pacific nations, while providing greater insight into regional nuclear-related concerns and potential acceptable solutions. Representatives from all the current and prospective nuclear energy users are currently participating in this CSCAP Working Group effort. The PACATOM project is premised on the belief that multilateral

confidence building measures aimed at increasing transparency and enhancing safeguards and individual assurances, if introduced at an early stage in the process, could help ensure that the anticipated expanded regional use of nuclear energy does not contribute to misunderstandings about the nuclear intentions of individual nations, while also promoting nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation goals. It is further driven by the recognition that, even in the extremely unlikely event that no newnuclear reactors were built in Asia, safety and security concerns associated with current ongoing programs still need to be addressed more effectively. These nuclear energy-related safety and security/proliferation concerns stem both from the production of electricity by nuclear power stations and from the operation of nuclear research reactors, especially those involved with plutonium-based fuel research. Other concerns center around the development and operation of reprocessing facilities which separate uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel rods for eventual reuse. Still other concerns are based on suspicions, emotions, misinterpretations or misunderstandings, or a lack of awareness of existing safety standards, procedures, and performance records. These real and suspected or imagined concerns run the gamut from

Next

Next

Next

Return to Table of Contents

[Next] aubrey

Next

Next

Next

Next

.

Next

.

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Next

Return to Table of Contents

	Foot Notes:	Back
1.	As stated in Article II of the CSCAP Charter. For a copy of the Charter and the June 1993 Kuala Lumpur Statement on the Establishment of CSCAP, see CSCAP Newsletter No. 1, May 1994, published by the Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which serves as the CSCAP Secretariat.
2.	Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, South and North Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. In addition, a European Community consortium and an Indian institute have joined as associate members.
3.	The UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the UN Department of Political Affairs' East Asia and the Pacific Division.
4.	U.S., Singapore, and Republic of Korea CSCAP member committees co-sponsor the CSBM Working Group. I have the pleasure of serving as one of its co-chairs.
5.	This was initially recommended by the CSBM task force established by the U.S. member committee (USCSCAP) to support the international effort. For details, see Brad Roberts and Robert Ross, "Confidence and Security Building Measures: A USCSCAP Task Force Report," in Ralph A. Cossa (ed), Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures (Washington D.C.:Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), Significant Issues Series, Vol XVII, No 3, pp. 137-160.
6.	Papers summarizing the CSBM Working Group's initial investigation of the topic, at its spring and fall 1998 meetings, can be found in Ralph A. Cossa (ed), Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities (Honolulu, Hi: Pacific Forum CSIS Occasional Paper, December 1996). Minutes from the three most recent meeting's on the PACATOM project are at Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.
7.	These findings were subsequently endorsed by the CSCAP Steering Committee and contained in CSCAP Memorandum No. 2: Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, published in 1995 by the CSCAP Secretariat.
8.	Notwithstanding the fact that some regional leaders can (rightfully) be accused occasionally of using this principle for this purpose.
9.	According to the APERC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook in the APEC Region produced by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, Institute of Energy Economics, Tokyo, Japan (Spring 1998).
10.	Marsha Burton and Lynne Olver, "Shut Down: Can nuclear plants survive deregulation: The jury is still out," Wall Street Journal, Sept 14, 1998, p. R21, citing U.S. Department of Energy sources and statistics.
11.	According to Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Japan charts prepared by Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki, which draws from MITI Advisory Council on Energy sources.
12.	Byong Whi Lee, "Viable Regional Cooperation of Nuclear Energy: Issues and Strategies," paper presented at the Okinawa Energy Business Forum on Harmonization of Energy and Environment, Okinawa, Japan, October 6-9, 1998.
13.	Hiroshi Araki, "Harmonization of Energy and Environment," keynote speech presented at the Okinawa Energy Business Forum on Harmonization of Energy and Environment, p. 6.
14.	Murray Stewart, "Clean Sustainable Electricity: Cooperation in the development of the nuclear option in the Asia-Pacific Region," paper presented at the Okinawa Energy Business Forum, p. 10.
15.	Pete Domenici, "Statement on Nuclear Fuel and Energy Issues." For the full text of this statement, see Appendix D.
16.	Ibid.
17.	Araki, p. 6.
18.	18. There are also "environmental security" concerns over global warming and greenhouse emissions. As noted earlier, since day to day operations of nuclear powered reactors are non-polluting, the Japanese (among others) cite concerns about global environmental security when advocating the nuclear power option.
19.	Under this agreement, brokered in 1994, North Korea agreed to freeze its ongoing nuclear research program (which was suspected to be nuclear weapons-related) in return for interim heavy fuel oil deliveries and the eventual construction of two less proliferation prone light water nuclear reactors. KEDO was established to implement this agreement.
20.	Ed Fei, "Combating the Civilian Use of Weapons-usable Plutonium," a February 4, 1998 draft report. A copy of this report is included as Appendix E.
21.	This plan was suspended after heavy international criticism but could resurface.
22.	Fei, "Combating Civilian Use," see p.E1.
23.	Roberts and Ross, p. 155.
24.	Ibid.
25.	For more details, see Robert A. Manning, "PACATOM: A Nuclear Cooperation Regime as Asian CSBM," in R. Cossa (ed), Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, pp. 29-40, op cit. 26.
26.	See Brad Roberts and Zachary Davis, "Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Survey of Proposals," in Ralph A. Cossa (ed), Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities, pp. 1-10.
27.	A detailed summary of possible nuclear fuel cycle issues, a comparative assessment of experience in various regions, and a compilation of relevant documents has been provided by Ed Fei of the U.S. Department of Energy. See Edward Fei, "Nuclear Energy and Fuel Cycle Issues in East Asia" and "Appendix A" in Michael Stankiewicz, Energy and Security in Northeast Asia, IGCC Policy Paper No. 24 (Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, August 1996).
28.	In this regard, broad international support was urged for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, given KEDO's contribution to transparency and cooperation on nuclear energy-related issues.
29.	While Chinese officials had reportedly talked about establishing a common site in China years ago, it was made clear that such an option was "totally unacceptable" today.
30.	See for example, the Republic of Korea's proposal for an Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization (ANSCO) which was tabled at the fall, 1997 CSCAP CSBM Meeting and is provided in Appendix F.
31.	Araki, p. 7.
32.	Atsuyuki Suzuki, "A Proposal for Regional Storage of Spent Fuel," paper presented at the Okinawa Energy Business Forum conference and provided here as Appendix G.
33.	Ibid.
34.	However, in the area of physical security (i.e., facility protection), too much transparency regarding details as to how security procedures were designed or implemented could prove counter- productive.
35.	Ed Fei, "Asian Regional Stability and Nuclear Fuel Cycles." Fei's commentary, which also includes a list of specific steps to be taken, can be found at Appendix H. For another perspective with additional recommended steps, all see Kaoru Kikuyama, "Asia Pacific Regional Nuclear Framework: Requirements and Effects," which was presented at the May 1998 CSBM Working Group Meeting and is reprinted as Appendix I.
36.	The PRC is currently considering a request to hold a CSBM Working Group meeting at one of its operational nuclear power production facilities.

Appendix A

Eighth Meeting of the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures

May 7-9, 1998, Washington, DC

Summary of Discussions

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) International Working Group (IWG) on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) met for the eighth time on 7-9 May, 1998 in Washington DC. During this session, participants built upon the Working Group's earlier efforts to identify, define, and promote regional CSBMs associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Fifteen CSCAP Member/Associate Member Committees were represented. Representatives from the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and five Washington-based Asia-Pacific embassies attended, as did the director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and one scholar from Taiwan, all in their private capacities. All told, there were almost 40 participants, with an additional 30+ observers in attendance for all or parts of the three day meeting. A follow-on meeting was held at the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico involving 16 participants from 8 member committees plus the UN Regional Centre and Taiwan to discuss how cooperative monitoring can assist confidence building and transparency among nuclear energy users in Asia.

The objective of the Washington DC meeting was to examine various approaches and options for addressing regional concerns, suspicions, and misunderstandings about nuclear energy programs. These include concerns about the safety of nuclear energy production and research operations, the potential downsides and dangers associated with reprocessing, spent fuel and other nuclear waste storage and disposal challenges, questions regarding the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials, and general suspicions about nuclear weapons applications and proliferation.

The CSBM Working Group has established three broad overall goals for its Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation (PACATOM) project:

- to identify, articulate, address, and where possible and appropriate alleviate nuclear energy-related concerns;

- to identify and help institute a series of information collection and dissemination and confidence building measures aimed at reducing current nuclear energy-related concerns while setting the stage for more formalized multilateral cooperation; and

- to assess the feasibility and define the likely parameters of an institutionalized regional regime aimed at promoting greater safety, security, and transparency in nuclear energy production and research operations.

A wide-ranging list of potential CSBMs had been developed at the October 1997 CSBM Meeting in Fukushima, Japan. This session's objective was to build upon that work by investigating some of those suggestions in greater detail. A range of other options and approaches were also examined, beginning with maintaining the status quo (i.e., working through existing regimes, perhaps with incremental changes or improvements) and including, at the other extreme, the creation of a formal governmental (or at least semi-official) PACATOM mechanism.

To put issues in a contemporary context, the group began by discussing the effects of the recent financial crisis on demand for nuclear energy. Some thought the lower emission targets set at last year's Kyoto Global Environmental Conference, along with the rising relative cost of oil in Asia (due to local currency devaluation), might increase the demand for nuclear energy. Others, however, cited the high start-up (capital) costs in developing reactors which would make nuclear energy even more prohibitively expensive. In general, it appears that countries currently pursuing nuclear energy will likely be more inclined to maintain or accelerate their programs while those faced with the huge costs of initiating such a program would be less inclined to go down that path. It was also noted that costly approaches toward nuclear energy CSBMs, and especially the establishment of a formal PACATOM institution, would seem less attractive to financially-strained governments. Getting officials to focus on nuclear energy-related concerns in the midst of the current Asian financial crisis could also prove difficult.

