A Cold War Legacy: Decommissioning the nuclear submarines
of the Russian Far East fleet
Dr. Ron Smith
Director, Defense and Strategic Studies
Department of Political Science and Public Policy
The University of Waikato
Hamilton, New Zealand
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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union built up the largest fleet of nuclear-propelled submarines in the world, with something under half of these stationed in the far-east. Since the demise of the Soviet Union many of these vessels have been taken out of service , either as a consequence of arms control agreements, or, more pressingly, because of lack of funds. They are now resting in various states of neglect and decay in harbours and inlets around the coastline of the Russian Far East. The special problems of nuclear submarine decommissioning affects (or will affect) all five of the established nuclear powers but only Russia faces the combination of a large number of ships that absolutely demand attention, together with a totally run-down infrastructure and a critical lack of funds. There have already been accidents in the course of decommissioning and some undesirable practices have emerged but the problems are still largely ahead. Unless Russia gets substantial financial and technical help from the rest of the world – most notably the United States, Britain and France – there is the prospect of an environmental disaster in the North Eastern corner of the Pacific. There is also a potential security threat from the nuclear material that is still in many of these ships, or in temporary storage on shore – the more so since some classes of nuclear propelled submarine used uranium fuel of 90% enrichment (i.e. weapons-grade material).
This is
the background to a major international conference on the issue held in
Vladivostok in September 2002 [1] and in which the present author was a
participant. The gathering also included a conducted tour of the main Far
Eastern Shipyard “Zvezda”, situated across Peter the Great Bay from
Vladivostok. It was very clear from the thrust of many of the papers and
the nature of some of the activities, that the conference was only partly
intended to present a review of the many problems in nuclear submarine
decommissioning and some of the possible solutions. It was also an effort
to encourage interest and participation from abroad and, above all, to get
financial support. For regional neighbors, the possibility of radioactive
contamination of the environment from accidents or inappropriate practices
is a serious concern. Modelling of the ecological consequences of air or
water spills, presented at the conference, shows how the various states
might be affected in particular circumstances
[2]. The submarines of the
Russian Far East fleet also pose a wider danger through the weapon
potential of the spent fuel that is still in many of them, or held in
temporary storage on land. This is arguably a global problem. |
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According to information provided at the conference, Russia has some 75
nuclear submarines in the Far Eastern region which have been withdrawn
from service, of which around 25 have been partially or completely
decommissioned. This is from a complete inventory of 245 submarines that
were built during the Cold War period (see Table 1, above). There is some
confusion in the terminology. Strictly, ‘decommissioning’ would refer to
the permanent removal of a vessel from service. However, the term is used
more generally to refer to a sequence of operations, the end point of
which is the safe storage or disposal of dangerous material and the
scrapping and recycling (where possible) of the rest of the hull and
fittings. This is the sense in which the present author will use the
expression. The decommissioning of a nuclear-propelled submarine is a complex operation. If it also has nuclear weapons, these, of course, will be removed at an early stage. In the context, this is a relatively straight-forward process, although, of course, the fissile material from the warhead needs secure storage once it is removed. The major steps in decommissioning concern the reactor (or reactors) [4], the reactor compartment, and the disposal of various grades of nuclear waste that will have been produced. After as many as seven years in the reactor the spent fuel will have become extremely radioactive, through the accumulation of fission products. It needs to be removed and held in a shielded environment whilst it cools. Similarly, the reactors and the compartment in which they are installed will have become very radioactive through intense neutron bombardment over their service life. Because of this, they cannot be simply treated as scrap. The solution adopted (also by the United States in the decommissioning of its submarines) is to cut out as one block the reactor compartment, together with the two compartments on either side. In the case of the Pacific nuclear fleet, these are then sealed and left floating by the dockside to await a more permanent solution. In the United States the three-compartment blocks are transported to the Hanford facility in Washington State and given a shallow burial. In the Russian Far East there are plans to store reactor-compartment sections on a specially constructed dry land storage platform at Chazma Bay, a little to the south of Zvezda. Ultimately, they may be buried but no site has been designated for this and really there is no money available for the purpose (or for the Chazma Bay project, either, for that matter). . |
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| Figure 1: Naval bases in the Russian Far East | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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The
ultimate destination for the spent fuel removed from the nuclear
submarines of the Russian Far Eastern Fleet is Mayak in western Russia,
some five or six days away on the Trans-Siberian Railway. This is only one
of the many bottlenecks holding up submarine decommissioning. There is
only one set of rolling stock to transport spent fuel to Mayak from both
the Northern and Pacific fleets. In the case of the Far East, there is
also a problem with the railway line that connects the Zvezda Yard and the
nearest point of the Trans-Siberian Railway, some thirty-five miles away.
