USING NUCLEAR ENERGY: A PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

BY RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines (Diliman)
Research fellow of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines (OSS,AFP).

INTRODUCTION

The Philippines is one country that has attempted to venture into using nuclear energy for electric power generation. Its government has created various instrumentalities for the development of nuclear energy in the country. These include the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission that is now known as the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute and more recently the National Power Steering Committee. The Philippines has even put up its own nuclear power plant located in its province of Bataan.

However, because of some technical considerations and political factors including the strong public opinion against using nuclear energy and operating the nuclear power plant, the country was never able to date operate its nuclear power plant or harness the potential of nuclear energy for electricity generation.

The tremendous electric power outages the country experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s which resulted from the lack of new power plants to supply the needed electricity coupled with the conking out of existing power plants that were poorly maintained has pushed the government to reconsider once more the use of nuclear energy to support the Philippines’ effort to industrialize. More recently, the Ramos Administration created in 1995 the National Power Steering Committee that was tasked to examine once more the viability of using nuclear energy in the country. The present Estrada Administration, however, is yet to come up with a definite policy as regards using nuclear energy in the Philippines.

In this context, this paper will provide a brief historical sketch of the Philippines attempt to use nuclear energy. It will also highlight the Philippine government’s policies that relate to nuclear energy use. Furthermore, it will identify and describe the various government instrumentalities that are concerned with use of nuclear energy. It will also provide a short description of the country’s first nuclear power plant, and its technical and geographical features. In addition, it will discuss the various issues surrounding the said plant including the public’s perception regarding some issues related to the nuclear power plant.

This paper concludes that while the country may indeed need nuclear energy to support its industrialization and that technically, it may be possible to have nuclear power plants that can be safely operated in the country, their eventual operation and the Philippines’ use of nuclear energy will still depend on the public’s acceptance and approval of the construction, operation and use of nuclear power plants.

BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PHILIPPINES’ ATTEMPT TO USE NUCLEAR ENERGY

The Philippines’ attempt to use nuclear energy started in June 13,1958 with the passage of Republic Act 2067 known as "The Philippine Science Act of 1958." This Act created the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and empowered it to "conduct or cause the research and development of, among others, processes, materials and devices used in the production of atomic energy."

Throughout the 1960s, the Philippine government requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for assistance in examining the prospects and feasibility of using nuclear energy in the country. After the studies conducted by the Philippine Government in collaboration with the IAEA, the Philippine Congress passed on June 15, 1968 Republic Act 5207 known as the "Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968." This law gave PAEC the power to issue license for the construction, possession or operation of any atomic energy facility in the Philippines.

On June 23, 1971, President Marcos issued Administrative Order No. 293 that set up a Coordinating Committee for Nuclear Power Study (CCNPS). This Committee was to prepare the initial work for a new and updated feasibility study. On September 10 of that same year, the Charter of the National Power Corporation (NPC) was revised with the enactment of RA 6395. This Act authorized the NPC to "construct, operate and maintain power plants for the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources." Consequently, in 1972, the CCNPS undertook a second feasibility study with assistance from the UN Development Programme.

In 1973 and 1974, evaluation and selection of the best site for the plant and discussions on the appropriate type of reactor, respectively were undertaken. It was decided that a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) was more appropriate. Thus, in 1976, a contract for the nuclear power plant was signed between the NPC and Westinghouse Electric Corporation that manufactures PWR. An estimate as to the construction cost of the power plant was placed at US$1.1 billion. During that same year, NPC filed an application for a provisional permit to start groundwork for the nuclear power plant with PAEC and was subsequently granted one. In the following year (1977), NPC filed an application for a construction permit for the nuclear power plant with PAEC and was also granted one. Also on that same year, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1206 that created the Ministry of Energy and attached the NPC to this new agency.

Unfortunately, construction work on the nuclear power plant was stopped in June 1979 after the Three Mile Island incident. A commission was formed to look into the plant’s safety. Consequently, after five months of inquiry, the Commission recommended that additional safety upgrades be incorporated in the original design of the plant. Construction work resumed in September 1980. The inclusion of additional safety upgrades in the plant design lengthened the construction timetable by an additional 18 months and increased the cost of construction to around US$1.95 billion.

In 1985, the nuclear power plant was finally completed and the first batch of nuclear fuel was delivered. However, in 1986 with the assumption to power of the Aquino Administration, the nuclear power plant was mothballed. Afterwards, the Philippine Government set up a Presidential Committee on Philippine Nuclear Power Plant. The Committee subsequently filed a lawsuit against Westinghouse on charges of bribery of President Marcos in connection with the plant’s contract.

Meanwhile, in 1987, President Aquino issued Executive Order 128, which reorganized the government and reconstituted PAEC as the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute under the Department of Science and Technology.