Following an update on the Working Group's past efforts, formal and informal multilateral and bilateral measures aimed at promoting nuclear safety and non-proliferation were reviewed. Regimes and a range of other measures that currently deal with nuclear energy issues and concerns were discussed in an attempt to find areas that were not currently covered by global initiatives. The basis for current cooperation rests in part with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its enhanced safeguards protocol (93+2) effort. All Asia Pacific states were encouraged to sign individual protocols with the IAEA to put this program into place--to date, only one Asia Pacific country (Australia) is among the seven nations that have adopted the 93+2 protocol. A broad variety of other initiatives were also reviewed and applauded. Management of spent fuel was the key issue that appeared not to be sufficiently addressed by current international efforts. Many participants also saw the need for a more comprehensive survey of existing mechanisms and proposals.

One of the functions of this CSCAP working group is to enhance transparency about regional nuclear energy programs. During this session, nuclear energy specialists from Japan and China provided an in-depth look at the current and projected future role for nuclear energy within the context of each nation's overall energy needs. Their presentations included information on nuclear energy production, research, reprocessing, safety, and anticipated future challenges and concerns.

Japan has the most extensive nuclear energy program, with 33% of electricity generated from nuclear power stations today. (This could rise to 45% by 2010.) However, Japan's nuclear energy program faces growing opposition from the general public and industry orders for new stations are declining, despite public awareness of the important role nuclear energy plays within Japan's overall energy security program. Japan, like all other nuclear energy producers, faces a problem with high-level waste storage and disposal. Japan's nuclear energy facilities and operations are under full safeguards and are frequently inspected. To further increase transparency, Japan has invited neighboring states to participate in regional workshops and training courses.

China also has a long-term commitment to nuclear energy. Per capita energy consumption in China is expected to rise as economic development continues and this will require increased reliance on nuclear power to meet future energy needs. While China, as a nuclear weapons state, is not subject to IAEA proliferation safeguards, it follows IAEA and other international safety standards and, to date, has experienced no significant safety or environmental problems. The PRC has a fast breeder reactor program for research but has not made a decision on commercialization. A review was also provided of some of the existing U.S.-Chinese cooperation programs that are already helping to address some of the bilateral concerns about nuclear energy.

The second day was devoted to a systematic discussion of various options ranging between maintaining the status quo and an institutionalized PACATOM. The purpose was not to take a vote to determine a CSCAP recommendation at the end of the day but rather to help develop possible steps forward for the Working Group.

Those advocating maintaining the status quo while pursuing only incremental changes noted that there is no shortage of institutions currently dealing with nuclear energy concerns. A new regional safeguards regime, it was argued, would require enormous political investment and was unlikely to succeed. Fully funding existing institutions, rather than creating new ones, would be more successful in addressing the problems. In this regard, broad international support was urged for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). It was further argued that countries using nuclear power had a legal and moral obligation to dispose of their own spent fuel without jeopardizing the security of others. It was incumbent upon individual states to solve the problem themselves without burdening the rest of the region.

The counter argument was that common problems might lend themselves to common solutions and that joint efforts could be more cost efficient in hard financial times. What to do about spent fuel and other radioactive waste is a dilemma that all nuclear energy producers face together. One possible solution was a common spent fuel disposal site. Location, of course, is the key and no Asia Pacific country appears eager to become a repository for other countries' spent fuel. (While Chinese officials had reportedly talked about establishing a common site in China years ago, it was made clear that such an option was "totally unacceptable" today.) Another problem with the status quo approach was that many in the region were not confident that existing institutions were adequately dealing with, much less fixing, existing problems. At a minimum, greater transparency of existing institutions seemed essential.

Presentations then turned to the desirability and feasibility of establishing an institutionalized PACATOM mechanism. While the EURATOM model provided some potentially useful lessons learned, its focus was on ensuring a stable fuel supply. By contrast, the primary concerns in Asia are related to transparency, safety, and spent fuel storage and disposal. Measures to enhance nuclear safety were generally easy, but measures to address the back end of the fuel cycle were much harder. It was also noted that the greatest challenges were political rather than technological and that this added to the difficulty of institutionalized approaches. As a result, many believed that cooperative measures should be emphasized over measures which placed new constraints or requirements (and thus drew greater political opposition). The principle of inclusivity was also debated, including the benefits and drawbacks of including India (and perhaps even non-CSCAP member Pakistan) in the broader PACATOM effort.

Finally, presentations turned to the middle ground between the extremes of either status quo maintainence or development of a formal PACATOM institution. It was noted that the process of cooperation was the key to successful regional CSBMs in the Asia Pacific, rather than the establishment of costly, time-consuming, and potentially distracting institutions or structures. Many of the measures identified at the October 1997 Fukushima meeting were process-oriented and worthy of continued consideration. These include joint training of plant operators, operator and technician exchange programs, greater sharing of information (especially in such areas as training, security standards and techniques, accident response procedures, etc.), the sharing of radiation and other technical data, the exchange of intelligence information (especially regarding potential physical threats to nuclear energy facilities), the possible creation of nuclear energy "white papers," and promoting greater awareness of existing information (including an inventory of items available through the world wide web or elsewhere).

More formalized initiatives worth considering included the establishment of a regional information center, greater sharing of in-house or limited access information (including voluntary disclosure of data collected by the IAEA), cooperative efforts aimed at guaranteeing future fuel supplies (especially as an alternative to reprocessing), and the development of regional norms or principles relating to nuclear energy cooperation. Participants also recognized the importance of unilateral confidence building and transparency efforts which can also serve as models for other states to emulate.

The Working Group also received a presentation on the potential for international spent fuel management -- an idea that has been around for a long time but is currently being reevaluated as an cooperative approach which could build confidence in Asia and lessen proliferation risks. Efforts (such as those undertaken at this meeting) to better define problems and candidly discuss suspicions and concerns and approaches to dealing with them were also seen as confidence building efforts in their own right.

In summarizing day two discussions, most appeared to agree that a status quo or incremental approach alone was not a satisfying option for addressing security problems associated with nuclear energy. In addition, while there may be some virtues in institution building (especially in approaching back end of the fuel cycle problems), funding concerns are a problem, particularly given the financial crisis. As a result, a formal, institutionalized PACATOM still seems premature.

Working Group members did agree, however, that greater transparency of existing facilities and operations is needed, along with greater awareness of the many efforts already underway to promote nuclear energy cooperation. It is in these areas that the CSBM Working Group can makes its greatest immediate contribution. Participants agreed that the CSBM Working Group should take the lead in developing a comprehensive inventory of current organizations, programs, and initiatives that already address nuclear energy-related challenges and concerns, in order to understand what institutions and processes--whether multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral--are tackling what parts of the problem. A review of various ASIATOM, PACATOM, and other multilateral nuclear energy-related cooperation proposals should be included in such a Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Handbook, in order to evaluate their feasibility and to see what aspects of these initiatives can realistically be incorporated into CSCAP's future efforts. The aim is to create a comprehensive roadmap of what's already being done or proposed to better educate the policy making community and to better determine what still needs to be done. Once completed, this Handbook should be posted on the world wide web and continually updated.

The Working Group also endorsed continued transparency efforts such as last year's CSBM Working Group visit to Fukushima nuclear power station and called upon other member committees to approach their governments about conducting similar tours at their facilities. The feasibility of establishing a "Statement of Principles Relating to Nuclear Energy Research and Production in the Asia Pacific" was also discussed, as was the possibility of developing a generic Nuclear Energy White Paper (similar to our earlier Defense White Paper effort) to promote greater transparency among nuclear energy producers. It was generally agreed that the CSBM Working Group could also serve an important function by continuing to highlight nuclear energy-related problems and concerns, while also serving as a forum for pursuing possible solutions.

While agreeing that more work should be done on the PACATOM project, participants also discussed other areas worth examining. Members generally agreed that the CSBM Working Group was uniquely qualified to continue examining the ASEAN Regional Forum's future role as a potential preventive diplomacy mechanism, provided the ARF did not launch its own investigation of this topic. The possibility of conducting preventive diplomacy case studies and simulation exercises to better define how preventive diplomacy could work in the region was favorably discussed.

Questions were raised about the impact existing bilateral military relationships had on confidence building (or confidence reduction) and the possibility of developing a register outlining the scope and intent of current military alliances and arrangements was also discussed as another possible transparency measure. Such an effort might also be come part of a broader examination of regional security outlooks. The possibility of examining confidence building measures aimed at reducing the potential for conflict in the South China Sea was also raised but there was no consensus reached in favor of pursuing this topic.

During the follow-on meeting at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, participants were exposed to a wide variety of existing nuclear energy-related transparency and cooperative measures employing the latest available technologies. Of particular interest were examples of airborne radiation monitoring and transportation monitoring. CMC also outlined their visiting scholar program and indicated that they would seriously consider supporting a research proposal from a CSCAP member (or members) aimed at establishing an Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Handbook (which could also be posted on their website). Several members also suggested a pilot program, perhaps undertaken by a small select group of Working Group members, aimed at developing a generic nuclear energy monitoring scheme that could then be presented to nuclear energy producers in the region for consideration on a unilateral basis. CMC expressed interest in pursuing this idea as well.

In sum, both the Washington and Albuquerque meetings provided participants with new insights into the nature and complexity of nuclear energy-related problems and concerns. The discussions reinforced the need for greater awareness among Asia Pacific policy makers of the potential problems and the need for imaginative cooperative approaches toward addressing them. While the creation of a formal PACATOM institution remains premature, much needs to be done to increase transparency and promote confidence in the region. The states of the region, individually and collectively, must do more to deal with common problems such as spent fuel management, storage, and disposal and regional apprehensions about the safety and security of nuclear energy production, research, and reprocessing activities. As a result, the CSCAP Working Group proposes to continue its efforts first to identify and articulate nuclear energy-related concerns and then to identify and help develop confidence building measures aimed at reducing these concerns while also setting the stage for more formalized multilateral cooperation in the future.
 

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix B

Seventh Meeting of the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures

October 30-31, 1997, Fukushima, Japan

Summary of Discussions

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) International Working Group (IWG) on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) met for the seventh time on 30-31 Oct, 1997 in Fukushima, Japan. Ralph Cossa (USCSCAP) chaired the session, which was co-hosted by CSCAP-Japan. The meeting focused on nuclear energy-related issues and concerns as part of the IWG's investigation of the PACATOM concept. Representatives from nine CSCAP Member/Associate Member Committees attended, along with a scholar from Taiwan and several government officials, all in their private capacities. There was a good mix of policy and technical energy expertise with most (but by no means all) participants possessing some working knowledge of nuclear energy-related issues.