The result of all this, is that the removed spent fuel cannot be got away
and that the onshore storage is full. . |
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Figure 2: Nuclear submarine alongside for refueling in Zvezda Dockyard. |
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Decommissioning nuclear submarines also produces nuclear contaminated
liquid wastes. The intensity of radiation here is low but the material
still needs appropriate disposal. Earlier Russian practice was to put this
material in drums and drop it in a deep part of the Sea of Japan. After a
1993 episode, Japan provided a special barge to concentrate such wastes
and prepare them for disposal on land. Sea dumping is anyway now forbidden
under the London Dumping Convention of 1972. However, no land disposal
site for low level nuclear wastes (LLW) is available in the Russian Far
East region so that there is now an accumulation of such material. This
constitutes yet another bottleneck in the process of submarine
decommissioning and it may be why a Japanese spokesman at the conference
expressed ‘disappointment’ at the slow rate of progress since the barge
(as part of a $US200m package) was provided. . |
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| Figure 3: Separated reactor compartment units in Chazma Bay | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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This is by no means the full
range of problems. All that is being dealt with at present (when money and
capacity permit) are Russian submarines of the first and second
generations and then only those that can be got to the Zvezda Yard. There
are vessels in other locations in the Russian Far East (for example at
Avachinskaya Inlet on the Kamchatka Peninsula) and many of these are in no
state even to be towed. Indeed, some have ‘lost buoyancy’ altogether (they
are sinking) or are in very shallow water (they are beached). Others,
again, are being held up by pontoons. In some cases sufficient buoyancy
may be achieved by injecting a special foam into the tanks so that they
can be towed. There is also the possibility of de-fuelling using a nuclear
submarine support vessel but this still leaves the rest of the
decommissioning process to be completed. This (with refueling to follow)
was the way the Soviet (now Russian) fleet was maintained in service.
Earlier vessels involved in this activity are now also part of the
problem, in their own right. Years of receiving spent fuel have made them
significantly radioactive. To merely cut them up would be to produce a
very large amount of low-level radioactive waste, which would need to be
disposed of. Other techniques are being investigated. Amongst these is a
procedure that entails spray-coating the inner surfaces of the ship with a
special polymer, which is then treated to ‘lift-off’ contamination. There
are presently two former nuclear submarine service vessels that need this
kind of decommissioning. There is yet a further problem looming with the decommissioning of some of the later generations of nuclear submarine; and this is due to the extremely high enrichment levels in the fuel. Most nuclear submarines have operated with reactors that took fuel rods containing 20-45% U-235 (compared with the 3-5% enrichment of a typical civilian power reactor). This allows for a more compact power reactor and longer periods between refueling but it does mean that the concentration of radionuclides in the spent fuel is higher and thus that the problems for those dealing with the material are much greater. Despite this, with appropriate techniques, spent fuel can be safely handled in these cases. However some of the later Soviet-designed submarines have fuel of 90% enrichment (the United States never did this). In relation to this, it was estimated by one of the speakers at the conference that using present procedures a decommissioning worker would receive his maximum annual permitted radiation exposure within 4 minutes. This suggests that new methods will be needed to decommission this class of vessels, or that the vessels will need to be left to ‘cool’ for a very long time; either way will be very expensive. There are also special problems with some of the older generations of submarines. In some cases there is damage to the reactor which will impede or prevent conventional decommissioning methods. In other instances there have been accidents during the actual de-fuelling process. All of these irregular situations will require special treatment, which will no doubt cost a great deal. Russia also has a fleet of eight nuclear propelled icebreakers that will ultimately come up for decommissioning and this will add to the overall burden of material to be treated and safely disposed of. There is some very modest
potential for the sale of metals and other materials that may be recycled
from the decommissioning of Russia’s nuclear submarines but this income
will be trivial compared with the enormous cost, put by several speakers
at the conference at around $US3.8 billions for the programme immediately
in hand. There seems little likelihood that Russia will be able to provide
the funds for this; so the only way it will go forward will be if there is
a significant and sustained contribution from the rest of the world. Of
course, they are Russia’s submarines. Russia (or, at least, the Soviet
Union) built them and (it might be said) it is its responsibility to deal
with them. On the other hand, neighboring states have a clear interest in
heading off what could be a serious environmental problem if it is not
dealt with appropriately. In the light of the security threat that would
be posed by spent fuel from highly enriched uranium fuel rods that were
not adequately safeguarded, it may be that the wider world community has
an interest in providing for its safe storage and removal. |
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