On March 4, 1992, the Philippine Government under the Aquino Administration and Westinghouse entered into a compromise agreement. Under this agreement, Westinghouse would upgrade and refurbish the plant over a three-year period at a cost of US$400 million and operate the plant for up to 30 years. In return, Westinghouse will be paid a management fee of US$40 million a year and .029 US cents for every kilowatt-hour generated by the plant. Westinghouse would also pay the Philippines US$10 million in cash and US$75 million in discounts on the upgrade and credits on non-nuclear-related equipment for the Philippines’ power development program. However, these efforts failed.

In 1992, Congress passed Republic Act 7638 or the Department of Energy Act of 1992 titled "An Act Creating the Department of Energy Rationalizing the Organization and Functions of Government Agencies Related to Energy and for other Purposes." The DOE comes up with Philippine Energy Plans, the most recent of which is the Philippine Energy Plan 1998-2035.

On May 1995, President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 243 that created the Nuclear Power Steering Committee (NPSC). The NPSC was to "provide policies, directions, evaluation, and other functions necessary and appropriate to attain the objectives of the overall nuclear power program, and to prepare action plans, work programs and proposed timetables."

In November 1997, the Philippine Government approved the BNPP’s "integrated conversion into alternative utilization for power generation using natural gas." In more specific terms, the BNPP is to be converted into a combined gas cycle plant. The unspent uranium fuel was subsequently shipped out in December 1997 to its buyer, Siemens Power Corporation in the US.

POLICIES RELATED TO ENERGY AND NUCLEAR ENERGY USE

Section 2 of the Declaration of Policy of the Department of Energy Act of 1992 states that:

"It is hereby declared the policy of the State: (a) to ensure a continuous, adequate and economic supply of energy with the end view of ultimately achieving self-reliance in the country’s energy requirements, through the integrated and intensive exploration, production, management and development of the country’s indigenous energy resources, and through the judicious conservation, renewal and efficient utilization of energy to keep pace with the country’s growth and economic development and taking into consideration the active participation of the private sector in the various areas of energy resource-development; and (b) to rationalize, integrate and coordinate the various programs of the government towards self-sufficiency and enhance productivity in power and energy without sacrificing ecological concerns."

Based on this, more specific policy thrusts have been formulated. These include the following:

The policy of achieving self-reliance through indigenous sources of energy can pave the way for the eventual use of nuclear energy. As argued by proponents of using nuclear energy, it is a cheap and to a certain extent renewable source of energy as the plutonium from spent fuel rods can be reprocessed and reused as fuel for nuclear power plants. Thus, using nuclear energy can decrease the country’s dependence on imported oil.

In addition, the Philippine Energy Plan for 1998-2035 prepared by the Department of Energy envisions that nuclear power shall provide 600MW of electricity in the 2021-2025 period.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY

The Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)/The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI)

PAEC was created through Republic Act 2067 or "The Philippine Science Act of 1958." It was tasked to "conduct or cause the research and development of … processes, materials and devices used in the production of atomic energy."

With the government reorganization in 1987 under the Aquino Administration, PAEC was reconstituted as the PNRI. As an institute, the PNRI is now under the Department of Science and Technology. It is mandated to "undertake research and development activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to institute regulations on the said uses and to carry out the enforcement of said regulations to protect the health and safety of radiation workers and the general public."

Just like PAEC, the PNRI is in-charge of both the promotion of nuclear energy and the regulation of its use. It is the regulatory body for all matters that pertain to nuclear energy in the Philippines with its Nuclear Regulations, Licensing and Safeguards Division (NRLSD) as the regulatory arm. However, there is a growing view among experts that promotion and regulation of nuclear energy should not be the responsibility of one agency. An agency tasked with promoting the use of nuclear energy may not be in a good position to regulate the use of this source of energy.

With respect to its regulatory role, the PNRI is empowered to perform the following functions:

The Nuclear Power Steering Committee

As previously mentioned, the NPSC was created through EO 243 issued by President Ramos on May 1995. Through the NPSC, the Philippine Government has once again reconsidered the option to use nuclear power.

The NPSC is a multi-agency body headed by the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) with the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Department of Justice (DOJ), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Office of the Press Secretary (OPS), National Power Corporation (NPC), Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) and the Office of the President (OP) as members.

It has eight sub-committees namely: siting study, NPC; radioactive waste management, PNRI; nuclear-related legislation, DOJ; nuclear manpower development, DOST; nuclear power public education and information, DECS-CHED; research and development programs on nuclear safety and nuclear fuel cycles, PNRI; feasibility study on nuclear power plant operation, NPC; and feasibility studies on nuclear reactor design alternatives, NPC.