The meeting began with a comprehensive briefing and tour of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Participants were provided extensive details on the plant's operations, capabilities, and safety standards/record, along with a brief overview on Japan's overall nuclear energy program and TEPCO/Fukushima's contribution to this effort. The tour of the reactor facility, which began in the control room for reactors five and six, allowed us to stand atop one of the reactor cores and visually inspect IAEA seals (under the watchful eye of ever-present IAEA surveillance cameras). We also inspected a reactor cooling pond where spent fuel rods are initially stored, plus the common spent fuel storage pond and the spent fuel dry storage cask facility which both provide interim or longer term storage. TEPCO personnel were open and direct in answering our questions on current and future planned operations and allowed pictures to be taken throughout the tour. We also experienced, first hand, TEPCO's security and safety procedures and IAEA monitoring efforts. All agreed that the tour was a useful confidence building transparency effort and we are all extremely grateful to TEPCO for their gracious hospitality and support.

The IWG meeting itself was described in advance as a "working session" without fixed agenda, aimed at taking stock of where the PACATOM project has been and is (or should be) going. In the Chair's opening comments, it was stressed that the intent of the IWG's PACATOM project was neither to promote nor to rally efforts against nuclear energy but merely to highlight the regional concerns associated with its use and to investigate if multilateral confidence building efforts could help alleviate or reduce these concerns. At a minimum, the IWG's efforts can (and already have) contributed to a greater awareness among both the policy-making and nuclear energy communities of regional concerns related to nuclear energy research and production.

The IWG's efforts in this field may range from simple information gathering and dissemination on one end of the spectrum to the possibility of defining and promoting an international PACATOM organization to address identified problems in a more institutionalized fashion. In between these two extremes are a variety of interim steps or measures that can help identify, articulate, and hopefully address or alleviate nuclear energy-related regional concerns. Even if a formalized PACATOM organization proves unattainable or ill-advised, a series of confidence building measures aimed at reducing current concerns and perhaps setting the stage for future more institutionalized cooperation could prove helpful.

Given the venue and availability of Japanese nuclear specialists and officials, this meeting also provided an opportunity to gain insights into some of the highly-publicized troubles experienced by Japanese nuclear power operations in recent years. In support of this effort, the group received a very candid, comprehensive assessment of Japan's nuclear power production and research programs and problems from an official assigned to the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). He provided details on the various accidents and incidents of mismanagement that have shaken public confidence in PNC and in Japan's nuclear energy program in general and its nuclear fuel cycle (reprocessing) plan in particular. He noted, however, that there was also concern in Japan about future energy shortages and greenhouse gasses caused by burning fossil fuels, concluding that Japan had no option but to pursue nuclear energy as a critical component in its overall energy program.

While others may use to term "energy security" to describe proliferation or other military-related concerns, in the Japanese context it deals with ensuring a stable, reliable supply of energy in a nation which (in the energy sector) is resource poor and thus increasingly dependent on outside sources to satisfy its growing energy needs. Japanese reprocessing efforts (at home and abroad) and research in plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor technology should be seen in this light. Nonetheless, there is great and growing awareness in Japan regarding regional concerns over such activities--concerns which were reinforced and amplified during this meeting (see below). Japanese analysts also recognized the consequent need both for greater transparency and for careful and continuing analysis of their efforts in this (internationally and domestically) politically sensitive area.

IWG participants began their PACATOM deliberations with a renewed look at the nuclear energy-related problems or areas of concern that we hoped to address through this multilateral effort. The following categories of concern were identified:

- the safety of nuclear energy production and research operations, including dangers to the environment, operational mishaps, safety standards and training, emergency response capabilities, and growing public apprehension (including, among other issues, growing public perceptions/misperceptions about nuclear power safety and the not-in-my backyard or NIMBY factor);

- the potential downsides and dangers associated with reprocessing, including added safety and environmental concerns, transportation and storage difficulties, fears about proliferation or diversion for military use, and precedents and implications for programs of neighboring states;

- spent fuel and other nuclear waste storage and disposal challenges--both interim and long term and involving both high and low-level radioactive waste--which have both safety and security/proliferation aspects and which also have political, psychological, and emotional dimensions that should not be underestimated or ignored;

- questions regarding the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials (i.e., susceptibility to terrorism, espionage or external attack); the general adequacy of safeguards; the inadequacy of current transparency efforts; the unavailability, inaccessibility, or inadequacy of public information; and problems just over the horizon associated with eventual decommissioning of aging nuclear power production and research facilities.

IWG participants recognized that many of these problems and challenges were, first and foremost, domestic issues that needed to be dealt with on an individual basis, but noted that many also had broad-reaching international implications. Specialists within the group also pointed out that many bilateral and multilateral efforts (including those of the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators) were also addressing many of these problems. Obviously, CSCAP's PACATOM efforts must recognize, complement, and build upon (while being careful not to undermine or detract from) existing efforts. It was also recognized that the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime distinguishes between the declared nuclear weapons states and non-weapons states when it comes to applying IAEA safeguards. It was generally agreed, however, that efforts aimed at enhancing nuclear safety should not be discriminatory, but should to the maximum extent possible apply to all participants equally.

The value of greater transparency regarding most aspects of nuclear energy production and research was highlighted, along with the recognition that, in the area of physical security (i.e., facility protection), too much transparency regarding details as to how security procedures were designed or implemented could prove counterproductive. A step-by-step incremental approach toward the development and implementation of confidence building measures was also endorsed as the most practical approach.

A brainstorming session was also held, in order to develop a broad (and largely unevaluated) list of transparency and other confidence building measures that could be subject to further examination at future meetings. This shopping list included joint training of plant operators, operator and technician exchange programs, greater sharing of information (especially in such areas as training, security standards and techniques, accident response procedures, etc.), the sharing of radiation and other technical data, the exchange of intelligence information (especially regarding potential physical threats to nuclear energy facilities), the possible creation of nuclear energy "white papers," and promoting greater awareness of existing information (including an inventory of items available through the world wide web or elsewhere).

Other initiatives worth considering included the establishment of a regional information center, greater sharing of in-house or limited access information (including voluntary disclosure of data collected by the IAEA), cooperative efforts aimed at guaranteeing future fuel supplies (especially as an alternative to reprocessing), the creation of a regional joint reprocessing facility and/or a common regional waste storage or disposal facility, identifying (or in their absence establishing) regional norms relating to nuclear safety, promoting and tabulating bilateral agreements and investigating which ones may lend themselves to broader participation, promoting "open skies" agreements, giving consideration to a "non-targeting of nuclear facilities" agreement, and undertaking efforts to achieve greater awareness of available technologies and cooperative monitoring capabilities. Participants also recognized the importance of unilateral confidence building and transparency efforts which can also serve as models for other states to emulate. Efforts (such as those undertaken at this meeting) to better define problems and candidly discuss suspicions and concerns and approaches to dealing with them represent confidence building efforts in their own right.

There was no attempt at this meeting to further evaluate these suggestions and they do not, at this point, reflect IWG recommended actions. They will likely be the subject of further examination and debate at subsequent IWG meetings. A consensus did appear to emerge, however, over the need for a comprehensive inventory of current unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral safety and transparency efforts already underway in the region. Among these is a Republic of Korea proposal for the establishment of The Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization (ANSCO). A copy of the draft ANSCO was distributed at the IWG meeting. It was also widely recognized that the use of plutonium as a fuel source (either by itself or as a component in so-called MOX fuel) both raises the need for, and the challenge to, regional confidence building efforts.

Further examination of nuclear energy safety and security-related issues, to include the development of near-term transparency and other confidence building efforts, appears advisable and potentially fruitful. This includes, but is neither limited to nor contingent upon, examination of the prospects for (and nature of) future more institutionalized approaches toward multilateral cooperation in this field. Given the breadth of topics to be discussed and the level of expertise desired among the participants, it appears useful to separate the PACATOM project from other CSBM Working Group efforts at this time.

A follow-on CSBM Working Group meeting dedicated to this effort is proposed for the spring of 1998 in Washington, DC. Consideration is also being given to arranging a side trip for interested participants to the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, New Mexico) to learn more about various technologies available to assist in promoting confidence and transparency in the nuclear energy field.

Among the topics to be discussed at the spring 1998 meting will be the various potential confidence building measures emanating from this meeting's brainstorming session. We also would like to further investigate the subject of just how safe or unsafe nuclear energy is, to include examination of differences in safety records for power production vice research and reprocessing or storage facilities. An effort will be made to create an inventory of current organizations, programs, and initiatives that already address nuclear energy-related challenges and concerns. The IWG will also continue its examination of efforts in other regions (such as EURATOM and ABACC) to identify lessons learned.

The next meeting will begin with a "nuclear energy 101"-type lecture to provide the audience with a common basic level of understanding of the nuclear energy process and its related issues and concerns, based on the recognition that representatives bring varying levels of expertise to the table. (A failure to provide such a primer was acknowledged to be a shortcoming of the May 1997 IWG meeting.) In the interest of promoting greater awareness as to major nuclear energy research and production efforts, we would also like to request CSCAP-Japan and CSCAP-China to give presentations on the nature and extent of the nuclear power programs of their respective nations. (Similar presentations by other nuclear energy users may be included in future meetings.) We also intend to expand upon our earlier survey of various ASIATOM, PACATOM, and other multilateral nuclear energy-related cooperation proposals in order to evaluate their feasibility and see what can realistically be incorporated into our own future efforts.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix C

Sixth Meeting of the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures

May 21-23, 1997, Washington, DC

Summary of Discussions

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) International Working Group (IWG) on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) met for the sixth time in Washington DC on 21-23 May, 1997. Ralph Cossa (USCSCAP) and Kwa Chong Guan (CSCAP-Singapore) served as co-chairs. The two primary topics of discussion were nuclear energy-related confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy.

Representatives from 15 of 18 CSCAP Member/Associate Member Committees attended, along with the directors of both our UN affiliates, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the UN Department of Political Affairs' East Asia and the Pacific Division. Two scholars from Taiwan also attended in their private capacities, as did representatives from the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and State and 8 Washington-based Asian embassies. All told, there were over 40 participants and an additional 40+ observers in attendance for all or parts of the three day meeting.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, was a featured guest speaker at an IWG luncheon that was also attended by many Asia-Pacific Ambassadors and other senior Embassy staff members. The meeting also featured a special presentation on the U.S. Department of Energy's Cooperative Monitoring Center which described the Center's capabilities and how they might support CSBM Working Group efforts or other regional or national bilateral, multilateral, or even unilateral confidence building efforts.