To date, the NPSC has conducted the first Nuclear Power Seminar where policy and technical issues were discussed. It has also conducted summer training courses for secondary education teachers on "Strengthening Nuclear Science in Secondary Education." Most importantly, it has submitted a report on 10 potential sites for the establishment of a nuclear power plant in the Philippines.
 
THE BATAAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (BNPP)

Technical and Geographical Features

The BNPP is a 620 MW nuclear facility located in Napot Point, Morong, Bataan overlooking the South China Sea. It is constructed at a site 18 meters above sea level. It is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) type of plant. As a PWR-type plant, its operation is described as follows:

"Water under high pressure circulates through the reactor core to absorb the heat generated by the nuclear reactions. When the heated water (primary coolant) passes through the steam generator, the secondary coolant boils and steam is generated. The steam drives the turbine that runs the electric generator. The steam passing through the turbine gives up heat to the tertiary coolant, which is water from the sea. The steam changes to water and goes back to the steam generator."

Issues Surrounding the BNPP

According to the report of the Fact-Finding Mission on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant undertaken by the Multisectoral Task Force on Power Scheduling, the issues surrounding the BNPP can be categorized as those that concern: (1) safety, (2) economic viability, and (3) corruption charges against the contractors and suppliers of the plant’s equipments on the one hand, and against the Marcos Administration on the other hand.

This Fact-finding Mission constituted in 1992 pointed out that as regards the plant’s safety of operation, most of the technical questions regarding these matters "can be addressed through a prudent and diligent refurbishing and upgrade program of the plant and a comprehensive and continuous training program for the plant’s personnel and that of the PNRI."

It also pointed out that the plant’s siting and seismic criteria of its design provide for a safe operation of the plant. Bataan is the best possible site for the plant as argued by both local and international (IAEA) experts. The plant has also been designed to withstand an earthquake up to 0.4g of acceleration while the strongest earthquake that can hit the area could only generate up to 0.35g ground acceleration.

It is protected from any lava flows that may come from a dormant, but maybe active, volcano, Mt. Natib because it sits on a high ground (18 meters above sea level) and is surrounded by deep valleys. Furthermore, its 18 meters above sea level location protects it from tidal waves, the highest one to hit the area being only 16 meters in height.

The Mission also pointed out that the plant design and equipment provide for a safe operation of the BNPP. Its fuel is a low-enriched uranium which is non-explosive while the spent fuel to be generated during the plant’s 30 year operation can be stored in the plant’s storage space which can readily accommodate all the spent fuel.

As regards the plant’s decommissioning after its expected 30 years of operation, the Mission was optimistic that over 400 decommissioning experiences from nuclear power plants that are currently in operation will provide the Philippines with the best available technology for this undertaking.

With regard to the commercial viability of the BNPP, the Mission argued that nuclear power "represents a significant savings over the lifetime" of other plants (gas turbine, coal, combined cycle and oil). It estimated that operating BNPP could generate a savings from "a low of P1.06 billion for geothermal to a high of P3.6 billion for gas turbines annually." It also pointed that nuclear energy is generally cheaper and more stable over longer periods of time compared to other fuels.

Those that oppose the operation of the BNPP, however, argue otherwise. Professor Roland Simbulan of the University of the Philippines (Manila) who serves as the chairperson of the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC) pointed out that it is not safe to operate the BNPP.

For one, contrary to the government’s argument, a strong earthquake around the plant’s location could cause ground acceleration at the plant’s site of up to 0.53g while the plant is only designed to withstand ground acceleration of 0.4g.

He also argued that as pointed out by the National Union of Scientists Corporation composed of 50 scientists from different countries including the US that was commissioned by the Philippine government to provide a technical audit in 1986, 1988 and 1990 on the BNPP, the plant has "serious defects" in its "cover design, construction, quality assurance, workmanship and project management" that were never addressed by Westinghouse. He warned that the BNPP is a man-made disaster.

Simbulan also argued that the government is being overly optimistic in terms of projected savings when the plant is made operational. He cautions that the figures provided by the government such as the US$1.1 billion savings over a 30-year period of operation fails to include the cost of insurance, training, permanent disposal of nuclear wastes, decommissioning, emergency planning and accidents.

While the Fact-finding mission did not touch upon the issue of corruption on the plant’s construction, Simbulan argued that the BNPP was constructed under a "conspiracy of corruption." It was a conspiracy among Westinghouse, Mr. Marcos and his crony Herminio Disini. The BNPP is an overpriced, unsafe plant and one that has left the Filipinos with US$2.2 billion of debt.

Public Opinion on the BNPP

In the 1992 National Survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations, almost half (48%) of the respondents were aware of the BNPP. In terms of the respondents’ geographical location, awareness was greater in urban centers (63%) than in rural areas (32%). Furthermore, awareness was low in rural Visayas (29%) and rural Mindanao (23%).

In terms of the people’s perceptions as to the safety of operating the plant, it is interesting to note that a slight majority (52%) viewed the plant as being unsafe. It also appeared that upper classes were more apprehensive with 54% of class ABC being apprehensive of the plant’s safety compared to 52% of class D and 46% for class E. Male respondents (55%) were more skeptical as to the safety of operating the plant as compared to female respondents (48%). It is also interesting to note that the younger respondents were more apprehensive as regards the issue of safely operating the plant. Sixty-two percent (62%) of the youth (18-24 yrs. old) believed that the plant was unsafe while only 52% of the intermediate young (25-34 yrs. old) and 44% of the older respondents (45 yrs. and older) believed so. Respondents in Metro Manila were more apprehensive (60%) about the operation of the plant as compared to other locales.

One-third (33%) of the respondents were also aware that Westinghouse was the contractor in building the BNPP. Of these respondents, almost two-thirds (67%) were also aware of the out-of-court settlement between the government and Westinghouse. Furthermore, a third (36%) agreed with the settlement while almost a third (30%) disagreed. Class ABC (37%) as compared to class D and E (29% and 25%) was more disapproving while those aged 25-34 (23%) were least disapproving as compared to those aged 18-24 (32%), 35-44 (31%) and 45 & above (37%).

More than half (51%) of the respondents also believed that Westinghouse bribed President Marcos. The higher class (ABC) was more convinced (64%) that Westinghouse bribed President Marcos as compared to classes D and E (47% and 49%) respectively. Those living in urban centers (55%) believed that Marcos was indeed bribed as compared to those living in rural areas (39%).
 
 

CONCLUSION

The Philippines’ initial attempt to use nuclear energy and operate a nuclear power plant to support its development was not fruitful because of several factors. These factors include technical questions regarding the safe operation of the nuclear power plant, political considerations such as the Aquino Administration’s decision to mothball the nuclear power plant as the lady president promised in her election campaign, and public opinion against the use of nuclear energy and operation of a nuclear power plant.

The public’s apprehension against using the nuclear power plant resulted from nuclear accidents abroad such as the Three Mile Island Incident of 1979 and the Chernobyl Accident of 1986. Furthermore, the people questioned that safety of operating the BNPP because of their perception that its technical and geographical features did not provide for a safe operation. Worse, the people believe that the plant was constructed under a conspiracy of corruption between former President Marcos and Westinghouse that resulted to an overpriced yet unsafe nuclear power plant.

More recently, the government, in particular the Ramos Administration has once again renewed the government’s interest in using nuclear energy in the country. It has created the Nuclear Power Steering Committee to examine the prospects and viability of using nuclear energy in the Philippines. However, while the country may indeed need nuclear energy to support its industrialization and that technically, it may be possible to have nuclear power plants that can be safely operated in the country, their eventual operation and the Philippines’ use of nuclear energy will still depend on the public’s acceptance and approval of the construction, operation and use of nuclear power plants.
 

Selected Bibliography

Aleta, Carlito A. "Nuclear Science and Technology: Perspectives and Prospects for Philippine Development." In Elvira Z. Sombrito, Rhodora R. Leonin, Ma. Teresa Yulo-Nazarea, editors. Challenges of Nuclear Technology for the 21st Century (Proceedings of the 2nd Philippine Nuclear Congress, December 10-12, 1996). Quezon City: PNRI, 1997. Pp. 27-37.

Arroyo, Dennis P. "Public Opinion on Issues regarding the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant," Social Weather Bulletin 92-16, August 1992.

International Atomic Energy Agency. "Country Nuclear Safety Profile: Philippines." (Unpublished).

Interview with Alumanda M. Dela Rosa, Acting Director, Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, PNRI Complex, Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, May 3, 1999.

Multi-sectoral Task Force on Power Scheduling. Report of Fact-finding Mission on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant. Makati City: Multisectoral Task on Power Scheduling, [1992].

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute 1997 Annual Report.

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. "Brief on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant." (Unpublished).

Pollard, Robert. More Facts on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Quezon City: Third World Studies Program, CSSP, UP, [1981].

Salcedo, Ben-hur C. "Nuclear Power: A Strategic Option in the Philippine Energy Plan." In Elvira Z. Sombrito, Rhodora R. Leonin, Ma. Teresa Yulo-Nazarea, editors. Challenges of Nuclear Technology for the 21st Century (Proceedings of the 2nd Philippine Nuclear Congress, December 10-12, 1996). Quezon City: PNRI, 1997. Pp. 195-196.

Simbulan, Roland G. These Outrageous Outages. Quezon City: National Council of Churches in the Philippines, [1992].

University of the Philippines – Institute for Science and Mathematics Education Development (ISMED). Nuclear Power: Pros and Cons. Quezon City: ISMED, 1984.