Nuclear Energy

The IWG continued its examination into the prospects for multilateral cooperation in matters dealing with nuclear energy-related safety and proliferation concerns, building upon discussions from the two immediately previous meetings.

Participants focused first on energy requirements and associated security concerns in the Asia Pacific region. The group examined the region's projected energy needs and where nuclear energy fit into this picture. It was noted that energy demand is growing faster in Asia than perhaps anywhere else in the world and that many states in the region see nuclear power is an important means of satisfying part of their overall energy needs.

Nuclear energy is likely to continue to account for only a small percentage of overall energy supply in Asia, however. As coal, oil, and natural gas-related technologies make these primary sources of energy cleaner and more economical, nuclear energy will likely become somewhat less attractive. Nonetheless, the presence of nuclear materials and technologies poses both short-term and long-term problems that, if not addressed more directly, could significantly undermine confidence of states in one another and their future security relations. Even if no new nuclear reactors were built in Asia -- an extremely unlikely event -- nuclear energy and its associated safety and security concerns are destined to remain.

Safety concerns centered around the safe operation of nuclear power plants and the safe handling of nuclear fuel and waste materials. The planned disposal in North Korea of low level radioactive waste from Taiwan and lingering suspicions regarding Japanese stockpiling of plutonium and its transshipment through the region had a political as well as a safety and a security dimension. Spent fuel storage and questions relating to reactor decommissioning added additional safety concerns, while the concept of a central location for spent fuel storage raised various political and potential security problems as well.

Meanwhile, in the back of everyone's mind is concern about the potential development of nuclear weapons by any of today's nuclear energy users, even if operating under current IAEA safeguards. As more states operate nuclear reactors for energy or research purposes, such suspicions or concerns about possible weapons proliferation (warranted or not) are likely to grow.

It should be stressed that the working group's proliferation concerns in this context were not intended to go beyond those associated with nuclear energy-related issues -- test ban treaties, non-first-use proposals, missile control regimes, and various arms control-related initiatives were not the focus of our attention here. In addition, while the group has previously supported nuclear weapons free zones as an important confidence building measure, our examination of these mechanisms in this instance is restricted to how they impact upon or possibly provide useful examples for multilateral cooperation in the nuclear energy field.

IWG participants were also asked to examine if the creation of a nuclear cooperation forum would be useful in addressing the above concerns and thus contribute to confidence and security in the region. Members surveyed the experience of other regions to determine what lessons can be learned that might prove useful in determining the nature and purposes of a regional forum.

It was clear that any attempt to duplicate the EURATOM experience in Asia -- i.e., create an identical organization that provides for common ownership of fissile materials, jointly conducted regional safeguards, and shared reprocessing of spent fuels -- was destined to fail, given the differences that exist between Asia today and Europe 40 years ago. It did seem clear, however, that it was much easier (and considerably less painful) to learn from others' mistakes than to learn from your own, and several of our European participants gave extremely candid and useful expositions on pitfalls to be avoided when pursuing nuclear energy-related multilateral cooperation.

Finally, the views from the various Asia Pacific sub-regions regarding the future of nuclear cooperation were examined. Once again, participants reviewed how a multilateral cooperative regime might be crafted to address sub-regional concerns and, if feasible, what should be its primary objectives. It was generally agreed that the area of nuclear safety was one in which concern was wide-spread and cooperation was possible and less controversial. This could include the exchange of operational experience and the development and sharing of accident response procedures.

For sake of simplicity, the group initially used the term PACATOM or ASIATOM in describing the multilateral mechanism to be examined. It must be stressed, however, that this is not to imply that we are promoting, much less trying to create, a EURATOM for Asia. Numerous PACATOM or ASIATOM proposals have, in fact, surfaced in recent years. Our effort is focused on examining different proposals and, more importantly, looking at regional challenges and concerns, and seeing how best to deal with them cooperatively.

Even if no formal organization or mechanism is found to be feasible or desirable, most agreed that discussions on this issue were important to sensitize policy-makers on the wide range of regional concerns surrounding the use of nuclear energy.

Preventive Diplomacy

The IWG continued its examination of preventive diplomacy. First, participants examined what kind of preventive diplomacy activities are currently going on regionally and globally, including efforts undertaken by the UN. The focus was on determining how these efforts might apply elsewhere in the region and on what states in the region could be doing to support and encourage preventive diplomacy efforts, unilaterally and bilaterally, as well as multilaterally. UN terminology was reviewed to provide a clear definition of preventive diplomacy and how it differs from other somewhat related initiatives. Recent successful Chinese bilateral and multilateral preventive diplomacy efforts were also highlighted as examples that might apply more broadly across the region.

The IWG then reexamined its previous recommendations regarding how the ARF could take on a preventive diplomacy role, with emphasis on what should be done now to help it evolve in this direction. Having laid out some possible objectives for the ARF at the last meeting -- objectives that were reportedly considered by some as a bit too ambitious when reviewed at the ARF Track Two Preventive Diplomacy Conference in Paris last November -- the focus this time was on how to get there from here; i.e., on interim, less ambitious steps that could be taken to move the ARF in the right direction.

Next steps could include increasing trust among ARF members by delimiting the scope of preventive diplomacy beforehand and continuing confidence building measures, widening perspectives and participation in the exercise of preventive diplomacy, undertaking a first draft of the principles for preventive diplomacy, and garnering knowledge by surveying existing early warning systems.

Future Steps

The last session of the IWG meeting was dedicated to reassessing the scope and relevance of the CSBM Working Group's activities and in charting the role and objective of the group's future activities. The co-chairs reiterated the earlier consensus view that IWG activities must complement but not duplicate the ARF's or other regional efforts. As a result, the IWG will continue to closely monitor and coordinate its own research with the efforts of the ARF's Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and related ARF initiatives in order to ensure that its own track two, non-governmental efforts complement the more official governmental effort.

In this regard, it was noted that ARF Senior Officials were currently deliberating on next year's ARF agenda and that one proposal under consideration was for the EU and Singapore to co-chair an ARF Track Two Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in September, 1997. Given CSCAP's stated desire to become more closely affiliated with the ARF process, most members viewed this as an excellent opportunity for CSCAP, through the CSBM IWG, to take an active, if not leading role in this ARF effort.

It was fully recognized that the decision for CSCAP to pursue such a role was up to the Steering Committee to decide and the decision to allow CSCAP to play such a role was in the hands of the ARF ministers. Nonetheless, IWG members expressed a willingness to actively participate in the ARF Preventive Diplomacy Track Two Workshop in whatever capacity was deemed appropriate. It seemed more appropriate to become directly involved in the ARF Track Two effort than to pursue a parallel path at this time, provided the ARF did in fact conduct such a workshop.

[NOTE: The Steering Committee endorsed the proposal to pursue an active CSCAP role in the ARF Track Two process and the ARF, at least at the senior officials level, seems supportive of CSCAP taking the lead in this effort. CSCAP-Singapore and CSCAP-EU will likely co-host the ARF Preventive Diplomacy Track Two Workshop, in close coordination with the CSBM IWG.]

The IWG also saw great value in further examining the prospects for greater dialogue and potential multilateral cooperation on issues relating to the use of nuclear energy, while perhaps also looking at broader energy-related concerns as well. Safety-related concerns appeared to be a good area for initial focus, as did nuclear waste management, with a eye toward determining what type of regimes might be feasible and desirable in dealing with these concerns. A more detailed examination of lessons learned from earlier attempts at nuclear cooperation also appears useful, in order to more effectively channel our confidence building efforts. A useful next step appeared to be a smaller, more focused workshop aimed at more clearly defining the parameters of our research effort.

[IT was further learned at the CSCAP Steering Committee meting that the ARF plans a second track two conference this fall, on non-proliferation. Pending ARF ministers' approval, it will likely be co-hosted by CSCAP-New Zealand and CSCAP-Indonesia, again with assistance provided by the CSBM IWG. It is anticipated that at least one session will be devoted to the subject of nuclear energy safety and non-proliferation concerns.]

Other possible future efforts involve follow-ons to earlier ground-breaking research by the IWG on arms registers and defense policy papers. At several earlier meetings, the IWG investigated the utility and applicability of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to the Asia Pacific region, while also laying the groundwork for possible development of an Asian Arms Register. Future work on this topic has been postponed, pending the outcome of the 1997 UN review of the Arms Register.

The IWG has also previously developed a generic outline for defense policy papers ("white papers") to aid those regional states who have decided to produce or refine current versions of this transparency tool. Several regional states have reportedly adopted this model as a guide in preparing their own reports. Exchanging information on the development and refinement of such papers could enhance regional trust and military transparency. If such an initiative is not pursued at the track one level, the IWG may seek to do some follow-up work here as well.

The potential role of the IWG in monitoring and assessing the progress of the track one process in adopting and implementing confidence building measures recommended by the ARF, CSCAP, and others was also raised and seems worthy of future consideration. The IWG will also be watching for additional suggestions to come out of the ARF meeting and various ISG reports, while recognizing that our role is as much to anticipate and/or drive the ARF agenda as it is to react to its suggestions or needs.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix D

Statement on Nuclear Fuel and Energy Issues

Senator Pete V. Domenici

Over the last few months, I have been speaking out regularly on a wide range of nuclear issues that confront our nation -- issues that have not been carefully addressed to optimize the positive impacts of these technologies and to minimize their associated risks. As I began these statements, I noted that nuclear issues are not exactly the ones that most of us focus on to hear cheers of public support.

Nuclear issues typically have been relegated to back burners, or only to attacks that wildly inflate their risks. Based on the strong encouragement I've received from people like Senator Nunn, John Deutch, Allan Bromley, and Edward Teller, I intend to continue to seek national dialogue on a wide range of nuclear issues. In fact, I will invite each of my Senate colleagues to participate in a Nuclear Issues Caucus, focused on issues ranging from nuclear power and waste to nuclear stockpile. My goal is that out of this Caucus, and out of a rebirth of critical thinking on the roles of nuclear technology, we can craft policies that better meet the needs of the nation and better utilize the power of nuclear technologies.

Strategic national issues are always hard to discuss. In no area has this been more evident during these last few decades than in development of public policy involving energy, growth, and the role of nuclear technologies. But as we leave the 20th Century, arguably the American Century, and head for a new millennium, we truly need to confront these strategic issues with careful logic and sound science. We live in the dominant economic, military, and cultural entity in the world. Our principles of government and economics are increasingly becoming the principles of the world. There are no secrets to our success, and there is no guarantee that, in the coming century, we will be the principal beneficiary of the seeds we have sown. There is competition in the world and serious strategic issues facing the United States cannot be overlooked.

The United States -- like the rest of the industrialized world -- is aging rapidly as our birth rates decline. Between 1995 and the year 2030, the number of people in the United States over age 65 will double from 34 million to 68 million. Just to maintain our standard of living, we need dramatic increases in productivity as a larger fraction of our population drops out of the workforce. By 2030, 30 percent of the population of the industrialized nations will be over 60. The rest of the world-the countries that today are "under-industrialized" - will have only 16 percent of their population over age 60 and will be ready to boom. As those nations build economies modeled after ours, there will be intense competition for the resources that underpin modern economies.

 When it comes to energy, we have a serious, strategic problem. The United States currently consumer 25 percent of the world's energy production. However, developing countries are on track to increase their energy consumption by 48 percent between 1992 and 2010. The United States currently produces and imports raw energy resources worth over $150 billion per year. Approximately $50 billion of that is imported oil or natural gas. We then process that material into energy feedstocks such as gasoline. Those feedstocks -- the energy we consume in our cars, factories, and electric plants -- are worth $505 billion per year. We debate defense policy every year, as we should. But we don't debate energy policy, even though it costs twice as much as our defense, other countries' consumption is growing dramatically, and energy shortages are likely to be a prime driver of future military challenges.

Even when we've discussed energy independence in my quarter century of Senate service, we've largely ignored public debate on nuclear policies. At the same time, the anti-nuclear movement has conducted their campaign in a way that has been tremendously appealing to mass media. Scientists, used to the peer-reviewed ways of scientific discourse, were unprepared to counter. They lost the debate. Serious discussion about the role of nuclear energy in world stability, energy independence, and national security retreated into academia or classified sessions. Today, it is extraordinarily difficult to conduct a debate on nuclear issues. Usually, the only thing produced is nasty political fallout.

My goal today is to share with you my perspective on several aspects of our nuclear policy. I am counting on you to join with me to encourage a careful, scientifically based, re-examination of nuclear issues in the United States. I am going to tell you that we made some bad decisions in the past that we have to change. Then I will tell you about some decisions we need to make now.

First, we need to recognize that the premises underpinning some of our nuclear policy decisions are wrong. In 1977, President Carter halted all U.S. efforts to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and develop mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for our civilian reactors on the grounds that the plutonium was separated during reprocessing. He feared that the separated plutonium could be diverted and eventually transformed into bombs. He argued that the United States should halt its reprocessing program as an example to other countries in the hope that they would follow suit. The premise of the decision was wrong. Other countries do not follow the example of the United States if we make a decision that other countries view as economically or technically unsound. France, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia all now have MOX fuel programs. This failure to address an incorrect premise has harmed our efforts to deal with spent nuclear fuel and the disposition of excess weapons material, as well as our ability to influence international reactor issues.

I'll cite another example of a bad decision. We regulate exposure to low levels of radiation using a so-called "linear no-threshold" model, the premise of which is that there is no "safe" level of exposure. Our model forces us to regulate radiation to levels approaching a few percent of natural background despite the fact that natural background can vary by a factor of three just within the United States. On the other hand, many scientists think that living cells, after millions of years of exposure to naturally occurring radiation, have adapted such that low levels of radiation cause very little if any harm. In fact, there are some studies that suggest exactly the opposite is true -- that low doses of radiation may even improve health.

The truth is important. We spend over $5 billion each year to clean contaminated DOE sites to levels below 5 percent of background. In this year's Energy and Water Appropriations Act, we initiated a ten year program to understand how radiation affects genomes and cells so that we can really understand how radiation affects living organisms. For the first time, we will develop radiation protection standards that are based on actual risk. Let me cite another bad decision. You may recall that earlier this year, Hudson Foods recalled 25 million pounds of beef, some of which was contaminated by E. Coli. The Administration proposed tougher penalties and mandatory recalls that cost millions. But, E. Coli bacteria can be killed by irradiation and that irradiation has virtually no effect on most foods. Nevertheless, irradiation isn't used much in this country, largely because of opposition from some consumer groups that question its safety. But there is no scientific evidence of danger. In fact, when the decision is left up to scientists, they opt for irradiation -- the food that goes into space with our astronauts is irradiated. And if you're interested in this subject, a recent issue of the MIT Technology Review details the advantages of irradiated food.

I've talked about bad past decisions that haunt us today. Now I want to talk about decisions we need to make today. The President has outlined a program to stabilize the U.S. production of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by some time between 2008 and 2012. Unfortunately, the President's goals are not achievable without seriously impacting our economy. Our national laboratories have studied the issue. Their report indicates that to get to the President's goals we would have to impose a $50/ton carbon tax. That would result in an increase of 12.5 cents/gallon for gas and 1.5 cents/kilowatt-hour for electricity-almost a doubling of the current cost of coal or natural gas-generated electricity.

What the President should have said is that we need nuclear energy to meet his goal. After all, in 1996, nuclear power plants prevented the emission of 147 million metric tons of carbon, 2.5 million tons of nitrogen oxides, and 5 million tons of sulfur dioxide. Our electric utilities' emissions of those greenhouse gases were 25 percent lower than they would have been if fossil fuels had been used instead of nuclear energy.

Ironically, the technology we are relying on to achieve the benefits of nuclear energy is over twenty years old. No new reactors have been ordered in this country for almost a quarter of a century, due at least in part to extensive regulation and endless construction delays-plus our national failure to address high level waste. We have created an environment for nuclear energy in the United States wherein it isn't viewed as a sound investment. We need absolute safety, that's a given. But could we have that safety through approaches that don't drive nuclear energy out of consideration for new plants? The United States has developed the next generation of nuclear power plants-which have been certified by the NRC and are now being sold overseas. They are even safer than our current models.

Better yet, we have technologies under development like passively safe reactors, lead-bismuth reactors, and advanced liquid metal reactors that generate less waste and are proliferation resistant. A recent report by Dr. John Holdren, done at the President's request, calls for a sharply enhanced national effort. It urges a "properly focused R&D effort to see if the problems plaguing fission energy can be overcome -- economics, safety, waste, and proliferation." I have long urged the conclusion of this report -- that we dramatically increase spending in these areas for reasons ranging from reactor safety to non-proliferation.

I have not overlooked that nuclear waste issues loom as a roadblock to increased nuclear utilization. I will return to that subject. For now, let me turn from nuclear power to nuclear weapons issues. Our current stockpile is set by bilateral agreements with Russia. Bilateral agreements make sense if we are certain who our future nuclear adversaries will be and they are useful to force a transparent build-down by Russia. But our next nuclear adversary may not be Russia -- we do not want to find ourselves limited by a treaty with Russia in a conflict with another entity. We need to decide what stockpile levels we really need for our own best interests to deal with any future adversary. For that reason, I suggest that, within the limits imposed by START II, the United States move away from further treaty imposed limitations to what I call a "threat-based stockpile."

Based upon the threat I perceive right now, I think our stockpile could be reduced. We need to challenge our military planners to identify the minimum necessary stockpile size. At the same time, as our stockpile is reduced and we are precluded from testing, we have to increase our confidence in the integrity of the remaining stockpile and our ability to reconstitute if the threat changes. Programs like science-based stockpile stewardship must be nurtured and supported carefully. As we seriously review stockpile size, we should also consider stepping back from the nuclear cliff by de-alerting and carefully reexamining the necessity of the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad. Costs certainly aren't the primary driver for our stockpile size, but if some of the actions I've discussed were taken, I'd bet that as a bonus we'd see some savings in the $30 billion we spend each year on the nuclear triad.

Earlier I discussed the need to revisit some incorrect premises that caused us to make bad decisions in the past. I said that one of them, regarding reprocessing and MOX fuel, may hamstring our efforts to permanently dismantle nuclear weapons. The dismantlement of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States has left both countries with large inventories of perfectly machined classified components that could allow each country to rapidly rebuild nuclear arsenals. Both countries should set a goal of converting those excess inventories into non-weapon shapes as quickly as possible. The more permanent those transformations and the more verification that can accompany the conversion of that material, the better. Language in this year's Energy and Water Development Appropriations Legislation that I developed clearly sets out the importance of converting those shapes as part of an integrated plutonium disposition program.

Technical solutions exist. Pits can be transformed into non-weapons shapes and weapon material can be burned in reactors as MOX fuel-which, by the way, is what the National Academy of Sciences has recommended. However, the proposal to dispose of weapons plutonium as MOX runs into that old premise that MOX is bad despite its widespread use by our allies. I believe that MOX is the best technical solution. The economics of the MOX solution, however, need further study. Ideally, incentives can be developed to speed Russian materials conversion while reducing the cost of the U.S. effort. We need an appropriate approach for MOX to address its economic challenges-perhaps something paralleling the U.S.-Russian agreement on Highly Enriched Uranium.

I said earlier that I would not advocate increased use of nuclear energy and ignore the nuclear waste problem. The path we've been following on Yucca Mountain sure isn't leading anywhere very fast. I'm about ready to reexamine the whole premise for Yucca Mountain. We're on a course to bury all our spent nuclear fuel, despite the fact that a spent nuclear fuel rod still has 60-75% of its energy content -- and despite the fact that Nevadans need to be convinced that the material will not create a hazard for over 100,000 years. Reprocessing, even limited reprocessing, could help mitigate the potential hazards in a repository, and could help us recover the energy content of the spent fuel.

Current economics may argue against reprocessing based on present-day fuel prices, but now we seem to be stuck with that old decision to never reprocess, quite independent of any economic arguments. For Yucca Mountain, I propose we use interim storage now, while we continue to actively advance toward the permanent repository. In addition to collecting the nation's spent nuclear fuel in one well secured facility, far from population centers, interim storage also allows us to keep our options open. Those options might lead to attractive alternatives to the current ideas for a permanent repository in the years before we seal the repository. Incidentally, 65 Senators and 307 Representatives agreed with the importance of interim storage, but the Administration has only threatened to veto any such progress and has shown no willingness to discuss alternatives.

Let me highlight one attractive option. A group from several of our largest companies, using technologies developed at three of our national laboratories and from Russian institutes and their nuclear navy, discussed with me an approach to use spent nuclear fuel for electrical generation. They use an accelerator, not a reactor, so there is never any critical assembly. There is minimal processing, but carefully done so that weapons-grade materials are never separated or available for potential diversion. Further, this isn't reprocessing in the sense of repeatedly recirculating fissile materials back into new reactor fuel -- this is a system that integrates some processing with the final disposition. When they get done, only a little material goes into a repository -- but now the half lives are changed so that it's a hazard for perhaps 300 years; a far cry from 100,000 years.

The industrial group believes that the sale of electricity can go a long way toward offsetting the cost of the system, so this process might not add large costs to our present repository solution. Furthermore, it would dramatically reduce any real or perceived risks with our present path. This approach, Accelerator Transmutation of Waste, is an area I want to see investigated aggressively.

I still haven't touched on all the issues embedded in maximizing our nation's benefit from nuclear technologies, and I can't do that without a much longer speech. For example, I haven't discussed the increasingly desperate need in the country for low level waste facilities like Ward Valley in California. In California, important medical and research procedures are at risk because the Administration continues to block the State government from fulfilling their responsibilities to care for low level waste. And I haven't touched on the tremendous window of opportunity that we now have in the former Soviet Union to expand programs that protect nuclear material from moving onto the black market or to shift the activities of former Soviet weapons scientists onto commercial projects.

Along with Senators Nunn and Lugar, I've led the charge for these programs. Those are programs directly in our national interest. I know that some national leaders still think of these programs as foreign aid, I believe they are sadly mistaken. We are realizing some of the benefits of nuclear technologies today, but only a fraction of what we could realize: nuclear weapons, for all their horror, brought to an end 50 years of world-wide wars in which 60 million people died. Nuclear power is providing about 20% of our electricity needs now and many of our citizens enjoy healthier longer lives through improved medical procedures that depend on nuclear processes. But we aren't tapping the full potential of the nucleus for additional benefits. In the process, we are short-changing our citizens.

I hope in these remarks that I have demonstrated my concern for careful reevaluation of many ill-conceived fears, policies and decisions that have seriously constrained our use of nuclear technologies. My intention is to lead a new dialogue with serious discussion about the full range of nuclear technologies. I intend to provide national leadership to overcome barriers. While some may continue to lament that the nuclear genie is out of his proverbial bottle, I'm ready to focus on harnessing that genie as effectively and fully as possible, for the largest set of benefits for our citizens.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix E

Combating the Civilian Use of Weapons-usable Plutonium

by Ed Fei

The civilian nuclear industry has generated thousands of tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium which poses a growing threat to international security and to the future of nuclear power. (The quantities of plutonium held by civilian authorities dwarfs the amount that is coming out of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons programs.) U.S. leadership will be required to address this problem.

Background

At one time, many countries believed that civilian use of plutonium for electric power production would be cheap and safe. For over two decades the U.S. has led an international effort to show that this belief is wrong, and to prevent the development of a plutonium economy with its attendant risks of national or subnational diversion of plutonium to nuclear weapons. Time has proved the correctness of the U.S. position - international plans for the civilian use of plutonium around the world are faltering. However large amounts of separated plutonium were produced and stockpiled in anticipation of future use as fuel for breeder reactors and there is continued pressure for additional reprocessing, driven now by waste management concerns rather than a desire or need to recycle. The short term benefits that reactor operators would receive by moving spent fuel off-site to reprocessing plants would ultimately make the international security and proliferation problem even worse, by increasing the amount of the plutonium overhang. However, there is no international consensus on how to manage and eliminate this huge amount of nuclear weapons-usable material.

The Asian Focus

While this is a global problem, the issue is most serious in Asia because the problem of excess plutonium occurs in a region where local tensions have repeatedly led to national programs to develop nuclear weapons. These have been curbed almost solely by the U.S. with only limited reliance upon the IAEA or regional partners. Japan has done much to raise the international focus on this issue. The nuclear establishment has been alarmed because the increasingly apparent demise of the Japanese reprocessing program contributes to the growing public resistance to nuclear power. This has led to an active Japanese search for new ideas and a significant flow of Japanese official and private funds to support international studies and conferences on nuclear power, plutonium, and international cooperation.

In Taiwan the spent fuel problem and nuclear waste problem are severe enough to lead to the possibilities of reactor shutdowns in the near future due to lack of space for full core emergency unloading of the reactor. This pressure led to the ill-advised venture to ship low level waste to the DPRK and will lead to more requests to reprocess spent fuel in Europe.

On the Korean peninsula both Koreas need a solution to their spent nuclear fuel problems. In the North, the Agreed Framework calls for the spent nuclear fuel that has been canned to be allowed to cool and then removed from Korea. A recipient must still be found. In the South technologists are experimenting with DUPIC and utility officials at KEPCO are advocating reprocessing - neither of these is going to be the long term answer. The North-South De-Nuclearization Agreement bans reprocessing on the Korean peninsula but there is no clear alternative that is being advanced and there is hope among some parties in Korea that the ban will be rescinded if Korea unites.

U.S. Priorities

In this situation, U.S. priorities should be first, to lead international efforts to stop making the problem worse by generating even more unwanted separated plutonium and second, to lead in developing approaches to the management and disposition of plutonium that minimize and eliminate the risks to U.S. national security.

The door is open for U.S. leadership, because there is growing international recognition of a plutonium problem and the need for collective international solutions. Increasingly, foreign nuclear authorities and utilities simply don't want plutonium and see it as an expensive fiscal and political burden. International organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency are attempting to address the needs of their member states and develop policies to contain the threat of unwanted nuclear weapons-usable material. An increasing number of private organizations and nuclear industry officials are also meeting and wrestling with the problem.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix F

A Proposal by the Republic of Korea for

Establishment of The Asia Nuclear Safety

Consultation Organization (ANSCO)

(Draft)

Introduction

The Asian region, where nuclear power programmes are most actively pursued in the world, has the urgent task of establishing a regional organization that will provide channels for consultation and cooperation among regional countries in order to secure nuclear safety in the region

Until now, cooperation in the area of nuclear safety in Asia has been carried out through such international institution as the IAEA or on the traditional bilateral basis. Although there are a great deal of bilateral cooperative work going on in the Asian region, multilateral cooperation in the regional dimension would also be very useful for the enhancement of nuclear safety.

The Republic of Korea has already proposed, on several occasions the establishment of a "Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization in Asia" which will serve as a venue for facilitating regional cooperation in the field of nuclear safety.

The basic concept of the Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization is as follows:

Purpose

The ANSCO will meet the following purposes:

· Discussion and consultation on nuclear safety related issues and implementation of cooperation programs in this region

· Prompt and effective response and cooperation in nuclear emergency situation

Membership

Consultation Organization will consist of the following countries:

· Full member countries

- First Stage: Countries in the Asian region which have (and will have) nuclear power programs

- Second Stage: Gradually expand to all countries in the Asian region which may wish to join the organization

 · Observer

- Pacific basin countries and international organizations which may wish to join the organization

Cooperation Areas

· Safety of Nuclear installations

- Expert exchange and training program in the field of nuclear safety

- Regional cooperation research program of nuclear safety

· Cooperation in the case of a nuclear accident

- Establishment of an early notification and assistance system in the case of a nuclear accident or radiation emergency

- Exchange of opinions about compensation with respect to nuclear damage resulting from accidents in the region

Implementation Plan

· First Stage: Preparation (1998)

- Designation of a national coordinator or contact point in each country

- Holding a preparatory meeting, regional cooperation seminar, expert meeting, etc.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix G

A Proposal for Regional Storage of Spent Fuel

A More Flexible and Robust Way to Develop Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power in East Asian Region

by Atsuyuki Suzuki

A global energy perspective, there is no doubt about the need for nuclear power. The question is how to address this need, and how to proceed with further development of nuclear energy. A problem with nuclear power, however, is the public concern over safety and radioactive waste management. In particular, the major concern is associated with management of spent fuel arising from nuclear power stations.

Once the use of nuclear power is begun for electricity production, one can not avoid generation of spent nuclear fuel. So, the use of nuclear power is inherently interrelated to management of spent fuel. Spent fuel contains extremely highly radioactive materials which are inevitably accompanied by nuclear fission reactions. Thanks to the extremely small volume of spent fuel generation (annually generated amounts of spent fuel in Japan are now only 10 grams / capita, which is the result of supplying electricity of 3,000 kWh / capita, 300 x 109kWh in the whole nation), technically, or from an engineering point of view, there is little difficulty to store spent fuel safely.

Because of its extremely high radioactivity, however, it is true that we must pay a lot of attention to the safety. The radioactivity decays rapidly with time but remains at a significant level for thousands of years, and thus long-term management is required.

Spent fuel contains plutonium as well. Plutonium is an extremely efficient energy source but extremely sensitive in terms of nuclear proliferation. Because of this, international safeguards control is required through which the issue concerning the management of spent fuel becomes more or less connected with international politics.

Basically, there are two options concerning management of spent fuel. One is, as soon as possible after cooling for a certain period of time, reprocess it, recovering the plutonium, and recycle it as a reactor fuel. The other is to dispose of it directly as an industrial waste.

A great deal of uranium savings are expected from reprocessing and recycling. In particular, this would make a significant contribution to environmental protection in uranium mines. However, the residual waste after reprocessing is still highly radioactive and long-lasting, again demanding a high level of care and attention. Experts and nuclear industries now consider that, technically, the best way of disposing of the waste is to isolate it geologically from the biosphere by burying it at a deep underground repository. Comparing this option with that of spent fuel, which can also be geologically isolated at a deep underground repository, one would expect some advantage from the reprocessing and recycling option since the residual waste after reprocessing contains little plutonium which is very sensitive in terms of environmental safety as well, although, taking into account secondary wastes arising from reprocessing which must be also geologically disposed of, the advantage may not be so significant.

Nevertheless, the most noticeable feature of the reprocessing and recycling option is the economy. Capital intensivity of a reprocessing plant is usually such that the construction cost required for a commercial plant is on the order of ten billion US dollars, if it is the European and Japanese standard. In Europe and Japan, there potentially has been a commercial market for reprocessing and thus the financial capability is large enough to invest such an amount of money for plant construction. It should be recognized, however, that otherwise, it is very expensive. Actually, Japanese nuclear industries are now obliged to follow the Government policy of deregulation and cost reduction, and their financial capability to invest in the reprocessing and recycling option is decreasing.

The United States changed its policy concerning management of spent fuel about 20 years ago, after recognizing that the reprocessing is not only uneconomical but not attractive from the standpoint of its national and international security. They have insisted that there is an increase of nuclear proliferation risks associated with the separation of plutonium through reprocessing. How to manage the proliferation concerns or risks is certainly important. However, this is not the main subject I'd like to touch upon at this particular talk. Nonetheless, I would like to comment that the most important thing for mitigating these concerns is to maintain transparency and accountability concerning the use of plutonium. What I'd also like to remind you is that the United States possesses a lot of domestic energy resources and there is little incentive for reprocessing in terms of national security.

Consequently, the United States' policy concerning management of spent fuel was changed to direct disposal from spent fuel reprocessing with the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and as such the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the disposal program. Actually, more than ten years ago, the DOE selected the potential site for the disposal to be Yucca Mountain in Nevada, and yet it remains the subject of intense discussion between the DOE and the State Government as to whether or not the site selection has been appropriate. The societal complexity facing the DOE in implementing the disposal program illustrates the difficulty in obtaining the public's understanding concerning the geological disposal, whichever it may be spent fuel orth. waste after reprocessing.

The reason for such difficulty is mainly due to a sort of emotional fear that both spent fuel and the reprocessing waste are so deadly that they have to be buried into a few hundred meters deep underground. This concept and associated issues are totally unfamiliar to the public. It takes time for them to become familiar with the issues. Those countries in East Asia that plan to expand nuclear energy programs should learn from these experiences -- from the economic difficulties in Europe and Japan regarding the reprocessing option on one hand and the societal difficulties in the United States regarding the direct disposal option on the other.

Fortunately, we have time and we can afford to wait and see what we should do in the future as far as the management of spent fuel is concerned, since the world market of uranium has been and appears to be stable in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, technically there is no difficulty to store spent fuel at a ground surface facility for tens of years.

As a result, I'd like to make a personal proposal concerning management of spent fuel in the East Asian region. First of all, we should recognize each country can make the decision on its own concerning its nuclear program. The decision of whether to choose the reprocessing and recycling option or the direct disposal option should be left with each country. However, each country must assume responsibility for transparency and accountability concerning the use of nuclear power.

What I am now proposing is neither the reprocessing option nor the direct disposal option, but somewhere between the two. That means, spent fuel is to be stored as a strategic material which will be reused as a reactor fuel when necessary. Let me call it the strategic storage option.

In implementing the option, first of all, we should recognize that the spent fuel is not an industrial waste but a strategic material. Why ? Once you label the spent fuel as a waste, then you are forced to take action for final disposal as rapidly as possible, because no one would like to hold waste in his or her own backyard, even if it is interim storage. This is such with the case for Monitored Retrievable Storage in the United States.

Conversely, if we recognize spent fuel is a material which holds some value added, then we can afford to put some positive meaning to an undertaking of spent fuel storage. As in the case of strategic storage of oil, it is possible to regard it as a sort of national project or a project based upon national policy and national funds. In Japan, there are a large number of facilities operating for strategic storage of oil and some of them are deep underground facilities. And yet, there has been no objection from the public or local residents. So, to designate spent fuel not as a waste but as a strategic material makes sense to a large extent in order to improve public understanding.

Secondly, we should specify the length of storage time, for otherwise there is a risk, from the perspective of the local people, that spent fuel would be stored permanently. For the transparency and the accountability of the project, it is desirable to fix a storage time in advance. It seems to me, the shortest length of time is around 50 years, because it is a sort of technical life-time of facility and if shorter than that, economic incentive will be lost. The largest length of time is around 100 years, which may be the maximum length of time we can promise for the future. So a priori, we should definitely determine the maximum time of storage for this strategic storage option to be somewhere between 50 and 100 years. After the end of that storage time, the spent fuel should be returned to its owner in accordance with advance agreements that might be made between the storage facility owner and the spent fuel owners.

Thirdly, the public needs to be convinced that strategic storage will not create a hazard for such a long period of time. As I mentioned already, there is no technical difficulty in storing spent fuel. Even for such long storage, it is safely managed with appropriate maintenance. In this connection, the DOE made a very interesting statement on January 31, 1998 that the department is not able to begin spent fuel acceptance this year as is required in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. However, it is also clearly stated on January 31 that utilities can continue to safely store spent nuclear fuel at their reactor sites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in its recent Waste Confidence proceeding, affirmed this statement. This suggests that safety is not the main issue with storage of spent fuel.

The fourth aspect of the strategic storage option concerns international safeguards. As I mentioned at the beginning, the management of spent fuel is more or less connected with international safeguards. In Japan, currently there are 17 commercial nuclear power stations and 52 nuclear reactors and each reactor holds its own facility for storing spent fuel. All of them are under IAEA safeguards control. We believe our facilities are completely incompliance with IAEA requirements and it is our policy to continue to cooperate with the IAEA.

However, we have to take it into consideration that the costs the IAEA needs to pay are in proportion to the increase in the number of nuclear nations and nuclear facilities. Actually, the IAEA is now being face with serious budget constraints, and it is necessary that we develop a safeguards system with better cost/performance. In this regard, it would be advantageous to build a centralized storage facility in East Asia which is multilaterally managed and operated. It is not only economically attractive but significantly contributes to mutual confidence-building and will subsequently lead to development of a safeguards system with better cost/performance as well.

Obviously, the host country would need large economic and technological incentives. To this end, all participants in the collaboration would be subject to an incentive/tax system in which each is obliged to look fora final geological repository. This part of the regime would provide for construction and operation of an international research laboratory. During the intermediate storage period, the laboratory would be devoted to research and development of geological disposal technologies. One of its most effective features would be public education by demonstrating the safety and technical feasibility of geological disposal.

In the region, there are a limited number of countries now operating nuclear power stations, but many other countries are interested in doing so. Anti-nuclear environmentalists are likely to see such international collaboration as a way of both prolonging and expanding nuclear power use, and therefore oppose it. It must be emphasized to the concerned populations that spent fuel is already with us--storage is necessary irrespective of whether or not nuclear power usage expands to new countries.

The economies of scale inherent in cost-sharing would add flexibility to present national nuclear energy programs in the region. Without collaboration, spent fuel will most likely remain on-site at nuclear power plants. And at on-site storage, in the absence of international safeguards, spent fuel poses not only a local safety hazard but spawns weapons proliferation fears. But if many additional plants are added to existing international safeguard regimes, the burden of inspecting such widely dispersed facilities could overwhelm the budgets.

International issues are always very sensitive and complex, and I am afraid I don't have enough time to go into the details here. What I personally have emphasized over the past several years is that the time has come to give more thought to relations between the countries in this region and to proceed in a more collaborative manner in the field of management of spent fuel, particularly the strategic storage option.

Again, an important point is that spent fuel is not an industrial waste but a strategic energy source, even when we consider the possibility of multilateral cooperation of having a centralized facility of storing spent fuels arising from different countries.

Recently, similar ideas have been proposed others. One of them, probably the most well-known, is the IMRSS (Internationally Monitored Retrievable Storage System), proposed jointly by Prof. W. Hafele, Germany and Dr. C. Starr, the United States. This idea is to buy time during storage until a final decision can be made. They are proposing the system which is fully commercially operated. Basically, the idea is very similar to my proposal. The main difference is that they do not clearly specify whether the spent fuel is a waste or at least potentially a useful material, and they also include the storage of express plutonium, either military or non-military. I personally think it is better to consider the international scheme for safe management of plutonium separately from spent fuel storage, because the plutonium issue is by far more sensitive internationally than the spent fuel issue. Nor is this issue very urgent for most countries in East Asian region.

Dr. N. Egorov and others from Minatom, Russia gave a talk last year at the Global '97 to disclose that they are considering the possibility to store spent fuel and reprocessing waste shipped from other countries. I think it is a very unique and internationally cooperative idea and hope they will soon make a more concrete proposal that can be well and widely accepted in Russia. Japan should show its support of this idea. However, Japanese nuclear industries should make sure that the spent fuel is not a waste but to be stored strategically and under an appropriate international safeguards control.

A similar thought was recently given in the United States as well. Senator Pete V. Domenici, made an invited speech last year at Harvard University, entitled "A New Nuclear Paradigm." As a concluding remark of his talk, he mentioned, "I propose we go somewhere between reprocessing and permanent disposal by using interim storage to keep our options open. Incidentally, 65 senators agreed with the importance of interim storage, but the Administration has only threatened to veto any such progress and has shown no willingness to discuss alternatives." I do not want to say whether the United States should choose the reprocessing option or the direct disposal option. What I do want to say is that we do not need to decide now which is better. It seems much better that we keep our options open. I fully agree with Senator Domenici on his remark and I do hope the United States will show more interest in to our proposal and take a more pragmatic approach.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix H

Asian Regional Stability and Nuclear Fuel Cycles

by Ed Fei

Asian Regional Stability

Since WWII Northeast Asia has been a region of considerable instability and the region with the greatest risk of large-scale nuclear proliferation. In such a situation, perhaps the most important goal for Northeast Asian states is to avoid conflict and to build a regional security architecture that will be the foundation for economic growth and trade.

The question I will address is, what are the implications of nuclear fuel cycles in Asia upon Asian regional stability? Is the region more stable or less stable because of nuclear programs?

The Effect of Nuclear Programs on Regional Stability

The simple fact is that nuclear activities of states in Northeast Asia have at times greatly contributed to regional instability and tension. Today there are three nuclear weapons states in Asia - Russia, China, and the United States. However there have also been repeated efforts by other states in the region to acquire nuclear weapons. Had these efforts succeeded, Northeast Asia might have been the location of a half dozen nuclear weapons states instead of only three. For example, as late as 1970 Australia, which is today a strong supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, was giving serious consideration to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

While the story is not over, it is possible to see Northeast Asia as a nonproliferation success story. Despite the very high risk of nuclear proliferation, it has not yet occurred. It is important to note that the so-far successful efforts to prevent proliferation have relied not only on the so-called nuclear nonproliferation regime, but more significantly on ad hoc bilateral and multilateral responses of individual states.

The Agreement Framework and KEDO

The most recent example of such an ad hoc effort is the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), in which the DPRK agreed both to freeze its unsafeguarded nuclear activities and, in the future, to undergo inspections in exchange for fuel oil and light water reactors.

The point to note is that a situation of grave regional security concern -- unsafeguarded nuclear activities which would have provided materials for nuclear weapons -- has been transformed into a situation in which nuclear cooperation is increasing, rather than decreasing regional stability. Americans from my office, at this very moment, are working with North Korean technicians at Yongbyon to can the spent nuclear fuel from North Korea's small gas graphite reactor. The states of Northeast Asia should build on the example of the Agreed Framework and use it as a model for resolving certain types of regional problems by turning them into opportunities for regional cooperation.

What are some of the characteristics of the Agreed Framework that should be kept in mind when we look at it as a possible model? Without going into detail I would suggest the following: a threat or problem that many states wanted to be resolved; a focus of attention on the problem; original thinking and leadership; hard work; international consultation and collaboration including the creation of KEDO; an over-arching agreement in principle; and the Agreed Framework, which is combined with specific technical activities - shipping fuel oil, cleaning spent fuel storage ponds, canning spent fuel.

Pursuing this last point, what are some other agreements and activities involving the nuclear fuel cycle that might be used to enhance rather than undermine regional stability?

Specific Steps

Specific discrete actions that involve the nuclear fuel cycle and which increase regional stability, can be taken by a variety of different organizations. Of course governments can be involved, but in addition ministries, nuclear utilities, quasi-governmental organizations, laboratories, universities, think tanks, professional societies and non-governmental organizations can all be important contributors. Some examples of such activities include the following: nuclear safety cooperation; international exchanges among utilities and nuclear industries; exchanges of scientists or executives; verification and transparency experiments; regional safeguards and inspection regimes which might begin with site visits; regional approaches to the management of low level nuclear waste; and regional approaches to the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. The KEDO approach provides one model for such cooperation.

Political and General Steps

Political actions whether large scale or small, unilateral or multilateral, can help to create a framework which provides guidance and direction to more specific or technical actions. Actions that might be taken of this sort include: international agreements; agreed statements of principle or declarations at meetings such as APEC or ARF; international memoranda of understanding; unilateral or bilateral speeches; voluntary offers to cooperate or increase transparency; and the creation of international organizations such as a Pacificatom that might provide an umbrellas for specific technical actions.

In summary, it is important to think regionally as well as nationally. Planners in each country should think not just of domestic concerns, but of the international implications of fuel cycle activities. More far-seeing planners should ask how nuclear activities and cooperation might also contribute to the greater goal of regional stability.

Return to Table of Contents

Appendix I

Asia Pacific Regional Nuclear Framework:

Requirements and Effects

by Kaoru Kikuyama

Given the currency crises prevailing in major Asian nations that have already had a significant impact on economic growth, it is estimated that energy demand will experience a relatively low increase in the near term. This has already affected nuclear power development programs in such countries as Korea and Indonesia. However, economists anticipate that the current crises will have a short recovery with long-term steady economic development in the aftermath.

Given this outlook, it can be estimated that in Asia, the number of nuclear power plants will increase from 85 at present to nearly 120 by the year 2020. This will be one third of the world share, as Europe and U.S. nuclear power development will be downsized. Global warming concerns will also bring new momentum to nuclear energy development in Asia since nuclear power generation emits no CO2 while it provides a country with a diversification of energy sources with a stable supply of large magnitude.

Meanwhile, in many regional countries including China (and Indonesia by 2010), oil-based energy security becomes a concern as fewer oil discoveries make regional producers into net importers of oil. It is a vital interest shared among Asian countries to avert heavy reliance on Middle East oil, which has recently marked more than 80% of their total oil imports and will reach around 90% by the year 2010. This has undoubtedly presented an impetus for introducing nuclear power in the Asia Pacific.

A close observation of nuclear power development in the Asian Pacific region, however, may suggest several drawbacks or inherent defects as follows:

- mounting difficulties for obtaining public acceptance and lack of transparency;

- short-term cost-effect calculation at energy market;

- growing diversification of energy sources being developed, i.e. natural gas;

- introduction of energy market deregulation and price competition;

- technical and social uncertainties for waste disposal and spent fuel management;

- increasing burden in disposition of fissile materials from dismantled weapons;

- safety concerns of nuclear plants and lack of a universally standardized safety culture;

- concerns of diversifying fissile materials to weapons purposes.

Regional Nuclear Framework Concepts To Date

To counter these challenges, there have been various initiatives to formulate a multilateral mechanism focused on nuclear energy development in the region, such as "ASIATOM," "PACIFICATOM," or "PACATOM". Each concept , however centered on the establishment of a cooperative regional nuclear framework, is not monolithic as regards either the countries covered or the prioritized issues to be considered. Major characteristics of these concepts can be summarized in three points, however:

·These concepts are often biased toward a technical establishment since many, as their basic principle, advocate the EURATOM application to the Asian Pacific nuclear dimension. A framework, therefore, is prone to serve technological requirements of member countries through their efficient cooperation in nuclear energy related technology development and transfer, as well as waste management under the coordinated mechanism.

·With respect to the sociopolitical nature of Asia, it is regarded pragmatic to develop non-institutionalized mechanism, or a consulting platform like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

·With an occasional exception, they see U.S. participation essential for facilitating the development of a regional nuclear framework. Given the sensitive political reasons over the NPT regime, India and Pakistan are in general excluded from the framework, as is Taiwan for other equally sensitive political reasons.

With these characteristics in hand, it is important to address the viability of creating an Asian Pacific nuclear cooperation framework in view of real requirements existing among countries concerned and effects to be derived from multilateral cooperation.

Current Technical Requirements For Regional Cooperation

There are concrete and potential factors that require an early conclusion to conceptual discussion on the shape of an Asian Pacific nuclear framework in favor of the initiation of practical measures to be taken for its formulation. Technical requirements accelerating this move include:

- among developed nuclear countries notably in East Asia, there is a considerable problem with spent fuel storage ;

- among developed nuclear countries, high level radioactive waste management is facing a threefold problem: obtaining sites for disposal, public acceptance, and proven technology development;

 - aggressive nuclear power development programs ongoing in some regional countries will further widen a gap of nuclear technology level throughout the region.

Political Requirements For Multilateral Regional Nuclear Cooperation

There are numerous political incentives underlying the cooperative regional framework, which partly result from the lack of cultural coherency and the various political egos among the regional countries. It is significant to accommodate these political requirements in light of what will be gained in return for a regional confidence building mechanism. These political factors or considerations include the following:

- new legal factors added to international nuclear non-proliferation regimes (CTBT, Fissile Cut-Off Convention) which could diversify the region even further, reflecting each respective government's position and interest;

- the later implementation of a regional nuclear framework occurs, the more clear it becomes who, based on size of nuclear capacity and capability, should have a bigger voice in its consolidation (while non-nuclear power states might lose an incentive to participate in such a process);

- as each country pursues self-sufficiency in developing and utilizing nuclear power through bilateral cooperation or its own indigenous efforts, multilateralism could lose momentum;

- public acceptance of nuclear power is deteriorating world-wide, with negative effect on each nation's nuclear programme;

- the larger regional nuclear capacity becomes, the more requirements will be imposed to ensure safety of plants, physical protection of fissile materials and cost-effective safeguards system apart from the IAEA system;

- in view of the sensitive nature inherent in nuclear energy, related confidence building measures will be needed at the regional level.

The experience of ARF and APEC shows that inter-regional interdependence in the Asia Pacific is approaching a mature level. This needs to be expanded to the nuclear field both to facilitate technical solutions to nuclear related problems and to supplement existing confidence building measures in the region.

How To Develop A Cooperative Regional Nuclear Framework

Given the highly technical and political nature of the issue, and complications caused by mixing nuclear energy and non-nuclear energy producers (and nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states), it has been undoubtedly difficult to implement regional nuclear framework concepts. Practical solutions should take the following factors into account::

- the mechanism should be incorporated into the existing regional framework for three reasons:

· to avoid the long lead-time needed to create a new forum

· to avoid unnecessary duplication of similar activities

· to avoid further exhaustion of national resources which have already been stretched by international cooperation in various fields;

- since technological cooperation-oriented mechanisms alone cannot provide a politically viable framework, political incentives should be evaluated;

- the process should begin with interested countries, including those outside the Asian Pacific region (as observers) in view of their interest and business involvement in the region's nuclear power development;

- both governments and private organizations should be involved;

- the issues to be dealt with should be developed in order of priority and reflect acute needs and interests in nuclear development for the countries concerned;

- given the nature of the issues to be addressed, it is necessary to institutionalize the mechanism.

- It is important to have many initial member countries in order to achieve a comprehensive and coherent approach,

Conclusion: What Are The Effects?

By implementing multilateral regional nuclear cooperation at this stage, positive effects will be generated which benefit each country concerned and the Asian Pacific region as a whole. These effects are:

- economizing and making more efficient various nuclear energy related projects such as spent fuel storage and joint development of waste disposal facilities.

- facilitating nuclear technology sharing and transfer, and information exchanges related to nuclear development;

- improving safety culture and public acceptance;

- improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system through its coordination with a regional system that will be applied to both nationally and regionally-owned nuclear facilities;

- improving security of nuclear materials with adequate accountancy and physical protection;

- rendering efficient and thereby economizing the region's nuclear-related conventions by the effective centralization of these activities under the framework while avoiding duplication of effort; and

- promoting regional stability through the region's first-ever institutionalized nuclear cooperation mechanism.

Since nuclear energy developments in the Asian Pacific region is an irreversible trend for the foreseeable future, negative impacts should be minimized in terms of regional and global security and stability. To this end, and given the political and technological implications, multilateral regional nuclear cooperation must be implemented.

Return to Table of Contents